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Äýiýiiýiüi8iAi 1111I III ff This thesis is an exploration of several themes in the work of Aristotle and 
Hegel concerning the nature of action and ethics, and discusses the issues 
raised in relation to modern moral philosophy. The thesis takes as its starting 
point both Aristotle's and Hegel's conception of rational, purposive human 
action as being central to ethics and morality. This is carried out in contrast to 
influential trends in modern moral philosophy regarding the nature of reason 
and desire. Part one considers Hegel's view of the task of philosophy, i. e. the 
assimilation and reflection of the particular subject matter of which it speaks, 
rather than abstract theoretical thinking. The discussion will highlight that 
many of the problems raised in the rationalist/empiricist debates of the 17th 
and 18th Centuries are due to the abstract nature of those discussions, and to 
attempts to assimilate the subject matter to primary assumptions about 
reason, experience and the individual. In particular, the metaphysics of mind 
and the epistemology that the debate involved, it will be claimed, draws a 
hard and fast distinction between reason and desire. This has led to abstract 
theories of reasoning and motivation. 
One particular consequence of abstract, theoretical thinking is that the 
conceptual language of debate becomes divorced from the subject matter 
under discussion. In particular, the cluster of concepts that form the basis of 
the philosophy of mind, action, ethics - reason, desire, motive, intention, 
purpose, etc. - become refined and specialised to a degree that they come to 
bear only a vague resemblance to the reasons, etc. that are features of 
actual (as opposed to theoretical) human conduct. In Part Two of the thesis, I 
will offer a contrasting perspective, discussing Aristotle's and Hegel's 
treatment of these concepts without the theoretical framework inherited from 
17th and 18th Century metaphysics and epistemology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the place of Action in ethics, and to 
trace what has been a particularly influential trend in modern moral 
philosophy back to its roots in 17th and 18th century metaphysics and 
epistemology. ' I shall argue that this trend rests on an abstract 
distinction between reason and desire, a distinction fundamental to the 
thought of (amongst others) Descartes, Hume and Kant. Furthermore, 
it will be argued that this distinction serves only to divorce morality from 
its basis in human conduct, rendering morality as a sphere of abstract 
conceptions of formal reasoning and yielding only equally abstract and 
formal rules and principles which, under close scrutiny, can be seen to 
bear little resemblance to what actually goes on in human conduct. 
Action, on the other hand, stripped of its intrinsically rational content, a 
1 It is necessary to explain the use of the capital in 'Action'. In Principia Ethica Moore 
sets out by "... considering what is good in general; hoping, that if we can arrive at any 
certainty about this, it will be much easier to settle the question of good conduct; for 
we all know pretty well what 'conduct' is" (Cambridge, 1922, p. 3). That (human) 
conduct is a clear-cut matter in philosophical discussions seems to me to be 
mistaken, and there is plenty of evidence in recent and current debates to 
substantiate this. This is not the place to argue the point here, but this much can be 
said: both Aristotle and Hegel were quite specific in what they understood by rational 
human Action, and specific in the way they were intended to be understood by their 
respective readers. As we shall come to see, one of the main factors in their view of 
Action is that it does not rest on a fundamental distinction between reason and 
desire. 
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content given over to abstract formal reasoning, finds explanation in 
psychologistic conceptions of desire motivation. As an antidote and 
corrective to this, within the ethical considerations of Aristotle and 
Hegel, morality remains a sphere of practical activity as opposed to a 
sphere of abstract and theoretical deliberation, precisely because of 
the lack of such a fundamental distinction between reason and desire 
in those considerations. 
The thesis is divided into two main sections. Part One will concentrate 
on Hegel's discussion of his philosophic predecessors and 
contemporaries, concentrating on what he considered to be their 
formal, abstract and one-sided reasonings. This one-sidedness will be 
seen in treatments of reason, will, law, freedom and mind that take 
them out of their context of practical activity - their sphere of concrete 
expression - and thus render them formal and abstract. 
In Part Two I shall consider modern treatments of Action in relation to 
particular areas of moral debate, showing how abstract conceptions of 
reason and desire often create the very problems that are being 
addressed. That is to say, it is often particular ways of thinking that 
create the difficulties and problems within many areas of ethical 
debate. In doing so I employ Aristotle's conception of Action which 
emphasises reason, desire, character, choice and ethical notions of 
the good and the worthwhile - the conceptual content of Action - as 
features of practical activity, rather than as abstract and formal 
features that can be captured extraneously in attempts to explain 
human conduct. One upshot of this is that attempts to explain Action 
3 
by methods of abstract reasoning begin to look peculiar, in that when 
we consider this conceptual content as phenomenological features of 
human conduct, questions such as `What moves us to Action? ' 
become redundant. The theories of motivation that such questions 
provoke will then form some concluding considerations. 
Firstly though, in this introductory essay I shall give an outline of what 
has been an influential trend in modern moral philosophy. I do this here 
because the main body of the thesis does not aim to establish or yield 
a particular moral outlook or theory. Rather its aim is to question 
certain conceptual assumptions that lie behind the very project of 
establishing or yielding particular normative moral outlooks or theories. 
However, this does not mean to say that I am wholly sceptical about 
normative ethics per se, for, as we shall see, the later part of the 20th 
century has seen developments in ethical debate which very much 
take their point of departure from the considerations with which this 
thesis is concerned. 
Moral Theory, Reasoning and Morality 
In the preface to his Moral Luck, Bernard Williams gives us a brief and 
clear statement on the scepticism about morality that is characteristic 
of much of his work. I shall quote him at some length as he brings out 
several points with which this thesis will be concerned. He says: 
am more than ever convinced that what it [moral 
philosophy) does not need is a theory of its own. There 
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cannot be any very interesting, tidy or self-contained 
theory of what morality is, nor, despite the vigorous 
activities of some present practitioners, can there be an 
ethical theory in the sense of a philosophical structure 
which, together with some degree of empirical fact, will 
yield a decision procedure for moral reasoning. This latter 
undertaking has never succeeded, and could not 
succeed, in answering the question, by what right does it 
legislate to the moral sentiments? The abstract and 
schematic conceptions of `rationality' which are usually 
deployed in this connection do not even look as though 
they were relevant to the question - so soon, at least, as 
morality is seen as something whose real existence must 
consist in personal experience and social institutions, not 
in sets of propositions. 2 
The main problem raised here is that Williams casts severe doubts on 
the enterprise of constructing moral theories, a scepticism with which I 
am much in agreement, throwing up as it does a series of subsidiary 
difficulties and questions. There is a difficulty of definition. Throughout 
history philosophers have attempted to produce tidy or self-contained 
theories, constructed around one or more principles, rules or canons. 
But either by criticism of particular criteria or by way of whole 
competing theories, individual examples and arguments have been 
2 Moral Luck (Cambridge, 1981) pp. ix-x. Williams goes on to express a similar 
scepticism towards morality "... in its supposed existence as a dimension of practical 
thought or social evaluation... " (Ibid. ), a point I shall take up shortly. 
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produced which those criteria or arguments do not cover, and the main 
structures of those theories have had to be adjusted to accommodate 
the problems that arise out of this. 
Utilitarianism is a case in point here, through its different forms in 
Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick and Moore, and distinctions such as 
'hedonistic', 'act', 'rule' and 'negative' utilitarianism, manoeuvres that 
could be seen to give Kant's reference to its 'serpent meanderings' a 
prophetic quality. This sort of adjustment and tinkering raises the 
philosophical, i. e. logical and conceptual, problem as to whether 
morality is the sort of thing that can be tidily captured in a self- 
contained way. Given this, and the variety of competing theories, there 
exists a similar doubt to that raised in connection with the very idea of 
political philosophy: is it not the case that we are being served up a 
series of writers' particular preferences in the form of principles to 
which they give their personal allegiance? 3 And further, if there is a 
theory of obligation involved, then by what authority or (as Williams 
asks) by what right does that theory oblige me or any other individual? 
If it is by rigour of argument, then that argument would have to be of 
such strength that I, or any other individual giving it serious 
consideration, could not but see ourselves obliged in the way indicated 
- providing, of course, that we attend to it with our full 'rationality'. This 
3 Ronald Dworkin, 'Liberty and Pornography' in New York Review of Books, 1991, a 
question (according to Dworkin, no longer relevant) that provoked responses by 
Isaiah Berlin - see his 'Does Political Theory Still Exist? ' and 'Two Concepts of 
Liberty' in The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays (Chatto & Windus, 
1997). 
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is the sort of pellucid, self-evident reason that Kant claimed to be 
involved in the moral law, but this has hardly escaped serious criticism. 
It is this second dimension, the practical dimension, that this thesis will 
primarily focus on, rather than the first, theoretical dimension. This is 
because the concepts that constitute the discussion points of the latter 
have their genesis in the former, and it will be argued that the proper 
significance of those concepts originates in the activities and practices 
that constitute morality as personal experience and social institutions. 
To ignore this vital connection between human activity and ethical 
evaluation leads to abstract and theoretical considerations which, 
together with abstract and schematic conceptions of rationality, creates 
the gulf between the theoretical and practical dimensions to the extent 
that the relevance of the generalised and abstract concepts, and the 
conclusions of the debates employing them, is called into question. 
That is to say, the relevance, aims and the overall propriety of moral 
theory and theories of moral reasoning are called into question. 
Action and Ethics in Aristotle and Hegel 
Aristotle does not give us a clear definition of a tidy or self-contained 
moral theory, although there is the clear line of thought that the best 
life for man is that which is led in accord with the virtues. Over the last 
few decades this has been taken up as an antidote to deontology and 
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utilitarianism, an area of debate that is still developing. 4 Aristotle 
approaches the subject from a different perspective than that of 
definition, giving us a descriptive account of the nature of human 
activity out of which evaluation arises. Ethics for Aristotle being a 
preface to politics, and man being by nature a social and political 
creature, human activity is constitutive of moral and ethical life. Thus, 
Aristotle does not give us a definition of morality in terms of either 
theory or `as a dimension of practical thought or social evaluation', but 
it is clear that he takes morality as personal experience and social 
institutions as given as the natural environment of human beings. It is 
from within this environment that evaluation arises, and such 
evaluation has its basis in human activity. 
Much the same can be said of Hegel. In PR he gives us a description 
of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) for precisely the same reason that it is from 
within this that evaluation takes place. Ethical life is constituted by 
human activity, and thus the details of his description of ethical life are 
considerations of human activity - the latter being the spring, so to 
speak, out of which evaluation arises. Ethical life is not something over 
and above, distinct from, the human activity which constitutes it, the 
concept 'ethical life' having its instantiation, and the particular details of 
its explication, in human activity. Conversely, human activity cannot be 
defined in isolation to ethical life, for a description of aspects of human 
41 shall discuss virtue ethics in brief later in this introduction. For considerations of 
virtue ethics as a moral theory, cf. Gary Watson, 'On the Primacy of Character in 
Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader, ed. Daniel Statman (Edinburgh University Press, 
1997). 
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activity would form part of an explication of ethical life - in more formal 
terms, human activity is the object of the concept of ethical life. 
Thus for Aristotle and Hegel, the existence of a dimension of personal 
experience and social institutions is given, but not as a theoretical 
dimension over and above human activity. Human activity, rather, is 
constitutive of that dimension, human activity that is carried out in 
terms of ethical concepts. Thus, for example, virtue is not a theoretical 
concept that can be defined analytically in isolation from particular 
instances, but a character trait of a person, exemplified in particular 
circumstances. Similarly, good is not a theoretical concept that can be 
defined analytically in isolation from particular instances, but something 
that is brought about by an activity that is an instantiation of it. Whether 
an activity is virtuous or good rests, not on its being assimilated to, or 
fulfilling the requirement of, an abstract conception of 'virtue' or 'good', 
but rather on account of the particular details, conditions and 
circumstances of what is done. 
Without such particularity 'virtue' and 'good' remain abstract notions; 
attempting to define them without such particularity would be akin to 
attempting to explain 'fruit' in isolation from cherries, plums, grapes, 
etc. There is a further point, however. The medical profession 
generally holds that fruit is good for our health, but it is only good for us 
if we eat it, and then only in particular circumstances, to certain 
degrees, at the appropriate time, etc. In a similar way we may produce 
a list of particular characteristics in order to explain virtue - courage, 
honesty, benevolence, etc. But these are not virtuous in themselves. 
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As such they are mere spoken or written words; they are only virtuous 
when someone acts courageously, etc., and only then in relation to the 
particular circumstances of the Action. Here there is a discernible logic: 
'courage', for example, is a particular in relation to the universal 'virtue', 
but courage is not virtuous until it has been individually instanced. In 
other words, it is the logic of the Action, and its particular and individual 
details and circumstances that accommodates its description as 
virtuous, good, moral, ethical, etc., and not the logic or theory of 
abstract notions of virtue, good, morality, ethics, etc. that define 
virtuous, etc. Actions. 
One of the benefits of adopting G. E. M. Anscombe's call5 to abandon 
the use of 'moral obligation', 'moral duty' and 'morally ought', and to 
replace 'morally wrong' with 'untruthful', 'unchaste', 'unjust', etc., is 
precisely because judgements employing such terms aim to get 
directly to the particularity of the Action under consideration. Moreover, 
it indicates that attempts to construct elaborate theories on the 
specifically moral 'ought' and 'obligation', to come up with definitions of 
the good and the right, and models of moral reasoning, are misguided. 
A judgement that something was unjust directs us towards the 
particular characteristics of the specific Action under consideration, 
whereas to seek general theories of obligation, definitions of the good 
and right, and models of moral reasoning are moves that direct us in 
the opposite direction precisely because of their generalisations. This 
is why, I take it, Anscombe suggests that time would be better spent 
5 'Modem Moral Philosophy', in Ethics, Religion and Politics (Blackwell, 1981). 
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looking at Action, intention, wanting, etc., the primary considerations of 
Aristotle and Hegel in their discussions of ethics. 
Reason, Language, and the Morality of Principles 
One of the main arguments of the thesis is that there is one particular 
strand of modern philosophy that - consciously or unconsciously - 
takes as its starting point an unquestioned assumption that goes back 
to Descartes, Hume and Kant. This is the idea that reason and desire 
are distinct phenomena, that they operate on separate planes. For 
Descartes, reason is that on which, by its correct employment, "the 
supreme felicity of man depends". 6 The passions, on the other hand, 
being irrational effects on the soul being acted upon by the body and 
the main obstacle to the rational and good life, "... often represent to us 
the goods to whose pursuit they impel us as being much greater than 
they really are". 7 Hume says that the separate offices of reason and 
passion are clearly ascertained. 8 For Kant, "... man actually finds in 
himself a power which distinguishes him from all other things - and 
even from himself so far as he is affected by objects. This power is 
reason". 9 In modern moral debates reason is, for many philosophers, 
the arbiter of the good and the right, an external and impersonal power 
6 Descartes: Philosophical Letters, V. A. Kenny (Blackwell, 1980) 166. 
7 Ibid., 173. 
8 Enquiries (Oxford, 1975, Yd ed), p. 294. 
9 The Moral Law, tr. H. J. Paton (Hutchinson, 1976 reprint), p. 112. 
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transcending the particular wants and desires of individuals. As such, 
this reason supposedly represents the common basis of humanity that 
expresses itself in moral principles, or the working out of the formulae 
of moral principles. 
However, in discussions that focus on moral principles, the distinction 
between morality as a 'dimension of practical thought or social 
evaluation' (as Williams puts it) and as 'personal experience and social 
institutions' becomes ever wider. Not only is the personal taken out of 
morality, but the thinking and language in which it is expressed appear, 
under analysis, to bear little resemblance to how individuals can 
reasonably be said to conduct themselves. On one level, human 
activity comes to have no place in moral debate. On another level, 
hypothetical scenarios are envisaged, even the hypothetical credibility 
of which become extremely stretched by the use of language in the 
arguments that are supposed to show the value of such hypotheses. 
On the surface, it is quite puzzling how it is that Action has been 
allowed to drop out of the picture by so many philosophers engaging in 
ethical debate, leaving that subject as either an altogether different 
area of debate, or as a subsidiary dimension of discourse. It is true 
that, to a degree, Anscombe's call has been taken up, and following on 
from the work of Foot, the last few decades have seen the rise of virtue 
ethics as an approach to morality, emphasising Aristotle's claim that 
virtue consists of the 'complete harmony' of reason and desire (NE 
I102b28). But this has taken some time to develop. I say on the 
surface it is puzzling how Action has been allowed to drop out of the 
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picture, for it is clear, with a little scrutiny of the conception and use of 
language and reason by certain writers, how it is that Action can fall 
out. And, indeed, how it is in some cases a requirement in order to 
maintain certain theoretical positions. 
The Language of Morality 
In The Language of Morals R. M. Hare says: "Ethics, as I conceive it, 
is the logical study of the language of morals". ") One general 
observation on this concentration on the meaning of words is that it 
leads to some puzzling reading. For example, in Chapter Six he asks 
us to consider teaching English to a foreign philosopher, in the highly 
unlikely circumstances that he deliberately or inadvertently makes all 
the mistakes that he logically can, and that he knows no English and 
we know nothing of his language. In teaching him to become 
conversant with the meaning of the word 'red', we proceed to give 
ostensive examples of such things as pillar-boxes, tomatoes and trains 
- some red some not. 
This is highly unlikely in that it is difficult to see why (deliberately) or 
how (inadvertently) someone would make all the mistakes he logically 
could and, even given that we know nothing of each other's language, 
10 The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952), p. iii. See also Hare's 'Ethical Theory and 
Utilitarianism' in Utilitarianism and Beyond ed. Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams 
(Cambridge, 1977): "It is the object of this paper to show how a theory about the 
meaning of the moral words can be the foundation of normative moral reasoning". (p. 
24. ). 
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why we would not first look for a way to translate colour words. In this 
case, we would merely point to the translation word, and if we were to 
then show him, say, a pillar-box, surely that would be an exercise in 
showing him where to post his letters. As in the example of his reading 
of Aristotle on deductive inference, Hare does not take into account 
that communication is an activity. That is to say, apart from its formal 
elements or particular forms - talking, speaking, writing, gesturing, 
colour-coding, etc. - it serves a function, purpose, etc., and what is 
meant in the use of words, signs, symbols, particular gestures etc. 
cannot be accounted for without reference to the function, purpose, 
etc. of the particular act of communication. Even if we do accept the 
unlikely, abstract scenario for the sake of argument, the view of 
language that follows is highly suspect. Indeed, it very much appears 
to be that this view of language underpins the scenario. 
The abstract nature of this view comes over more fully in Hare's 
concentration on the 'logical behaviour' of sentences and, more 
specifically, the 'logical behaviour' of the term 'ought'. Ultimately it is 
this 'logical behaviour' that ethics rests on, for in deciding on the 
principle 'One ought to do XI am logically committed to the imperative 
that is entailed, 'Let me do K. Two points arise out of this. 
Firstly, Action plays no role in this account; indeed, it is dismissed in 
the preface, for such issues as the will and akrasia are "problems of 
the language of the psychology of morals, rather than the language of 
14 
morals itself'. " It comes out in the later Freedom and Reason that if I 
sincerely hold a particular principle then, logically, I cannot fail to act on 
it - such a failure would only throw into question my sincerity. 12 
The second point relates to Anscombe's concern. In `deciding' to adopt 
a particular principle, I am then logically compelled to the imperative 
that is entailed by that. 13 Thus (to use Anscombe's example), it is open 
to me to decide to adopt the principle not to punish the innocent. 
However, it is still open to me to make a new 'decision of principle' 
that, "in such-and-such circumstances one ought to procure the judicial 
condemnation of the innocent", 14 and I will thus be compelled, logically, 
to do so. Despite the logical compulsion that is supposed to be 
involved in this, it is difficult to see why this does not make morality 
arbitrary, despite his protestations to the contrary: I can decide to act 
how I like, so long as I make a decision of principle before doing so. 15 
The emphasis that Hare puts on decisions rests on his observation 
that, ultimately, "... we cannot get out of being men". '6 In Freedom and 
" The Language of Morals, p. iv. 
'2 For a full discussion, see C. C. W. Taylor's 'Critical notice of R. M. Hare's Freedom 
and Reason' in Mind, 1965. 
13 1 shall discuss the importing of logical compulsion into accounts of Action in 
Chapter Six. 
14 Anscombe, op. cit p. 42. 
'S The words of Hegel, discussing certain doctrines of his day, are apposite here: 
"... thereby ethics is reduced to the special theory of life held by the individual and to 
his private conviction". PR, #140. In a similar vein, Alasdair Maclntyre has pointed 
out that, as an attempt to get away from the emotivism entailed by the naturalistic 
fallacy Hare's position doesn't get us very far. See After Virtue (Duckworth, 1982), p. 
20. 
'6 The Language of Morals, p. 162. 
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Reason, responding to a criticism of Maclntyre's, 17 Hare likens his 
position to Sartre's in Existentialism and Humanism. 18 Here, Sartre 
says that as individuals we are responsible for our own Actions and, in 
a sense, for the world we live in due to the fact that our Actions help to 
create the human world. Sartre's point is summed up in his statement, 
in the earlier Being and Nothingness, that "... we are condemned to be 
free". 19 That is to say, ultimately we must choose to act or not to act, 
and it is this responsibility that is the constant feature of our existence. 
Hare says: "Sartre is... as much of a universalist as I am". 20 
But Hare is confusing the point that Sartre is making here. For the 
latter, the 'must', in saying that we must act or not act, is descriptive 
and is intended to point out a fact of our existence. And this for Sartre 
indicates the very problem of morality: 'must' does not have imperative 
force, i. e. it does not have the necessity of the descriptive 'must'; when 
faced with a decision between possible Actions, I must do something 
(even if it is 'to do' nothing), but it is not the case that I must do this or 
do that. To think this would be a case of bad faith, a case of denying 
my freedom, and if I decide (as in Sartre's example) to take care of my 
sick mother rather than fight for my country, I am not committing myself 
to the principle `Family comes before country', for if a similar situation 
arises again in the future, I still have to make a new choice. To say, 
"'What Morality is Not', Philosophy 1957. 
to Tr. Philip Mairet (Methuen 1973). 
19 Tr. Hazel E. Barnes (Methuen, 1969) p. 439. 
20 Freedom and Reason (Oxford, 1963), p. 38. For a discussion on the argument 
between Macintyre and Hare with regard to Sartre, see W. H. Hudson, Modern Moral 
Philosophy (Macmillan 1983,2nd edition), pp. 217-23. 
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"Well, I have already committed myself to 'family before country' so I 
must act thus" would again to be in bad faith with the imperative use of 
the 'must'. If on this occasion I act differently, even if there are 
different sorts of considerations it would be peculiar - and a case of 
bad faith - to call this a new decision of principle. Given this, it is 
difficult to understand Hare's use of the word 'principle', other than 
perhaps concluding that he thinks that it is doing a job of work (due to 
its 'moral weight') that it appears not to be doing. 
In such an account of morality the problems that are faced in acting in 
particular situations of conflict are pushed aside by the reliance on 
general principles. In the case of weakness of will, it is a question of 
the sincerity with which the principle is held. 21 In the case of the 
difficulties faced in situations that question our principles, they are 
overcome by new decisions of principles. These two points come 
together in Hare's Moral Thinking, 22 in which he discusses weakness 
of will in terms of 'overriding principles', developed from his earlier 
Freedom and Reason. The problems that arise in particular situations 
are thus explained away by recourse to general considerations of 
principle. But if a person faced with such difficulties, finding the 
situation conflicting with a principle already held, turned to 
considerations of 'overriding principles' and the general nature of 
principles, then surely that would throw up the question of his sincerity. 
21 This has similarities with the Socratic account of Akrasia, only there it is not so 
much that I don't hold the principle sincerely enough, but that I don't truly know the 
right thing to do. I shall discuss this in Chapter Five. 
22 Moral Thinking (Oxford, 1981). See especially, pp. 56-60. 
17 
Now clearly this is a position that Hare, logically and morally, does not 
want to arrive at, something immediately clear from the very project of 
attempting to establish the universal and imperative nature of moral 
judgements, upon which his prescriptivism is based. However, my 
point is this: if we start from abstract and theoretical conceptions - in 
Hare's case a conception of language that disregards its function, 
purpose, etc. - then it is often the case that the conclusions drawn are 
of an abstract nature. 
Here I have concentrated on Hare's conception and use of language. 
He also has some important things to say on moral education and 
social background, which I have not discussed. Briefly, Hare says that 
much of the time we are affirming a moral principle that is already 
there, "... if our fathers and grandfathers for unnumbered generations 
have all agreed to in subscribing to it, and no one can break it without 
a feeling of compunction bred in him by years of education". 23 This is 
the descriptive force, which moral judgements acquire, and this we 
might say is Hare's referring to morality as 'personal experience and 
social institutions'. The move to prescriptivism comes in that in 
subscribing to it I am making a moral judgement, and this is the 
prescriptive force based upon what Hare sees as its universalizability: 
in saying °I ought to XI am logically committed to 'Anyone in the 
same position ought to X. Thus the principles that are the basis of our 
moral judgements, even in the first person, do not involve individual 
reference. 
23 The Language of Morals, p. 195. 
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As is well known, Hare standardly insists on the 'impartiality' of moral 
principles, 24 something expressed when I imagine myself in another's 
position and thus identifying with them. But Hare confuses a point in 
his discussion. This identification, Hare claims, is what Aristotle found 
to be the essence of love, referring to the latter's discussion of 
friendship at NE 1166a32 and 1169b7. Aristotle, however, is describing 
what he takes to be the basis of love and friendship, and not a 
prescriptive act of identifying with someone other than oneself. As an 
act of identifying there would surely be something insincere about such 
'love' or 'friendship'. It in fact looks more like what Aristotle has to say 
about goodwill, which is not the same as the affection of friendship 
"... because it is without intensity and desire... and [the] kindly feeling is 
superficial" (NE 1167a1-3). In claiming that Aristotle is being 
descriptive here I am also claiming that what he says is a reflection of 
an aspect of morality as 'personal experience and social institutions', 
and not the result of practical thought or social evaluation that satisfies 
certain criteria of moral reasoning. Of course, Aristotle clearly does see 
love and friendship as a good thing, but it is not something we can just 
go about doing because it is a good thing. Here moral debate is 
anchored in morality as personal experience and social institutions, 
and not as a dimension of practical thought and social evaluation 
based on an abstract and schematic conception of rationality. 
24 For example, in Moral Thinking he tells us that it is a "... formal logical rule that 
individual references cannot occur in the principles which are the basis of our moral 
judgements" (p. 154) and that '. .. morality admits no relevant difference between 
'I' 
and 'he'... ' (p. 223). 
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This element of impartiality has, in the last few decades, taken on a 
stronger form than Hare's considerations. Whereas Hare recognises 
the importance of moral education and social background, the trend to 
see morality in terms of contractual relations and hypothetical 
scenarios widens the gulf between moral debate and morality as 
personal existence and social institutions. The widening of the gulf is 
mainly effected by abstract conceptions of rationality and deliberation 
based upon the impartial and the impersonal, and the width of the gulf 
throws into question the worth and, what is more, the very point of 
such exercises. 
Reason, Deliberation and Moral Principles 
In The Claim of Reason Stanley Cavell raises the following question in 
relation to Descartes' discussion of other minds: 
Ought not there ... to 
be an objection to the argument 
from analogy concerning its narcissism. Call the 
argument autological: it yields at best a mind too like 
mine. It leaves out the otherness of the other. 25 
25 The Claim of Reason (Oxford, 1979), p. 395, quoted in Raimond Gaita in 'The 
Personal in Ethics', Attention to Particulars ed. D. Z. Phillips & P. Winch (Macmillan, 
! 989), p. 145. Gaita makes a slightly different point than i do, but the article as a 
whole represents a forceful antidote to the attempt to characterise reason as 
impersonal. In particular, Gaita attacks Thomas Nagel, The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Value 1980 (Cambridge University Press, 1980) and Alan Donagan, The 
Theory of Morality (University of Chicago Press, 1977). 
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But the argument yields something a little more complicated than this. 
Not only does it yield a mind too like mine, it also renders Descartes' 
mind too like mine and all other minds. That is to say, it annihilates all 
otherness per se. This is a consequence of the method of doubt, 
whereby all individual influences, attitudes, experiences, opinions and 
characteristics are excluded, leaving only pure, unadulterated 
reason. 26 
This impersonal view of reason sets the tone for philosophy following 
Descartes. Although Hume clearly views reason differently from 
Descartes, the impersonal finds expression in the former's moral 
philosophy: "The moral agent must depart from his private and 
particular situation"27. Rationality is concerned only with factual or 
logical questions. 28 It gets its most forceful expression in Kant's 
categorical imperative "Act only on that maxim through which you can 
at the same time will that it should become a universal law". 29 Our 
conduct should be based on the fact that we are rational beings rather 
than our being individuals. Hare's universalizability says that a 
statement such as 'I ought not to do X implies 'One ought not to do X. 
That is to say, statements containing 'ought' are not personal 
statements but express general principles. 
Hare's view that there is a basis for independent and neutral moral 
reasoning has been taken up, in various ways, by philosophers who 
26 In Chapter One I shall discuss Descartes' method of doubt more fully. 
27 Enquiries, 222. 
28 A Treatise of Human Nature, 11,3, iii; Ill, 1, i. 
29 The Moral Law, p. 84. 
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argue that removing personal desires and projects from moral 
considerations provides an objective foundation for reason to 
adjudicate on moral value. 30 
Most famously amongst these is John Rawls who, in A Theory of 
Justice, puts a theoretical 'veil of ignorance' over his hypothetical 
citizens that hides their particular interests and circumstances. Thus 
veiled, the citizens would, Rawls contends, adopt rules and principles 
that would form the foundation for a just society. In such a situation, 
The principles of their actions do not depend upon social 
or natural contingencies, nor do they reflect the bias of 
their plan of life or the aspirations that motivate them. By 
acting from these principles persons express their nature 
as free and equal rational beings subject to the general 
conditions of human life. 31 
The contractualism that marks out this particular approach has been 
taken up by T. M. Scanlon, 32 making Alasdair Macintyre's comment of 
1981 still relevant today: 
30 Donagan says: The word 'reason', as it is used here, has a reference that is fixed 
for all possible worlds.... it describes a power correctly to perform acts having 
contents belonging to the domain of logic, for in any possible world, one and the 
same power is referred to by all such descriptions". Op. cit. p. 235. 
31 A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1972), p. 252-3. 
32 T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1999). See 
also his earlier 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism' in Utilitarianism and Beyond ed. 
Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams (Cambridge, 1977), in which he gives an outline of 
his version of contractualism. 
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Such analytical philosophers revived the Kantian project 
of demonstrating that the authority and objectivity of moral 
rules is precisely that authority and objectivity which 
belongs to the exercise of reason. Hence their central 
project was, indeed is, that of showing that any rational 
agent is logically committed to the rules of morality in 
virtue of his or her rationality. 33 
Macintyre, and in particular Bernard Williams, have long argued the 
misconception involved in such de-personalising of ethics, a point I 
shall take up in discussing the importance of character in Chapters 
Four and Five. Here, though, in accordance with one of the main 
features of the present thesis, I shall have a brief look at the language 
and reasoning that is employed by Scanlon in relation to the position 
he adopts. 
In What We Owe to Each Other, and in his 'Intention and 
Permissibility', -` Scanlon discusses moral principles and, in doing so, 
employs what at first seems a peculiar use of language. On closer 
inspection, however, Scanlon's use of language throws up the need for 
a theory of deliberation and judgement. But it turns out that these two - 
the peculiar use of language and the theory of deliberation and 
judgement - are themselves required to support the general moral 
33 After Virtue (Duckworth, 1981), pp. 63-4. 
34 T. M. Scanlon, 'Intention and Permissibility' in Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume 2000. 
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position of contractualism which Scanlon bases on his over-arching 
formula that: 
An act is wrong if its performance under the 
circumstances would be disallowed by any set of 
principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no 
one could reject as a basis for informed, unforced general 
agreement. 35 
This hypothetical rejection is the basis upon which his hypothetical 
contractors search for the general principles that are to govern society. 
What is worrying about the language and theory of deliberation is that 
it gives a peculiar view of human conduct and thought, and in doing so 
questions the overall value of such a theoretical and hypothetical 
exercise. 
Scanlon not only speaks of governance in the general sense of the 
principles that are to govern society; he also says that 'we govern 
ourselves'. 36 There is something very odd about talking like this. It 
suggests that we are in need of being ruled, directed, controlled or 
managed, but that we ourselves do the ruling, directing, etc. 
Philosophical charity might suggest that it is merely clumsy wording. In 
certain contexts it might be taken to be nothing other than a statement 
of autonomy - i. e. 'We are governed by no one but ourselves' - but 
such a context is difficult to see in the way that Scanlon expresses 
35 What We Owe To Each Other, p. 153. 
36'Intention and Permissibility', p. 307. 
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himself. Rather, it is a way of talking that is connected with his view of 
what moral principles are - i. e. "they specify the ways in which agents 
are to go about deciding what to do". 37 Moral principles are directives 
that we consult, as an authority, in a process by which we manage and 
regulate ourselves. It needs to be put in this way - expressed as a 
process - in that principles do not merely tell us what we are to do and 
what not to do, but rather initiate a process by which we are to decide 
what to do. 
There are certainly occasions when it does make sense to say that we 
govern ourselves, occasions when it is perhaps the case that 
individuals control themselves. Aristotle's examples, at the end of Book 
1 of Nicomachean Ethics, of continent acts, in which an agent acts 
according to what he conceives to be the right or good way but against 
the desire to act otherwise, would perhaps be cases of this. Kant might 
also be seen to be saying something similar in his example in the 
Groundwork of the person who, contrary to inclination, nevertheless 
acts out of duty. 38 A more extreme example might be the person jailed 
by an oppressive regime for distributing anti-government literature. 
When questioned by guards it is not just a question of whether to tell 
the truth or not, for even if he lies he needs to consider whether the 
'wrong' lie will result in 'punishment' for either himself or others. Such a 
37 Ibid. 
"8 The Moral Law, p. 64. 
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situation calls for what is, for all but a few, an unimaginable amount of 
self-governance and control. 39 
lt is nevertheless the case that in difficult situations where it is not clear 
what we ought to do, we often need to give consideration to the 
particular circumstances of the situation. This, for Scanlon, requires a 
theory of deliberation and judgement. This requirement arises against 
a background of general principles such as put forward by Scanlon, i. e. 
it is very much a symptom of considering principles to be the basis of 
behaviour. Faced with a difficult case, a person who `governs himself 
by moral principles needs to consider what is to count and what is not 
to count as an exception to his principle, those considerations brought 
about by the particular circumstances of the case. This is a balancing 
operation, but not the balancing between conflicting principles. Rather, 
Scanlon tells us, 
... what we are 
doing in such cases is asking what form 
the relevant principles would have to take if they are to be 
principles that no one could reasonably reject as 
authoritative guides to conduct. We begin from an 
(incompletely specified) idea of a general requirement or 
proposition that we believe meets this test. We then use 
our understanding of the reasoning behind this principle to 
specify it further, determining whether the consideration in 
question would or would not need to be recognised as 
39 1 refer here to the case of the civil rights worker recently (October 2000) released 
by the Burmese authorites. 
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marking out an exception to this general prohibition or 
requirement in order to be one that no one can reasonably 
reject. 40 
Scanlon says that this is his own view of what we are doing in such 
cases. I take it by this that he is saying that this is his way of putting it, 
i. e. even if we are unaware of such a process, or even if we would not 
put it that way ourselves, this is what we are really doing. But it is 
difficult to see how such a thesis could be proved other than by what 
can only be imagined to be an elaborate metaphysical argument of 
some sort that exposes the 'real' nature of deliberation and judgement. 
For the person who doesn't hold this, someone who doesn't 'govern' 
himself by way of moral principles, the problem is not 'balancing' the 
particular circumstances of a difficult case in order to work out - by a 
process of deliberation such as Scanlon suggests - whether they 
constitute an exception to the general principle, thereby establishing a 
more specifically determined principle that will govern his Action. As to 
whether, say, he should keep to his promise, his problem is, rather, 
'Given these circumstances, should I do what I said I would do? ' It is 
often the circumstances that raise considerations, if any, of general 
principles. Ordinarily, the question of whether or not doing what one 
said one would do need not arise for such a person, and that 'keep 
one's promises' never occurs either in his prior thoughts or his own 
retrospective characterisation of his thought and deed. His reason for 
doing what he said he would do may well simply be that he said he 
40 'Intention and Permissibilty', p. 308. 
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would, but that is an explanation of his Action of, e. g. repaying some 
money, and not an appeal or reference to a principle 'Do what you said 
you would do' or 'Keep promises'. We might engage him in a Socratic 
dialogue41 in order to convince him that what he is really saying, or 
what he is logically committed to saying, is that one always ought to 
keep one's promises. But he would be perfectly entitled to respond by 
asking why we have brought the 'ought' into the debate - 'You are 
creating a moral situation on the basis of occasions on which there 
were no moral considerations of what I 'ought' to do, i. e. occasions 
when I did something because I said I would. On those occasions 
considering not doing what I did never arose (and the 'because' here is 
explanatory and not justificatory)'. 
Here, people doing what they said they would do is being recast as a 
moral principle as a result of reflecting on the logical possibility of 
people not doing what they said they would do, but based on examples 
when there were never any considerations of not doing so for the 
persons concerned. Consequently, we end up in the peculiar situation 
whereby it is not the moral principle that determines what is wrong; 
rather it is what is wrong that determines the moral principle. More 
generally, the immoral determines the moral, and not vice versa - it is 
what the bad do that makes the good good. That is to say, it is difficult 
not to see this as nothing more than philosophy creating work for itself 
on the basis of the fact that there are bad people, and that this work 
creates the existence of an arena of moral debate which bears little 
41 1 would say 'pseudo-Socratic' dialogue for reasons that will become clear shortly. 
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relation to morality as 'personal experience and social institutions'. 
This, of course, is not to deny that there are circumstances and 
situations in which good people are faced with moral problems, but this 
is precisely my point: they are moral problems, not logical problems to 
be overcome by theories of deliberation, judgement and reason 
peculiar to abstract thinking. If we were to imagine ourselves in the 
hypothetical scenarios suggested by the likes of Rawls and Scanlon, 
where we 'govern ourselves' by moral principles, then the general 
moral, i. e. rule by which we should 'govern ourselves', would seem to 
be something like 'Watch your back'. Or, as one reviewer of What We 
Owe to Each Other puts it, it all sounds "... a bit like 'Try not to act so 
that you have a complaint against you'" 42 
The examples of Aristotle's continent acts, Kant's unhappy 
philanthropist and the person under duress that I referred, to are 
exceptions when it would make sense to speak of persons as 
governing themselves. Scanlon also talks of exceptions in difficult 
cases. But he does not restrict his theory of deliberation and 
judgement to these cases, but applies it to clear cases also. He says: 
Although it is sometimes unclear whether a certain 
consideration does or does not count as justifying an 
exception to some principle, there are also many cases in 
which it is quite clear to anyone who understands a 
principle whether a consideration justifies an exception or 
not. But it is generally very difficult -I would say often 
42 Simon Blackburn in The New York Times Book Review, February 21" 1999. 
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impossible - to spell out a principle in a way that would 
enable one to decide, without appeal to judgement, even 
these intuitively clear cases. [my emphasis]. 43 
But if it were as clear as Scanlon suggests then such a `consideration' 
would not even arise as a consideration upon which to pass 
judgement. What is worrying in all of this is that quite elaborate 
theories of deliberation and judgement are developed in order to 
establish a central place for moral principles in moral life. What 
happens, in fact, is that the contextual backdrop is no longer moral life, 
but moral debate. Particular examples are developed precisely for 
what they have to offer in support of generalisations, but then those 
generalisations are said to govern the particular cases. In doing this 
the specific features of the debate - moral principles, theories of 
deliberation and judgement - bear less and less resemblance to the 
real cases of moral life, what is going on in our thought and conduct. 
We might say that, as a rule, people do what they say they will do. This 
is not an unreasonable observation to make. But it is quite another 
thing to say that, as a rule, people govern themselves by the moral 
principle 'keep your promises'. 
Moral Theory and Thinking about Moral Problems 
One of the claims that is often made on behalf of moral theory, 
particularly deontological and utilitarian versions, is that one of its most 
43 Intention and Permissibility', p. 308. 
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fundamental points is to provide Action guidance. Thus, for instance, 
an objection common to both camps of virtue ethics is that it doesn't 
provide rules and thus it cannot provide guidance for Action. Again, 
writers who reject general principles, claiming that judgement can only 
be made by a person in the particular situation in which he finds 
himself, are accused of relativism - and, in some cases, it is claimed 
that this is itself a moral position (as opposed to the result of an 
analysis of the nature of moral problems). 44 
The classical problem for rule theorists is to accommodate their 
positions to cases of the conflict of duties, or situations where 
established principles or rules do not yield clear-cut guidance. It is in 
part due to such considerations that writers such as Hare and Scanlon 
talk about the adapting of principles in the face of particular cases. 
Hand in hand with the relatively recent interest in applied ethics, 
theorists have more and more come to use both imaginary and real life 
moral problems and dilemmas in relation to their theoretical positions. 
Whether deontologists, utilitarians or contractualists, the general idea 
is that conceptions of reason and deliberation can show us the 'right 
way' to approach, and in some cases solve, the moral problems that 
are presented by such cases. 
44 See for instance, Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (Oxford University Press, 1997) p. 
vii. 
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Logical Thinking and Moral thinking 
I have argued that such conceptions of reason, deliberation and moral 
systems may contribute to moral debate, but that, due to their abstract 
nature, they do little to contribute to an understanding of the nature of 
the moral problems that confront people in everyday life. Such a 
charge is thus a serious challenge to the claim that discussions along 
these lines can yield Action guidance: if they fail to contribute to an 
understanding of the nature of moral problems, they similarly fail as a 
guide to Action in the face of moral problems. Such conceptions are 
abstract in that they rest on the assumption that reason is somehow 
distinct from feelings, desires, emotions, etc, and that if we apply 
reason and deliberation in such-and-such a way then we can 
overcome or, at least, come to terms with moral difficulties. This 
emphasis on reason and deliberation, however, has lead to confusing 
moral problems with logical problems, the view that so long as we 
reason rightly, then the less will we be afflicted by moral problems. 
Maclntyre succinctly expresses my general view on this: 
... the view 
that I am criticising makes consistency 
between appraisals and principles of conduct a logical 
requirement. That principles should be so consistent is 
built into the meaning of moral words such as 'ought'. But 
the demand for consistency is in fact a moral not a logical 
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requirement. We blame a man for moral inconsistency 
perhaps, but we do not find what he says meaningless. 45 
We shall see in Chapter Four that Aristotle puts emphasis on right 
reason (orthos logos), and it is right reasoning that Socrates is 
concerned to encourage in his fellow debaters in the dialogues. But the 
views I have been discussing view reasoning in logically formal terms, 
whereas for the ancients - and particularly for Aristotle - what is 
sought in ethics is not formal reasoning but reasoning proper to the 
sphere of activity, i. e. moral wisdom or phronesis. The formal view of 
reasoning attempts to identify the general characteristics of thinking, or 
the logical properties of moral words and terms, whilst in ethics the 
problems that arise do so precisely because of particular 
circumstances. Thus it is unsurprising that generalist approaches to 
ethics find their greatest problems of justification in cases that involve 
too many particular circumstances for their generalisations to cover. 
But those problems - the problems faced by generalist approaches to 
ethics - are not moral problems, but logical ones that arise through 
mistaking logical reasoning for moral reasoning. 
In distinguishing between logical reasoning and moral reasoning, I am 
not claiming that the latter is a special type of reasoning, i. e. that moral 
reasoning has its own formal characteristics and that logical reasoning 
has its own. The difference I allude to is that moral reasoning - the sort 
of reasoning that we would hope to see in relation to difficult moral 
problems - involves understanding, and by that I do not mean an 
45 'What Morality is Not', p 35. 
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understanding of the logical properties or general features of 
reasoning. In Plato's dialogues, many of Socrates' fellow debaters are 
clever in this formal way: they can identify premises, and they can use 
those premises to come to conclusions. Often they are conclusions 
that Socrates then provides further arguments against, on other 
occasions conclusions with which he concurs. But what comes over 
most forcefully in the dialogues is not the element of formal reasoning, 
picking out premises and drawing out of conclusions, but the wisdom 
and understanding that Socrates encourages. As Raimond Gaita says, 
discussing Gorgias, "The capacity to answer seriously under Socratic 
examination requires that the ethical subject - he who understands 
and is responsive to the requirements of morality - be more than a 
rational agent". 46 
This, I argue, is why Aristotle is rightly concerned with character and 
character traits, rather than rules and principles by which to guide 
Action. Recent developments in virtue ethics might suggest that we 
can look at the virtues as alternative rules to those of deontology and 
utilitarianism, but we need to take care of the way in which 'rule' is to 
be understood. 47 For (to return to difficult and unclear cases), what we 
are looking for from the phronimos is not someone who has knowledge 
(in the Socratic sense) of the virtues-as-right-rules and can then apply 
46 Raimond Gaita, 'The Personal in Ethics' p. 141. 
47 Also involving care in what we understand by the application of a rule: See 
Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford, 1999) passim. As Hursthouse points 
out (p. 211-12), it is one thing to identify a particular character trait as a virtue, and 
we may consider that virtue to be a rule, but its application can only be determined 
case by case. I shall return to this point shortly. 
34 
them, but someone whose Action, in such circumstances, invents, so 
to speak, a rule. This `invention' isn't a conceptual product, but is 
characteristic of his Action - and it is this characteristic that will allow 
us to describe the Action as falling under such-and-such a virtue. 48 
Rules, Principles and Particular cases 
When difficult cases do arise, what it is about them that makes them 
'difficult' varies. For instance, difficult situations are often new 
situations, the result of unforeseen and unintended consequences, or 
by what are commonly called 'freaks of nature'. These are, ex 
hypothesi, unpredictable, and for a theory to predict how people will act 
(if they accept the theory), or ought to act, then that theory must 
contain within itself an element that predicts the unpredictable. It might 
be countered that, yes, there are elements in certain cases that are 
'new', and in that sense unpredictable. But these elements are 
particular aspects of overarching general problems (e. g. euthanasia, 
killing one in order to save many, etc. ); that they are particular aspects 
does not in itself necessarily entail that they cannot be brought under 
general rules or principles. However, this resort to and reliance on 
general rules and principles, and the failure to give due consideration 
to what are often unique particular aspects of moral problems, is itself 
to fail to understand the nature of difficult moral problems. 
48 Even here, the situation may not necessarily be so clear-cut that we can identify a 
particular virtue, something I shall return to in conjunction with applying the virtues 
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Jonathan Dancy, in the name of `particularism', puts the point against 
this sort of generalism thus: 
Particularism claims that generalisation is the cause of 
many bad moral decisions, made in the ill-judged and 
unnecessary attempt to fit what we are to say here to 
what we have said on another occasion... . it is this sort of 
looking away that particularists see as the danger in 
generalism. Reasons function in new ways on new 
occasions, and if we don't recognise this fact and adapt 
our practice to it, we will make bad decisions. Generalism 
encourages a tendency not to look hard enough at the 
details of the case before one, quite apart from any over- 
simplistic tendency to rely on a few rules of dubious 
provenance. 49 
In this thesis, what is of most interest in the particularist's criticism of 
generalisation is its foundation in the questioning of unexamined 
assumptions about moral motivation and reasons for Action. 50 What is 
and my tentative use of 'invention'. 
'9 Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford, 1993), p. 64. 
50 Simon Blackburn claims that Dancy's radical particularism ultimately would make 
practical reasoning arbitrary and unintelligible, Ruling Passions, Oxford University 
Press, 1998, p. 308. I would add that, if (a theme taken up in Part Two of the thesis) 
practical reasoning is based on the logic of Action itself rather than a specialised 
conception of reasoning which must satisfy criteria imported in from formal logic, then 
human Action itself would be arbitrary and unintelligible. Or, what amounts to the 
same, it would be difficult to identify terms to fulfil a description under which 
something might be called an Action. What concerns me about much of Dancy's 
work is his speaking of 'properties of Actions' and the metaphysical connotations 
associated with this phrase, a point that I shall only briefly raise here. In a illuminating 
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primary in this questioning are the philosophical problems underlying 
generalist approaches, for those problems have implications for the 
very exercise of taking general moral stances based on rules and 
principles. 
One of those problems is the very idea of morality, and what moral 
theory can achieve, that some generalists have. Consider the following 
from a critic of particularism: 
One of the things a shared commitment to morality needs 
to do is provide people with some assurance that others 
won't attack them, rob from them, break promises to 
them, or lie to them. Providing people with such 
assurance is of course one of law's most important 
functions. Ideally, perhaps, peoples' moral commitments 
would be adequate to provide this assurance, without the 
passage in Why There is Really No Such Thing as The Theory of Motivation' Dancy 
says: "There is another reason for denying that reasons are causes, this is that there 
is no possible metaphysical distinction between the action and the reasons for it, for if 
we subtract the reasons from the action, there is not enough left to be an action at 
all" (PAS 1995, p. 18. ). Surely 'properties' invites a similar process of substraction, 
with the implication that we can identify a substratum that will count as an Action 
apart from its properties. But an Action is nothing other than the description under 
which it can be called an Action, and it is the chacteristics to which the terms of the 
description apply which identify it as an Action to be (morally or otherwise) judged. 
Consider the statement 'He did that'. This is a particular statement, but as an 
utterance it is raised in a context, and that context provides the description under 
which 'that' can be called an Action. The characteristics of 'that' to which the terms of 
the description relate are the purpose, reason, motive etc. - the basis - of the 
utterance itself. The meaning and value of such a statement are derived, not from its 
logical form, but the conditions and circumstances which brought about its utterance. 
I shall return to this point in relation to motivation in the concluding chapter. 
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enforcement of legal sanctions. But realistically we 
recognise the need for legal sanctions to protect persons 
and property from others, and to enforce contracts. Yet 
there are things which both (a) we want peoples' moral 
commitments to ensure that they do, and (b) we do not 
want law to get involved in. An example may be that it is 
desirable for morality to pressure people to keep their 
spoken promises to their spouses, but we don't want the 
law to poke its big nose in such matters. And even where 
the law should and does stick in its nose, widespread 
internalization of moral restrictions is clearly needed. For 
knowing that others have certain firm moral dispositions 
can give us added assurance about how they will 
behave. 51 
Here morality is seen as some sort of force that pressures and ensures 
that people follow rules and principles, in doing so providing assurance 
and protection. This is a peculiar view of morality. It very much seems 
that what is being asked for are rules and principles that act as a (non- 
legal) moral police force, which people commit themselves to in order 
to act morally. But such Actions could not be meaningfully called 
`moral' precisely because they issue from pressure, ensured by rules 
and principles that they have committed themselves to. Honest, faithful 
people who do not attack and rob people are not pressured, and their 
51 Brad Hooker, 'Particularism: Wrong and Bad' in Moral Particularism ed. Brad 
Hooker and Margaret Little (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 16. 
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honesty, etc., are not ensured by rules and principles. To lie, to break 
promises, to rob and attack people, is not something that is ordinarily 
going to arise as a possible option for such people: they do not need to 
commit themselves to honesty and faithfulness, for they are honest 
and faithful. 
What is at fault here are the contractualist assumptions about the 
nature of morality. 52 The major problem with contractualism is that it 
fails to distinguish between the moral and the legal and political, 
carrying the enforcement (in terms of rights, duties, obligations, claims, 
etc) of the latter over to the former. But to talk of morality in terms of 
enforcement renders the term `morality' more or less meaningless: an 
enforced morality is no morality at all, and if it is thought that rules and 
principles are required to pressure people to act in certain ways then it 
would be just as well to give up speaking of morality at all. 
A further assumption of much thinking along these lines is that one of 
the purposes of moral theory is come up with a sort of blue-print of 
rules and principles for society to adopt, 53 and that "... widespread 
internalization of moral restrictions is clearly needed". What would be 
involved in a society's adopting of a particular theoretical moral 
position, and whether societies adopt sets of rules and principles at all 
(whether there is, e. g. some sort of process whereby societies as a 
whole adopt this rather than that set of moral principles) rests on a 
52 Hooker sees himself as being a consequentialist, but the similarity of what he. says 
here to contractualism is quite stark. For example, his counter-example to 
particularism is based on securing a deal, ibid. pp. 17ff. 
53 1 bid., p. 1. 
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number of assumptions to be addressed by social and political science 
and law. 
On the other hand, whether morality consists of the internalization of 
moral restrictions rests on assumptions about reasons for Action, 
motivation, moral habituation and character, practical reasoning and 
wisdom. To ignore problems raised in connection with these features 
of moral life and to construct a system of morality regardless of such 
considerations, is to presuppose the philosophical propriety and 
meaning of talking about societies adopting moral theories and the 
internalization of moral restrictions. 54 
Between Rules and Invention: Moral Wisdom 
The evolution of virtue ethics from Anscombe's 'Modern Moral 
Philosophy' has lead to consideration of the virtues as rules, but the 
54 In recent decades such thinking, and the very idea that moral theory can perform 
such a function as providing a blue-print for society to adopt, has been seriously 
undermined by communitarianism. In political theory, the main thrust of the criticism 
has been a response to Rawls' extreme individualism. The main philosophical thrust 
has been to question the individualistic assumptions by pointing out the social nature 
of reason, morality and Action. This label covers a general perspective that defies a 
systematic exposition of a particular ethical theory in the work of, in particular 
Macintyre and Charles Taylor, a point that is of notable significance: the most 
important contribution of such authors has been to point out misconceptions of 
reason in systematic ethical theories such as Kantianism, utilitarianism and 
contractualism. Interestingly Roger Crisp and Michael Slote suggest that 
communitarianism may well turn out to be the equivalent in political philosophy to 
virtue ethics (see their introduction to Virtue Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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understanding of 'rules' needs to be distinguished from its pervasive 
use in deontological and utilitarian ethics. 
The most important distinction lies in the notion of applying a rule. In 
clear-cut cases there is no problem for the person who is honest, 
courageous, etc. as to the appropriate virtue; here the person doesn't 
so much apply a virtue, he just acts honestly, courageously, etc., 
honesty, courage, etc. being character traits. However, a situation 
might be sketched out in which there is a conflict based on whether it 
would be best, e. g. to do what is honest or to do what is kind (or vice- 
versa): 'What would you do here? ' I may well give an answer to this 
particular scenario, but this would do nothing to establish a rule 
'honesty over kindness', for any such judgement would depend on the 
particular circumstances of any future case involving such a conflict. All 
that I say in relation to the present case is that, given this scenario, 
such-and-such is called for. Indeed, a future case may serve to remind 
us that just because 'honesty', 'kindness', 'courage', etc. are different 
words, conduct that exhibits them does not necessarily identify 
different 'rules'. That is to say, their meanings are established in 
Actions rather than the words themselves: it is often the case that 
honesty is kind and courageous. 
It is difficult and unclear cases that moral theory has the most 
problems accommodating. I claimed earlier that, as these often involve 
new and unique circumstances, what we are looking for in the 
phronimos is someone who, so to speak, 'invents' a rule, and that this 
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invention is characteristic of his Action, allowing us to describe it as 
falling under such-and-such a virtue. This needs two qualifications. 
Firstly, it might be the case that his Action doesn't fall neatly under one 
virtue term and can be variously described under several virtue terms, 
or we may struggle to find a term that expresses in any precise sense 
what the Action exhibits. 55 To ignore this possibility may again be due 
to wrongly assuming definite meanings attaching to specific words. 
The problem here is not the failure to identify a specific virtue, but 
failing to note that the meanings of descriptive virtue terms are not 
fixed by those terms but by the conduct that they describe. It is in this 
sense that virtue, in difficult circumstances, implies a rule, rather than 
the application of a rule. Further, the misguided desire for philosophical 
precision here should not cloud the admiration due to the moral 
wisdom, imagination and passion involved in such Actions. 
The second qualification concerns my use of 'invention' here, and its 
relation to Actions implying a rule. In using it I am not taking a side on 
the 'invention-discovery' dichotomy, for any invention does not, so to 
speak, come out of nothing, but has some contextual background out 
of which it arises. Any situation which calls for Action, even those that 
involve unique factors, comes about by a series of events, including 
both foreseen and unforeseen consequences. Only by focusing on the 
particular circumstances of such situations can an appropriate 
55 Aristotle, at NE Book 4 v, illustrates this lack of precision in his use of präotes, 
meaning gentleness, goodnaturedness, patience. 
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response be based, and it is only appropriate to the degree of that 
focusing. 
Throughout his works Hegel employs Aristotle's analysis of dunamis, 
potentiality, and energeia, actuality, in his discussions of concrete 
phenomena. In any activity we bring about (make actual) something 
that was potentially in the circumstances within which we act. 
Ordinarily, what we do requires little thought and involves nothing 
particularly remarkable, and what we do is quite straightforward. In 
difficult and problematic circumstances, however, wisdom, imagination 
and passion are required in attending to the situation at hand. 
Remarkable, admirable Actions are precisely those which exhibit those 
characteristics in developing the potentiality of those circumstances. It 
is in this sense that such Actions imply a rule, i. e. that it follows from 
the circumstances at hand. Although talking of great historical events, 
something Hegel says in IPW(p. 21) is apposite here: 
... a general principle 
is of no help, and it is not enough to 
look back on similar situations [in the past]; for pale 
reflections are powerless before the stress of the moment, 
and impotent before the life and freedom of the present. 
(... No two instances are exactly alike; they are never 
sufficiently identical for us to say that what was best on 
one occasion will also be best on another... ). 
The element of passion should not be underplayed here, for it is 
precisely this that the 'stress of the moment' requires. Laws, rules and 
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principles are "purely universal and abstract" (Ibid., p. 69), and what is 
required is Action and passion. 
If I put something into practice and give it a real existence, 
I must have some personal interest in doing so; I must be 
personally involved in it, and hope to obtain satisfaction 
through its accomplishment ... To 
have an interest in 
something means to be implicated and involved in it, and 
an end which I am actively to pursue must in some way or 
other be my own end. It is my own end which must be 
satisfied, even if the end for which I am working has many 
sides to it which have nothing to do with me. (Ibid., p. 70). 
Here we must not be diverted by the simplistic analytical distinction 
between self-interestedness and other-interestedness, the result, 
according to Hegel, of 'psychological pedantry' (Ibid., p. 87). There are 
certainly occasions when individuals, under the guise of pursuing some 
general good or the good of others, are pursuing personal advantage 
and furthering their own cause alone, "... even at the expense of 
detracting from the general cause, jeopardising it, or sacrificing it 
altogether. But anyone who actively supports a cause is not just an 
interested party - he is interested in the cause itself (Ibid. ). 
The reduction of self-interest to selfishness and egoism has had much 
coinage in philosophy, and it has contributed to blinding many writers 
to the element of passion that morality requires. It is one thing to 
charge someone with pursuing an end with passionate selfishness, but 
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quite another to talk of the passionate self-interest with which someone 
pursues an objective. 56 The briefest reflection on the notion of 'caring' 
will surely be adequate to show the limitations of a distinction between 
self-interest and interest in a particular objective, for it would be absurd 
to claim that caring is or ought to be absent in matters of morality. 
Equally, there is surely much truth in Hegel's claim that "Passion is the 
prerequisite of all human excellence, and there is accordingly nothing 
immoral about it" (Ibid., p. 86. ). Such passion, wisdom and imagination 
consists of no more than Aristotle's 'complete harmony' of reason and 
desire. 
Structure of the Thesis 
Early on in this introduction I stated that this thesis is concerned with 
the practical dimensions of morality, i. e. morality as personal 
experience and social institutions. I contrasted this with the sort of 
moral theory which aims to establish rules and principles, claiming that 
this sort of approach can be seen, in the work of certain authors, to 
rest on the underlying assumption that reason and desire are distinct 
phenomena. 
One consequence of this is that conceptions of reason, deliberation 
and judgement are put forward as the arbiters of the good and the 
right. When such conceptions are subjected to scrutiny, however, they 
In Chapter Two I will illustrate how this simplistic distinction finds its expression in 
discussions of the individual and the state in Hegel, and in Chapter Seven in 
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are seen to bear little resemblance to what actually goes on in thought 
and conduct in moral life. This comes over clearly in the language 
employed by those authors, creating a gulf between moral life 
(personal experience and social institutions) and this sort of moral 
theorising. This is the basis of my claim that such theorising is abstract, 
and in the chapters that follow I shall look at specific abstract 
conceptions of reason, deliberation and judgement that have been 
invoked in discussions of particular aspects of Action and ethics. 
This view that reason can and ought to be the basis of moral systems, 
rules and principles in the authors that I have discussed is a direct 
descendent of the moral philosophy of Kant, a point amply highlighted 
in the second half of the 20th century by, amongst others, Maclntyre, 
Williams and McDowell. In Part One of the thesis I will illustrate that, 
despite his attempt to synthesise rationalism and empiricism, Kant 
retains the misleading dichotomy between reason and desire that 
permeates the work of Descartes, Locke and Hume, a dichotomy that 
is pivotal in their metaphysics and epistemology. 
This feature of 17th and 18th Century philosophy has left its mark on 
much 20th Century philosophy in the areas of Action and ethics. Not 
only is reason seen as an authoritative and objective arbiter of moral 
rules, but also specific abstract methods of reasoning, such as causal 
analysis and logical inference, are invoked in accounts of judgement, 
deliberation and practical reason. Here I do not deny the importance of 
such methods in philosophical debate - for instance, in the philosophy 
discussions of Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia. 
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of science and formal and philosophical logic - but that they produce 
unduly abstract accounts of Action. 
The abstract nature of Kant's view of reason, and its basis in the work 
of Descartes, Locke and Hume, forms the starting point of Hegel's 
philosophical outlook. Hegel was the first to systematically subject 
Kant's work to critical analysis, his central claim being that reason, far 
from being a faculty or power of the mind or understanding, is 
historically and socially constituted. This will form the basis of Part One 
of the thesis. 
The claim that reason is historically and socially constituted is implicit 
in the claim of both Aristotle and Hegel that man is by nature a social 
and political creature, and the aim of Part Two of the thesis will be to 
explore this. Here I shall show how much more specific abstract 
aspects of reason are invoked in analyses of needs, desires and 
accounts of practical reason. The emphasis here will be to contrast the 
social nature of reason and morality with the individualistic and 
psychologistic conceptions that such analyses and accounts involve. 
Again here, implicitly if not explicitly, the latter have failed to shake off 
the Cartesian and Humean heritage that figures in a great deal of 
modem philosophy. This comes out in individualistic and psychologistic 
conceptions of desire and motivation, a claim that will form the basis of 
the conclusion to this thesis. 
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PART ONE: HEGEL ON PHILOSOPHY, ETHICS AND WILL 
Hegel's view of the task of philosophy is to grasp in thought how things 
are rather than, say, speculate how things might or ought to be, and to 
comprehend the philosophical problems of the era. Given this, it is only 
natural that he should take as his starting point in his work on logic, 
mind, Action, ethics, etc., what he saw as a new period in philosophy 
initiated by (amongst others) Descartes. This he refers to as the period 
of the `thinking understanding'. 
What Hegel means by 'thinking understanding' is that during this 
period from Descartes to Kant the pre-occupation was with knowledge 
and understanding, the basis of our knowledge and understanding. 
One of the fundamental problems of Cartesian dualism was the 
epistemological relationship between man and the world in which he 
lived. This is expressed through the consequent debates between 
rationalists and empiricists, focusing on the nature of 'the mind' that 
knows and understands, to Kant's discussions of the 'categories of the 
understanding'. Thus, Hegel saw his task as comprehending the 
source of this problem expressed in the attempts to resolve it in the 
philosophical works of the period. 
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The epistemological problem arises from the ontological assumption 
that man is fundamentally distinguished from the world in which he 
lives by the possession of a mind that is of a different nature, or 
faculties and senses by which the external world is experienced, 
considerations culminating in Kant's distinction between 'phenomena' 
and 'noumena'. For Hegel, however, what is at issue is not an 
ontological problem, i. e. that man is fundamentally distinguished from 
the world. Rather, it is a logical problem, i. e. it is a problem that arises 
out of the ways of thinking employed by the philosophers of the period. 
More often than not, according to Hegel, philosophical problems are 
not so much about the subject matters of philosophical discourse, but 
the way in which the subject matter is thought about. Thus, it is often 
the case that problems are not about mind, reason, ethics, Action, etc., 
but logical problems. 
In this section of the thesis I will explore some of the major issues and 
topics raised in this period in philosophy, illustrating Hegel's claim that 
many of the problems met with are due to the abstract nature of the 
thinking by which these issues and topics are discussed. Chapter One 
will address the philosophy of mind that developed from Descartes, in 
the ensuing rationalist-empiricist debate, against the historical, social 
and ethical context of Descartes' concerns. In addressing this the 
discussion will suggest some ethical implications of the philosophy of 
mind that followed. 
One of those implications is that the argument of the Cogito renders 
human beings as being first and foremost individual consciousnesses. 
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This suggestion will be explored in Chapter Two by way of contrast of 
Hegel's view that human beings are essentially social creatures, and 
that it is precisely this social nature that accounts for morality and 
ethics. This position has historically raised the problem of the 
relationship between the individual and society/state. This problem can 
be seen, however, to be the result of the abstract reasoning that is 
often the target of Hegel's criticisms, in particular the treatment given 
to the concept of freedom. 
This abstract reasoning that Hegel's predecessors and contemporaries 
afforded the concept of freedom is also much in evidence in 
discussions of will and Action, the subject of Chapter Three. This 
chapter will show that will and human conduct are derived from social 
context rather than some sort of abstract, a priori, conception of 
humans as essentially individual. 
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1. MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS 
Introduction 
In this chapter I shall explore the framework of Descartes' way of 
thinking and some of the implications of his starting position, a 
preliminary discussion to serve as a basis for an exploration of the 
moral and ethical implications. Here I shall concern myself primarily 
with the philosophical method and philosophy of mind that influenced 
the period culminating in Kant, the details of the moral and ethical 
implications to be the subject of later chapters. However, the full force 
of the new philosophy cannot be truly grasped without considering the 
theological, philosophic and moral background out of which it was to 
emerge. 
In LHP Hegel gives a systematic account of the development of 
philosophical thought, and an introductory discussion of his views on 
the philosophical treatment of thought as it emerges in history, of which 
I shall give a brief overview of the period leading up to Descartes. I do 
this on two counts. Firstly, and most obviously, to provide a historical 
background. Secondly, and more importantly for what is to follow in the 
current project: Hegel's approach to the topic, and his approach to 
philosophy as a whole, will lay the ground for the claim (the subject of 
later chapters) that Aristotle can be seen to carry out the philosophical 
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analysis of ethics from a quite different perspective than many modern 
treatments of the subject. This is something that I will sketch out in the 
last section of the current chapter. 
Philosophy in Context: history, ethical life and philosophical 
assimilation 
The central feature of Hegel's treatment of the history of philosophy is 
that, philosophy being concerned with what is (rather than, say, what 
might or ought to be), it represents a reflection of its own time. The 
actual (rather than the abstract, theoretical, consideration of) ethical life 
of a particular era - its social, political, legal, religious organisation - 
produces certain tensions and contradictions, and these tensions and 
contradictions are often the source of moral and ethical problems. 
Philosophy, being a reflection on, and assimilation of, how things are, 
often expresses those problems that are the product of the overall 
ethical constitution of an era. In this light, philosophy is something that 
attempts to bring to the surface why such problems arise. The history 
of philosophy is peopled by those (in Hegel's words, 'heroes') who 
have brought these aspects of ethical life to the surface. ' Given this 
contextual background of Hegel's view of philosophy, a critical review 
(as carried out by a historian of philosophy, for instance) of particular 
philosophers can only do them justice by considering their work from 
within the ethical life - and, more pertinently here, the ethical concerns 
1 Something perhaps supported by the fact that many of the major figures in the history 
of philosophy have been considered in their own time to be heretical in some way or 
another. To highlight a problem is often to question the state of affairs out of which it 
arose, without necessarily having to suggest an alternative state of affairs. 
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- of the prevailing period. As we shall see, the moral implications of 
17th and 18th Century philosophy attracted the displeasure of 
theologians who represented the dying spirit of the religious grip on the 
philosophy of the Middle Ages. The domination of Christianity in public 
life was reflected in the focal point of philosophic thought: the Divinity 
and the will of God. To the vast majority of the population of Europe 
this was a 'beyond', not only in the sense that He was beyond in a 
metaphysical sense, but also in a practical and moral sense. Access to 
the scriptures was exclusive to those who had attended the church- 
dominated universities and had learnt the Latin in which the scriptures 
were written, i. e. the clergy. Morality was derived from interpreting the 
will of God, and thus guidance in this area of life was the sole office of 
the representatives of the church. 
History, Philosophy and Religion: the Cartesian context 
For Hegel, philosophy is tied up with the practicalities of the age, and it 
reflects the thoughts that inform and guide the activities that constitute 
those practicalities. This is what Hegel refers to as 'spirit', and not 
some sort of ghostly, mystical, intangible omnipresence that is beyond 
the grasp of mortals. Philosophy, at any given time, will express the 
concerns of its time, and the task of the historian of philosophy is to 
assimilate the development of the thought that is expressed in 
historical progress. This is reflected in the philosophy of the age in 
which Descartes was writing, Hegel referring to it as the 'period of the 
thinking understanding'. 
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The main interest hence is, not so much the thinking of 
the objects in their truth, as the thinking and 
understanding of the objects ... (ibid., vol. 1 pp. 158). 
The subject of philosophy was no longer an external world created by 
God from beyond, but rather our understanding of the world that we 
inhabit, a world which we assimilate and shape. Or rather, this was the 
spirit of the new philosophy emerging from the strictures of an age in 
which philosophy was hardly distinct from theology. Hume puts the 
point thus: 
In later times, philosophy of all kinds, especially ethics, 
have been more closely united with theology than ever 
they were observed to be among the heathens; and as 
this latter science admits of no terms of composition, but 
bends every branch of knowledge to its own purpose, 
without much regard to the phenomena of nature, or to 
the unbiased sentiments of the mind, hence reasoning, 
and even language, have been warped from their natural 
course ... 
2 
Out of this new spirit develops the two opposite strands of thought of 
empiricism and rationalism, both of which carry with them moral 
implications which are contradictory to the prevailing orthodoxy. On the 
one hand, 
... 
The spiritual was observed as in its realisation it 
constitutes the spiritual world of states, in order thus to 
investigate from experience the rights of individuals as 
2 Enquiries, Oxford 1975 3rd. ed., pp. 322. 
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regards one another, and as regards rulers, and the 
rights of states against states (LHP op. Cit., pp. 163). 
The mandate of the clergy, handed down by God, on such matters was 
under question in the very spirit of empiricism, whilst for rationalism 
The individual is clearly not determined in any other way 
than from himself, he is the absolute beginning of 
determination; in the 'I', in the self, a power of decision is 
clearly to be found. This freedom is in opposition to the 
theory that God alone is really absolutely determining 
(Ibid., pp. 164-5). 
In the new philosophies the world and man were no longer mere 
appendages of God, worthy of interest only in that they are His 
creations. Now, man and his environment were the focal point of 
attention, and the task of philosophy was to determine the nature of 
our knowledge of the world, and the roles that reason, judgement, 
desires, inclinations etc. occupied in knowledge and Action. In 
Descartes we find the ultimate expression of the challenge to the 
doctrines and authority of the clergy, and a direct challenge to the 
authority of God. Man's freedom consists in the soul thinking the will to 
be unrestrained, and 
As free, man might do what is not ordained of God 
beforehand - this would conflict with the omnipotence and 
omniscience of God; and if everything is ordained of God, 
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human freedom would thereby be done away with (Ibid., 
pp. 249). 3 
Affirmation and Refutation and Principles of Philosophy 
Central to Hegel's view of philosophical history is that the task is to 
explicate the main principles of the particular philosopher under 
consideration. Those main principles will relate to, and involve a 
continuation of, a philosophical conflict or debate. Thus Descartes' 
motivating concern was the debate of the followers of Plato and 
Aristotle (though "... they have often corrupted the sense of his 
writings... "4), "The principal point of debate among their disciples was 
as to whether all things should be doubted or whether there were some 
which were certain", and the role of the senses and the understanding 
in the matter. 5 This conflict between doubt and certainty, and the 
senses and reason, sets forth the debate between empiricism and 
rationalism that was to follow the publication of Descartes' work. 
For Hegel, a correct grasp of philosophy has two elements - affirmation 
and refutation. In a given era different philosophical outlooks will 
3 The point here is not that we see in this period the rise of the individual, in the sense 
that before the Reformation human beings were not individuals. Rather, Hegel's point is 
that we see here the formal recognition of individuals in religion, states and doctrines. 
This is something that is assimilated in Descartes' philosophical reflections, which 
Hegel regards as Descartes' most positive contribution in the history of philosophical 
thinking. 
4 R. Descartes, Discourse on Method and the Meditations (Penguin Classics 1979), 




concern themselves with a particular aspect of philosophy and claim to 
refute one another. The one will claim that this particular aspect is 
essentially of this nature, the other that it is essentially of that nature. In 
coming to a correct grasp "... we must distinguish between the special 
principle of a philosophy in itself and the execution of this principle or 
its application to the world" (ILHP, pp. 94). The focal point of the debate 
that followed Descartes was knowledge. The special principles of this 
debate were rationalism and empiricism, i. e. knowledge is based on 
reason, or on experience. 
Different philosophies have not only contradicted but 
have refuted one another. Therefore you may well ask: 
what sense this mutual refutation has? ... 
What is 
refutable is only this, that some concrete mode or form of 
the Idea counts as the highest now and for every time 
(Ibid. ). 
A correct philosophical grasp will show that the error is to hold that this 
or that is the essential nature of this area of philosophy, and show that 
reason and experience are themselves just two aspects of knowledge. 
In doing so we will have executed a philosophical exposition of a 
philosophical concept, rather than hang our hats, so to speak, on 
particular philosophical pegs. Indeed, it is only in relation to one 
another that the notions of rationalism and empiricism (with regard to 
knowledge) have meaning. Hegel uses a different example from 
history: 
Stoicism makes thinking as such its principle; precisely 
the opposite is what Epicurianism defines as true, 
namely, feeling, pleasure. Thus the first is universal, the 
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other is particular, single; the first takes man as thinking, 
the second as feeling. It is only both together which 
constitute the entirety of the Concept; man consists of 
both, universal and particular, thought and feeling. Truth 
lies in both together.. . 
(Ibid. pp. 98). 
To claim the primacy of one aspect of a concept (knowledge, man) 
over another aspect is to include that other within the concept under 
discussion, even though it is considered less important; to do so is 
tantamount to saying that the true account of that concept will contain 
both those aspects in its explication. The task of philosophy, for Hegel, 
is to explicate concepts as a whole, and to emphasise one aspect of a 
concept is merely to give a one-sided view of that concept. The 
negative element of a philosophical analysis, its critical aspect, is not to 
refute the validity of that view, but rather to expose it as one-sided: 
... what 
is refuted is not the principle of a philosophy 
[rationalism, empiricism], but only the claim of one 
principle to be final and absolute and, as such, to have 
absolute validity. The refutation is the reduction of one 
principle to be a specific factor in the whole. Thus the 
principle as such has not disappeared, but only its form, 
its form of being final and absolute. This is the meaning 
of refutation in philosophy (Ibid. pp. 95-6). 
Thus for Hegel philosophy is not about following one particular 
doctrine, theory, outlook etc. as opposed to another. "Therefore there 
is no excuse for saying, I would like to pursue philosophy, but I don't 
know which. ' Cherries and plums are fruit; every philosophy is at least 
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philosophy" (ibid., pp. 92). To pursue philosophy is to comprehend 
thought, and not to align oneself to one particular strand of thought. 6 
Thus it is with Descartes' solitary ruminations that the new outlook first 
gets a firm foothold and philosophy is liberated from the strictures of 
theology. The two strands of empiricism and rationalism that were to 
consolidate in the responses to Descartes were to establish the new 
spirit, 'the age of the understanding', involving a concentration on 
epistemology and the nature of mind. 
Now if a problem arises in that account then one of the tasks of 
philosophy is to look at that account to see how the problem has 
arisen. The mind-body problem is a problem for Descartes in virtue of 
his starting point and the way that affects his thinking about the nature 
of mind and body, in his distinguishing them as being of different 
natures. That is to say, the problem is not with minds and bodies, but 
with Descartes' thinking about minds and bodies. This is something 
that Descartes more or less admits: asked how interaction between 
things of such different natures is possible, he replies: 
This is very difficult to explain; but here our experience is 
sufficient, since it is so clear on this point that it cannot be 
gainsaid.? 
There is no problem with minds and bodies, but with Descartes' 
explaining their interaction from within the framework of his way of 
6 "The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him a 
philosopher". L. Wittgenstein, Zettel, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Blackwell, 19812 nd edition), 
#455. 
7 Descartes, Conversation with Burman (Clarendon, 1976) tr. J. Cottingham, p. 28. 
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thinking. 8 It is to the implications of the response to Descartes and the 
framework of his way of thinking that I shall now turn. 
The Cogito and The Philosophy of Mind 
Now, therefore, that my mind is free from all cares, and 
that I have obtained for myself assured leisure in peaceful 
solitude, I shall apply myself seriously and freely to the 
general destruction of all my former opinions. 9 
With this statement Descartes sets the scene for modern philosophy, 
laying down the basis, I shall claim, for a conception of philosophy that 
even until recent years has been considered 'mainstream'. Here I do 
not ignore the obvious differences between rationalist and empiricist 
views on science and ideas that were to develop, but close scrutiny will 
show that both persuasions, consciously or unconsciously, accepted 
the basis that Descartes had laid, even if they were to develop from 
this in differing ways. 10 
8 Here use might be made of Wittgenstein's analogy of the fly in the bottle: the problem 
is that the fly cannot escape because he does not stop and look back to see how he got 
there. 
9 Meditations op. cit. pp. 95. 
10 Perhaps it will be said that this ignores a much more specific fact: not all were taken 
in by the method of doubt, and thus the claim that these individuals accepted 
Descartes' starting point is clearly philosophically absurd and, historically, plainly 
false. Hume is an example who springs immediately to mind: he thought the idea of 
universal doubt to be risible, and even if it could be effected (which it plainly could not 
be) it would be entirely incurable (Enquiries, op. cit., sec. xii, part 1. ). Hume did give 
some credence to a moderate form which "... is a necessary preparative to the study 
of philosophy, by preserving a proper impartiality in our judgements... " (Ibid. ), but 
such a prescription could hardly be considered a 'system'. 
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Philosophical Method and the Path of Reason 
Descartes' adoption of the method of doubt reflects his general pre- 
occupation with method in philosophy, as witnessed in the title of his 
first work Rules For The Direction of The Mind and in the Discourse on 
Method. This pre-occupation with method in employing one's own mind 
in philosophy provides the first hint of his view that the mind is 
essentially distinct from the world of which it has ideas, a view he 
elaborates on in the Meditations. This starting point determines both 
his conception, and the specific content, of his philosophy. It is also a 
starting point in a metaphysics and epistemology, in a way of thinking, 
that still pervades much modern philosophy. In particular, it bears very 
much on how human reason and desire, knowledge and sentiments 
are accounted for, and the view of human conduct that such accounts 
entail. 
In a sense, the laying down of the method of doubt is something of a 
philosophical red herring, for it is the autobiographical content of 
Descartes' statement that ought to command our attention. The 
foundation of Descartes' philosophical ruminations is not the method of 
doubt (although clearly he thought it was), but rather his solitariness. 
Indeed, his solitariness - as Descartes himself indicates - is a pre- 
requisite for the method of doubt to be applied, but more importantly it 
is the philosophical implications of such solitariness, implications that 
pervade his work, which have met with widespread acceptance. 
What I mean by the philosophical implications of Descartes' 
solitariness is this: not only does he isolate himself physically, but 
metaphysically also. Rather than following the supposedly Aristotelian 
project of the schoolmen to enquire into the nature of the things that 
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constitute the world we live in, Descartes pursues the question 'How 
can I know that my ideas of the world are true ideas? ' The change of 
focus is profound: 'the world' is what is present in the ideas and 
impressions that we have of it; the task of philosophy is to distinguish 
between true ideas, and those that might be chimeras, or deceptions of 
the senses, or those of our dreams. The epistemological foundation is 
laid: the metaphysics of the mind replaces the metaphysics of nature at 
the centre of philosophic enquiry. The unique feature of this shift, 
however, also represents the greatest difficulty. The human 'mind' is 
fundamentally distinguished from the world of which it has ideas, and 
Descartes' problem is how to reconcile the two. Man - due to his 
unique capacity to have ideas - is a solitary species in a material (and 
mechanistic) world. 
However, the solitariness goes further. 'The mind' is just a general 
term, represented in concreto (so to speak) by individual minds - the 
receptacle of ideas and impressions. The ideas and impressions that 
have are different from the ideas and impressions that you have, 
although it may turn out that we are having ideas and impressions of 
the same things. Whether we are having ideas and impressions of 
'things' at all is something that needs to be established (i. e. by some 
sort of independent criteria, logical argumentation, etc. ), for the only 
idea that we have that is self-evident is the Cogito - the / think. What 
the Cogito supposedly guarantees is the individual mind that thinks it, 
and thus Descartes must not only establish the existence of the 
external world: the existence of other minds needs to be established 
also. Not only is 'Man' the species isolated from the remainder of the 
world, individuals are also isolated from one another, requiring the 
discussion on the existence of other minds. 
62 
What is not being questioned here is Descartes' motive in adopting the 
method of doubt, i. e. that he believed that by this route, far from 
isolating himself and consequently bringing his meditations to sceptical 
conclusions, he could establish the existence of the world and others 
with certainty. It is clear that the expectation of such certainty was what 
motivated Descartes. However, the claim here is that given a particular 
starting point, a piece of deductive reasoning will follow, be determined 
by, the logic of that starting point and the assumptions that it involves, 
often regardless of the intentions and motives of the author. Thus, 
given Descartes' starting point of the distinction of mind and body and 
the establishing of the Cogito, he runs into problems reconciling his 
desire to establish interaction of mind and body and the existence of 
others, on the one hand, with the direction that the logic of his starting 
point takes him, on the other. It is the latter that yields individuals as 
being essentially distinct from one another, and serves up the problem 
of how mind and body interact. 
This picture of the human mind as essentially individual is a prejudice 
that is not captured by Hume's 'necessary preparative' for both 
empiricist and rationalist alike, but is re-affirmed in the concentration 
on ideas and impressions by Locke, Hume, and Leibniz. Of course, the 
first and the last of these had radically differing accounts of the origin 
and nature of them, but still the focus is on the individual minds 
'having' ideas and impressions. Perhaps it is only Spinoza's work that 
seriously differs, for rather than the 'having' of ideas his 'parallelism' 
involves our 'participating' in the ideas corresponding to material 
entities. But this doesn't quite do the job: we still individually participate 
in ideas, an individuality that is overcome only by recognising the true 
cause of ideas (i. e. not us individually) captured in scientia intuitiva. 
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Such a picture represents common ground; the difference lies in the 
approaches to reconciling ourselves with - the extent to which, and in 
what sense, our ideas and impressions involve knowledge of - the 
external world. 
The Reaction to Descartes: Locke 
Such differences are indeed important. Descartes' concern was the 
scepticism towards, and the dogmatic nature of, the schoolmen, and 
thus the self-certainty of the Cogito represents a stark contrast. 
Judgements of truth and certainty can be had, and they can be had by 
way of individual minds. This was largely undisputed among those who 
followed Descartes: it was the nature of judgements, truth and 
certainty, and the ideas and impressions related to them, which were 
to be the focus of debate. In taking issue with Descartes' innate ideas 
Locke initiates a perhaps more sober approach to the debate, but still 
he is concerned with those ideas that exist 'in men's minds' (an 
expression Locke employs liberally throughout the Essay). 
However, despite the force of the attack on innate ideas, Locke 
continues to follow Descartes' agenda in enquiring into the source of 
the ideas that we have, for "I presume it will be easily granted me that 
there are such ideas in men's minds... ". " The source of these is two- 
fold: 
Whence has it all the materials of reason and 
knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from 
11 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding ed. John W. Yolton (Dent 
1976, abridged) Introduction, 8. 
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experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and 
from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation, 
employed either about external sensible objects, or about 
the internal operations of our minds perceived and 
reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our 
understandings with all the materials of thinking. These 
two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the 
ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring. 12 
The historical significance of the two fountains of sensation and 
reflection cannot be over-emphasised. The first of these is taken up by 
Hume far more radically, which was to have a profound effect still 
prevalent today. The second, however, returns Locke directly to 
Descartes' isolatory ruminations, i. e. consideration of the notion of 
personal identity. 
The Cogito 'guaranteed' the existence of a thinking substance, 
something Locke's empiricist approach could not accommodate. 
Indeed, Locke's aim was to get away from the existence (but not 
necessarily the idea) of substances. But despite his assertion that 
"... our specific ideas of substances are nothing else but a collection of 
a certain number of simple ideas, considered as united in one thing "13 
his views on the matter are pretty close to those of Descartes. 
When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will 
anything, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to 
our present sensations and perceptions, and by this 
everyone is to himself that which he calls self it not being 
12 Ibid. II 12. 
13 Ibid. II xxiii. 14. 
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considered in this case whether the same self be 
continued in the same or divers substances. For since 
consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is 
that that makes everyone to be what he calls self, and 
thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking 
things: in this alone consists personal identity, i. e. the 
sameness of a rational being. 14 
The mention of substance here is a throwaway comment in that Locke 
does not consider substance to be a concept it is necessary to invoke. 
Personal identity can be had by way of the sensations of present and 
past experiences and the consciousness that constantly attends them. 
'Consciousness' is all-important here, for the very notion of reflection is 
dependent on it. But what, apart from sensations and specific ideas, is 
'consciousness'? Clearly it is this that gives us some notion of 
immaterial souls, but the existence (as opposed to idea) of such souls 
is not something that we are privy to "... by the contemplation of our 
own ideas... ". 15 
Thus both Descartes and Locke, by way of focusing on ideas, come to 
considerations as to wherein those ideas occur. The one claimed that 
such considerations proved the existence of thinking substance, whilst 
the other denied the validity of such a speculation; but both put forward 
the central notion of individual rational creatures as being essentially 
distinct. Hume, who was even more sceptical than Locke regarding 
substances, continued this: for Hume, there were no grounds for 
supposing such, never mind a guarantee for their existence. 
14 Ibid. II xxvil. 9. 
15 Ibid. IV iii. 6. 
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Locke and Hume: personal identity 
Hume's criticism of Locke has two related components. On the one 
hand he reproached Locke for being 'betrayed' into discussing innate 
ideas by the schoolmen, consequently employing the term 'idea' 
loosely and failing to distinguish between impressions and ideas. 16 
The second element of his dissatisfaction, from the Treatise, is the 
failure to distinguish between discussing ideas of personal identity, 
"... as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our 
passions or the concern we take in ourselves". 17 
In distinguishing between impressions and ideas Hume establishes 
empiricism proper. 'Impressions' are had by our experiencing the world 
in which we live, but an 'experiencing' that is far more radical than 
Locke's. Rather than the objects that populate the world merely 
impressing on our senses, we are affected by the experiences in the 
sense that they engage our affections. These impressions are 
"... distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of 
which we are conscious... ". 18 
A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different 
manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you 
tell me, that any person is in love, I easily understand 
your meaning, and form a just conception of his situation; 
but never can mistake that conception for the real 
16 Enquiries op. cit., 11 17. 
17 Treatise on Human Nature (Oxford 1968,2nd edition), pp. 253. 
18Enquiries II. 12. 
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disorders and agitations of the passion. When we reflect 
on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a 
faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours 
which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of 
those in which our original perceptions were clothed. 19 
Locke was correct to speak of reflection and memory (for Hume 
'operations of the mind') in connection with personal identity, but still 
there is not to be had an idea of the self. Perceptions (whether ideas or 
impressions) are 'distinct existences', and 
... they 
form a whole only by being connected together. 
But no connexions among distinct existences are ever 
discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a 
connexion or a determination of thought, to pass from 
one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the 
thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on 
the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind, the 
ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and 
naturally introduce each other. 20 
But there is no distinct idea of a self to be had from such a feeling, and 
any "... identity, which we ascribe to the mind of men, is only a fictitious 
one... ". 21 Such a fiction is due to a loose use of the term 'idea', failing 
to distinguish between distinct impressions and ideas. 
19 Ibid. 11.11. 
20 Treatise, pp. 635. 
21 Ibid. pp. 259. 
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This takes us to Hume's second dissatisfaction with Locke's treatment 
of personal identity. This can be seen as a call for critical reflection, 
and a warning not to get oneself caught up in the metaphysical 
reasonings of the schoolmen. Hume asks us to look at the way in 
which we think about such issues as the existence of substances and 
personal identity, rather than considerations of whether supposed 
conclusions are true or false. That is to say, errors in reasoning result 
in fictitious ideas of substances, and what is required is to examine our 
reasonings in order to show how such conclusions are arrived at. The 
idea we have of personal identity "as it regards our passions or the 
concerns that we take in ourselves" is quite distinct from the idea "as it 
regards our thought and imagination". It is the latter that occurs in our 
reasoning about personal identity, and such reasoning is the subject of 
philosophical examination (the former is ultimately the province of 
psychology). In other words, despite Locke's empiricist intentions he 
gets enmeshed in the metaphysical reasonings of the schoolmen - 
even though he arrives at different conclusions. 
We might here ask why personal identity had "become so great a 
question in philosophy" as Hume had declared. 22 I have suggested that 
if we examine the logical path from Descartes' starting point, the 
fundamental proposition is that human beings are distinct entities 
individuated by individual minds, and that questions of personal identity 
logically follow from this. In this I think Hume would be in agreement: it 
is a way of thinking that brings these philosophers to such a juncture. 
But there is also another reason why personal identity became an area 
of concern, an area of discourse that Hume rejects in putting aside 
22 Ibid. 
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how personal identity "regards our passions or the concern we take in 
ourselves". That is to say, it was not only the logical, metaphysical and 
epistemological implications of the Cogito that registered concern, but 
also the moral implications. 
The most adverse reaction to Descartes' work was of a theological 
nature and was reflected in personal moral condemnation by the 
established church, even though the very purpose of his doubting the 
existence of God was to establish indubitable proof of His existence. 
Locke's discussion of personal identity brought those fears to a closer 
focus. Whilst most attention has been directed at the epistemology of 
the Essay, Locke's driving motive for the study of Knowledge was 
"... morality and divinity, those parts of knowledge that men are most 
concerned to be clear in". 23 More specifically, in personal identity "... is 
founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment ... ". 
24 But 
Locke's refusal to go further into the nature of the thinking thing, and 
his ultimate scepticism about such an enterprise, cast immediate doubt 
on the immortality of the soul. Whilst the critical assessments of his 
discussion of personal identity by, for example, Leibniz and Berkeley 
brought out epistemological and logical difficulties, those authors were 
also deeply concerned with its theological and moral implications. 25 
23 Essay, op. cit., Epistle to the reader, pp. xliv. 
24 Ibid. II. xxvii 18. 
25 For a detailed discussion along these lines see Henry E. Allinson's 'Locke's Theory 
of Personal Identity in I. C. Tipton (ed. ) Locke on Human Understanding (O. U. P. 1977). 
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Mind and The Metaphysics of Morals 
The Cartesian emphasis on the Cogito and the epistemological 
implications that were consolidated in the ensuing 'rationalist- 
empiricist' debate represent a radical re-focusing. This re-focusing 
throws up serious and difficult questions regarding personal identity, 
which in turn presents difficulties in our understanding of morality and 
ethics. Many of these difficulties still prevail in the ethical debates of 
today; however, the source of much of the confusion can be seen to be 
derived from the acceptance of the Cartesian premises and the view of 
the individual human being that these involve. The debate from 
Descartes to Hume took on many differing forms, but Hume's 
insistence in making clear and fast distinctions between the 'faculties' 
of reason, perception and affections consolidates the Cartesian picture 
that still meets with widespread acceptance today. 
The Boundaries of Reason and Taste 
Consider the following statement from the Enquiries: 
... the 
distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of 
taste are easily ascertained. The former conveys the 
knowledge of truth and falsehood: the latter gives the 
sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The 
one discovers objects as they really stand in nature, 
without addition or diminution: the other has a productive 
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faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the 
colours borrowed from internal sentiment... 26 
Not only do humans have 'minds', but also those 'minds' are 
partitioned into separate faculties with "distinct boundaries and offices". 
For all his endeavours to steer well away from metaphysics, Hume 
gets involved in nothing other than a metaphysics of mind, predicated 
on the Cogito. The task of philosophy is to delineate something 'within' 
us; that something cannot be experienced other than as the ideas and 
impressions that pass through it when we reflect upon it, but 
nevertheless it is the subject of philosophic investigation. Similarly with 
respect to morals, which are predicated upon something 'within us' that 
the 'office' of reason translates into Action: the passions and 
sentiments. 
This metaphysics of mind reaches its peak in Kant. In attempting to 
bridge the gap between rationalism and empiricism, Kant turns his 
attention to the nature of `the understanding', and the concepts therein 
that allow us to make sense of experience: 
... experience 
is itself a species of knowledge which 
involves understanding; and understanding has rules 
which I must pre-suppose as being in me prior to objects 
being given to me, and therefore as being a priori. They 
find expression in a priori concepts to which all objects of 
experience necessarily conform, and with which they 
must agree. 27 
26 Enquiries, op. cit., pp. 294. 
27 I. Kant Critique of Pure Reason, Tr. N. Kemp Smith (Macmillan 1982), B xvii-xviii. 
72 
Again, with respect to morals, it is something 'within us', this time the 
faculty of reason as opposed to sentiment, that morality is predicated 
upon. Reason and sentiment are separate faculties; the latter may get 
in the way of the former, but the demand of the moral law is that 
personal sentiments be overcome by the rationality upon which the 
moral law is founded. Thus in Hume and Kant morality is not primarily 
concerned with the social, historical, political context of Action, the 
ethical realm within which we conduct ourselves, but the causes and 
principles of what we do. A metaphysics of the mind, and its 
constituent faculties of reason and sentiment replace the theological 
metaphysics of the schoolmen. 
Perhaps with regard to Hume the previous remark may be regarded as 
unjust, but there can be no doubt that Hume regarded one task of 
philosophical enquiry to be a 'mental geography' of the mind. For it is 
... no 
inconsiderable part of science barely to know the 
different operations of the mind, to separate them from 
each other, to class them under their proper heads, and 
to correct all that seeming disorder, in which they lie 
involved, when made the object of reflection and 
inquiry.... Nor can there remain any suspicion, that this 
science is uncertain and chimerical; unless we should 
entertain such a scepticism as is entirely subversive of all 
speculation, and even action. It cannot be doubted, that 
the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, 
that these powers are distinct from each other.... There 
are many obvious distinctions of this kind, such as those 
between the will and understanding, the imagination and 
passions, which fall within the comprehension of every 
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human creature; and the finer and more philosophical 
distinctions are no less real and certain, though more 
difficult to be comprehended. 28 
Certainly Hume could not have foreseen the consequences of his 
awaking Kant from his dogmatic slumbers, but it is precisely in the 
latter's 'categories of the understanding' that the particulars of Hume's 
philosophical analysis reappear, i. e. the necessary conditions of 
experience. 
Hume to Kant: reason and morality 
This metaphysics of mind, which distinguishes between reason and 
passion, carries over to Kant's work on morality, i. e. a metaphysics of 
morality. That is to say, true morality is transcendent of man's actual 
existence, dependent on a divinity, precisely because of this hard and 
fast distinction between reason and the passions and the conflict that 
arises between the two. Morality is grounded on reason, the 
expression of freedom, whilst desire is anchored in our empirical 
nature. 
As a moral being man has the moral law in himself, the 
principle of which is freedom and autonomy of will; for the 
will is absolute spontaneity. Determinations which are 
taken from the inclinations are heterogeneous principles 
as regards the will; or the will is heteronomy if it takes 
such determinations as its end and aim; for in that case it 
takes its determinations from something else than itself. 
28 Enquiries pp. 13-14. 
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But the essence of the will is to determine itself from 
itself; for practical reason gives itself laws. But the 
empirical will is heteronomous, for it is determined by 
desires; and they belong to our nature, not to the realm of 
freedom (LHP 3, pp. 458-9. ). 
The consequence of this, according to Hegel, is that true morality is not 
attainable by man, for there must be a constant struggle between 
reason and desire for the very possibility of morality. Reason is that 
which we all have in common in virtue of being human, and as such 
the moral law which reason wills (in accordance with the maxim 'Act 
only in such a way that your action can be a universal law') is the 
universal will which all ought to strive to identify with; but desire and 
inclination pertain to our individual will, which must be overcome in 
order for us to identify with the universal will, i. e. for us to be moral. 
The unity, that man should be moral, is postulated; but 
beyond the "should" and this talk of morality, no advance 
is made. It is not said what is moral; and no thought is 
given to a system of self-realizing spirit. For really, as 
theoretic reason stands opposed to the objective of the 
senses, so practical reason stands opposed to the 
practical sensuousness, to impulses and inclinations. 
Perfected morality must remain a Beyond; for morality 
presupposes the difference of the particular and universal 
will. It is a struggle, the determination of the sensuous by 
the universal; the struggle can only take place when the 
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sensuous will is not yet in conformity with the universal 
(Ibid., pp. 461). 29 
This way of thinking, that distinguishes between reason and desire, 
which are seen as some sort of faculties or forces within us, and then 
predicates morality on such a distinction, thereby abstracts morality 
from the social, historical, political context from within which needs and 
desires are pursued, the context within which individuals conduct 
themselves ("... no thought is given to a system of self-realizing spirit"). 
A philosophy of mind that rests on the assumption of Cogito, that then 
makes a fundamental distinction between faculties in terms of desire 
and reason, results in a view of human beings as individual hexes of 
desire and/or reason. The essential, fundamental aspect, the primary 
cause or source of morality, is then said to rest in one or other of these 
faculties. 
Moral Ideals and Moral Practices 
More recently, in an interesting discussion paper drawing on 
similarities between Aristotle and Kant, Stephen D. Hudson raises 
issues similar in nature to those raised by Hegel. The major similarity 
between Aristotle and Kant, says Hudson, is that they both anchor their 
moral thought on "The nature and structure of moral personality". 30 
29 1 shall elaborate on this comment from Hegel in relation to what I shall claim is 
Kants 'external' teleology. 
30 "What is Morality All About? " in Philosophia 1990, pp. 3. 
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For Kant moral excellence or virtue -a good will - 
represents an ideal toward which man progresses by a 
continuous discipline of one's inclinations by reason: it 
represents a remaking of one's self, a reform of one's 
sensibilities and inclinations through Selbstuberwindung. 
It is a state of character to be acquired by continuous 
effort and striving. 31 
Much the same can be said of Aristotle. Taking courage to be a 
paradigm of moral excellence, Hudson continues: 
The very notion of a courageous act is secondary to and 
dependent upon the notion of a courageous person. The 
former acquires its sense from the latter. How so? An act 
gets rightly called courageous when and only when it is 
such that the courageous person would perform it in 
those circumstances. The courageous man is thought of 
as an ideal type, who is the exemplar of courage; it is by 
reference to that type that we select which acts are 
typical of courage. Once we have, so to speak, got our 
hands on such an exemplar, we can, by reference to 
what he would do, decide whether what we and others do 
is in fact courageous. 32 
However, Hudson's rendering of the similarity between Kant and 
Aristotle here belies the fundamental- difference between the two, 
illustrated by the transcendent nature of Kant's moral outlook, the 
reason for Hegel's referring to his version of it as a 'Beyond'. 
31 Ibid. pp. 7-8. 
32 Ibid. p. 8. 
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Morality: the ideal and the practical 
The crucial point here is the very notion of an 'ideal' or 'ideal type', 
something which sits very awkwardly with the specifically practical 
nature of Aristotle's ethical thought. For Aristotle it is practical wisdom 
(phronesis)33 and good judgement by which we act courageously and 
recognise courageous acts in others, i. e. looking to the particular 
circumstances of the situation at hand and not to ideas of courage and 
by way of reference to some external criteria, i. e. ideals of the 
courageous person. When called to act, the conclusion of practical 
reasoning is not an idea but an Action. The very notion of an external 
criterion, an 'ideal', is alien to Aristotle's account of practical reason, 
and it is because of this that the extremely puzzling, and misguided, 
question 'How do we acquire this criterion of an ideal? ' does not arise. 
What concerns me about Hudson's interpretation of the claim that an 
act gets rightly called courageous when and only when it is such that 
the courageous person would perform it in those circumstances, is his 
reading of NE 2. vi as a whole implied by his use of 1105b5-8. 
Specifically, my concern is his generalisation of the courageous man 
into an ideal type or exemplar. But there is no suggestion from Aristotle 
that he has such an ideal type or exemplar in mind in this passage, for 
here he is concerned to distinguish acts that are incidentally virtuous 
from those that are done from a virtuous disposition. That is to say, in 
11 05b5-8 Aristotle speaks of courage in order to establish in 2. vi virtue 
as a character trait, or acting virtuously "... from a fixed and permanent 
33 Various aspects of practical wisdom and the practical syllogism will be raised 
throughout Part Two of the thesis. 
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disposition" (1105a34). This of course involves how the virtues are 
acquired, but this is a practical matter of repeatedly performing just and 
temperate acts, as opposed to those who have recourse to their rule, 
principle or theory (logos) "... and imagine that they are being 
philosophical and that in this way they will become serious-minded... " 
(1105b10). The crucial point is the repeated doing of courageous acts, 
the sign of courage as being a character trait, but whether this or that 
act is a courageous act will depend on the particular circumstances of 
this or that situation in which one acts, and not a general ideal type or 
exemplar of a courageous person. The latter looks a little too much like 
a recourse to a rule, principle or theory. 
It is here that the importance of phronesis comes in. As I have argued 
in the introduction, the wisdom, passion and imagination involved in 
phronesis are such only in relation to the particular circumstances of 
difficult situations, and the difficulty is that the circumstances are often 
such that there is only recourse to the foresightedness of the moral 
`inventor (see Introduction, pp. 39ff). But this will only be attained, and 
we will only be able to say that it has been attained, by reference to the 
particular circumstances of that difficult situation. In this sense the 
phronimos is not someone we are going to be able to refer or have 
recourse to. 
Again, Aristotle's teleology is internal not only in that, on a general 
level, he finds value within the ways in which human beings actually 
behave, but also in that in difficult situations ideally there will be an 
identity between what is required to be done and what is actually done. 
But whether such an identity will be attained will depend on the nature 
of the particular circumstances and not by reference to an ideal. It may 
well be the case that those circumstances will not allow such an 
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identity, which may be due either to the bad choices of individuals who 
helped bring those circumstances about, or to those circumstances 
being unintended and/or unforeseen such that no blame is warranted. 
Ideally, in such situations there will be the harmony of reason and 
desire involved in virtue; in blameworthy situations disharmony will be 
brought about by bad choices. In employing the duty/inclination 
dichotomy, based on the hard and fast distinction between reason and 
desire, morality is an external 'beyond' and we are imperfect as a 
species. For Aristotle on the other hand, we are imperfect through bad 
choices. What we can do we can do well, what we cannot do, through 
which there may be disharmony between reason and desire, we 
cannot be blamed for. That does not make us imperfect: we may not 
be perfect in that we are not divine, but that does not make us 
imperfect as a species, for the practical life is internal to our being the 
species that we are. 
It is this notion of an external criterion, I suggest, that marks off the 
significant difference between Kant's and Aristotle's ethical thought. 34 
In a footnote Hudson gives hint of this in mentioning the different 
teleologies that Aristotle and Kant employ, but he doesn't quite draw 
out the full significance of the difference. Aristotle's teleology of Action 
is internal. That is to say, the virtuous Action is one whereby there is an 
identity between what is required to be done and what is actually done, 
and such an identity will be achieved through a practical grasp of the 
circumstances at hand. There is no need for reference to an external 
criterion, just as there is no need for such a reference to recognise a 
34 That Kant attempts to provide an external criterion for good (or right) Action has long 
been a complaint of Bernard Williams. See, for example, Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy (Fontana, 1985). 
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virtuous Action, or when something is done well. the end, an Action 
well-done, will in its detail, its description, be internally related to the 
particular circumstances of the situation that called for Action. To 
generalise, for Aristotle morality is not an ideal (and surely here is the 
point of his attack on Plato's form of 'the Good'), but concerns the 
assessment of the problems and dilemmas that we face in life. Ethics 
can only guide us for the most part and there is no perfection to be 
attained. 35 
For Kant the situation is very different. Morality is only secondarily a 
matter of human affairs, although it is dependent on the vagaries of 
these affairs; the moral realm is a perfection to which we cannot attain, 
but the very notion, i. e. ideal, of morality is only possible because of 
our imperfection. Let us see how this fits in with the claim that Kant 
operates on an 'external' teleology. 
Teleology: the end of morality 
By 'external' here is meant that the end of something is validated by 
something other than that something. Thus, in the case of morality, the 
end of Action, validation comes from something external to any 
particular instance of Action. Although the Action is validated by the 
universal maxim by which it is carried out, the maxim itself pertains to a 
sphere that stands beyond the Action itself. 
35 There is the issue, with regard to Aristotle, of whether virtue proper is a matter of the 
practical, human affairs, or the concern of the 'godlike' theoria in us, something that I 
shall discuss in Chapter Seven. 
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We are indeed legislative members of a moral realm 
which is possible through freedom and which is 
presented to us as an object of respect by practical 
reason; yet we are at the same time subjects in it, not 
sovereigns, and to mistake our inferior position as 
creatures and to deny, from self-conceit, respect to the 
holy law is, in spirit, a defection from it even if its letter be 
fulfilled. 36 
The moral law is validated by reason, and we are "legislative 
members" of the "moral realm" in virtue of our being possessors of 
reason from which issues the maxim of our particular Actions; but we 
are subjects to the moral law and morality in that it rules over us. As 
such this is something that we must strive to respect - without such a 
striving there would be no sense to the idea of its ruling over us - and 
to constantly strive entails that what we strive towards is 'beyond' us. 
The possibility of such a command as, "Love God above 
all and thy neighbour as thyself' agrees very well with 
this.... The command which makes this a rule cannot 
require that we have this disposition but only that we 
endeavour after it.... That law of all laws, like every moral 
prescription of the gospel, thus presents the moral 
disposition in its complete perfection, and though as an 
ideal of holiness it is unattainable by any creature, it is yet 
36 1. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, tr. L. White Beck (Bobbs-Merril, 1956), pp. 85. 
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an archetype which we should strive to approach and to 
imitate in an uninterrupted infinite progress. 37 
At the root of this fundamental distinction between individual human 
beings as creatures and the moral realm is the fundamental distinction 
between reason and desires and inclinations, the legacy of the 
rationalist-empiricist debate. That we are affected by desires and 
inclinations accounts for our imperfection in relation to morality and the 
moral law, but also the very possibility of morality. 
If a rational creature could ever reach the stage of 
thoroughly liking to do all moral laws, it would mean that 
there was no possibility of there being in him a desire 
which could tempt him to deviate from them, for 
overcoming such a desire always costs the subject some 
sacrifice and requires self-compulsion, i. e., an inner 
constraint to do that which one does not quite like to do. 
To such a level of moral disposition no creature can ever 
attain. For since he is a creature, and consequently is 
always dependent with respect to what he needs for 
complete satisfaction with his condition, he can never be 
wholly free from his desires and inclinations which, 
because they rest on physical causes, do not of 
themselves agree with the moral law, which has an 
entirely different source. 38 
37 Ibid. pp. 85-6. The sense of `reverence for the law' that Kant prescribes is discussed 
by Williams, op. cit. (note 34 above), pp. 169 if., and Chapter Ten. 
38 Ibid. 
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Not only is the moral law transcendent to those who are to enact it, but 
its source is also transcendent to both practical and pure reason. 
Objects which in reference to the use of pure practical 
reason that is in conformity with duty must be thought of 
a priori (whether as consequences or grounds), but which 
are transcendent for its theoretical use, are mere things 
of faith. Of this kind is the highest good in the world, to be 
brought about by freedom.... the highest final purpose to 
be worked out by us, by which alone we can become 
worthy of being ourselves the final purpose of creation, is 
an idea which has, in a practical reference, objective 
reality for us and is also a thing. But because we cannot 
furnish such reality to this concept in a theoretical point of 
view, it is a mere thing of faith of the pure reason, along 
with God and immortality, as the condition under which 
alone we, in accordance with the constitution of our 
(human) reason, can conceive the possibility of that 
effect of the use of our freedom in conformity with law. 39 
The moral law, an object brought into reality by practical reason, and 
which is thought of by pure reason, has as its source neither of these. 
Rather, it is revealed to pure reason as a thing of faith - just as God 
and immortality are. Duty demands that we act, in spirit and in letter to, 
this revelation but, as I previously put it in the words of Hegel, "The 
unity, that man should be moral, is postulated; but beyond the 'should' 
and this talk of morality, no advance is made. " Specifically what we are 
to do is not at all clear - "... chill duty is the final undigested lump within 
39 I. Kant, Critique of Judgement, Tr. J. H. Bernard (Hafner, 1951), sec. 91. 
84 
the stomach, the revelation given to Reason" (LHP 3, pp. 461. ). A 
metaphysics of morals, grounded on a metaphysics of mind that 
distinguishes 'practical' reason from the practicalities of our needs and 
desires, and moreover the historical, social, political context within 
which those needs and desires can be rationally pursued, renders only 
a morality that is beyond practical use. 40 Kant's concern was to 
ascertain the grounds of ethics, but his insistence on the distinction 
between reason and desire leads him to a way of thinking that renders 
only abstract principles, that divorces ethics from its practical context. 41 
History and Philosophical Perspective: ideas, opinions and 
philosophers 
lt might be thought that in offering Hegel's discussion of Kant I am 
offering Hegel's challenge to Kant's thought. Certainly Hegel is 
ultimately critical of Kant's views on ethics, and in a sense criticism 
does represent a challenge. But in another sense it would be a 
misunderstanding of Hegel's conception of philosophy to see 
his 
treatment of Kant - or any philosopher - as a challenge. , 
40 As John McDowell notes, "There is no purely formal notion of practical reason such 
as Kant envisaged". "Two Sorts of Naturalism" in Virtues and Reasons (Clarendon, 
1995) ed. R. Hursthouse et. al. pp. 177. There is a similar theme running through both 
McDowell and Williams, op. cit., viz. that Kant's attempt to capture practical reason 
ends up as no more than a theoretical account. This is the basis of Hegel's critique of 
Kant's ethics generally, i. e. that it never manages to leave the abstract plane, 
something that Williams endorses (see e. g. op. cit. Pp. 184. ). 
41 In the next chapter I will bring this point up again in relation of the principle 'Duty for 
duty's sake'. 
85 
Criticism and Development 
For example, consider the history of philosophy. One idea of that 
history is that it is peopled by individual philosophers who produce their 
own ideas and thoughts as to what is true and false and that these 
ideas and thoughts supplant the ideas and thoughts of a previous 
philosopher, and thus truth in philosophy is represented by the ideas 
and thoughts of the dominant philosophy. 
The simple idea which people form of the history of 
philosophy arises from their awareness that there have 
been philosophies of many kinds, everyone of them 
asserting its possession and discovery of the truth and 
glorifying in the fact (ILHP, pp. 57). 
Thus the history of philosophy consists in the conflict between 
individual philosophers and philosophies. But 
This picture of numerous contradictory philosophies is the 
most superficial idea possible of the history of 
philosophy; and this difference is perversely used to the 
dishonour of philosophy. If someone goes no further than 
the idea of numerous philosophies, he yet assumes that 
only one of them could provide truth, and then goes on to 
argue that the truth of philosophy can only be opinions 
[meinungen]. 'Opinion' means an accidental thought, and 
we can derive it from mein [my]. It is a concept which is 
mine and therefore not universal (Ibid., pp. 58). 
Philosophy is dishonoured because it becomes no more than a series 
of opinions, and as such offers no criteria by which we might 
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distinguish what is true in all these opinions. But philosophy has 
nothing to do with individual opinions, for: 
The history of philosophy deals with the Ideas in the form 
of thinking. It presents conscious thinking, puts before us 
the heroes of thinking, of pure thinking, for our 
consideration in their achievements. The achievement is 
the more excellent the less the particular character of its 
author has imposed its seal on it. It is in philosophy that 
the particular (i. e. the particular or private activity of the 
philosopher) disappears, and all that remains is the field 
of pure thought (Ibid., pp. 62-3). 
We do indeed speak of the 'views' of philosophers - Plato's/Aristotle's/ 
Kant's... view on this or that - but what we, as philosophers, are 
interested in is not so much that it is Plato's view, but whether or not 
what he says is true. Now if we declare that what Plato says is true, 
then we are saying that it is true irrespective of the fact that Plato 
expressed it. It would be just as true if Aristotle or Kant had expressed 
it. Further, in declaring it to be true we are saying it is true irrespective 
of whether you or I declare it to be true. As philosophers, that is 
unimportant to us. Just as Locke could not accept what Descartes said 
about ideas, so Aristotle could not accept Plato's idea of the Good. But 
Locke accepted the validity of much of what Descartes said, just as 
Aristotle did of Plato. 
What is important, then, about the views of Plato and Aristotle, 
Descartes and Locke, is not that they thought this or that, but the 
thoughts that they expressed. As a philosopher my aim is not to 
communicate that I have this idea, or that I have this opinion, or this 
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view; what / think is in a sense irrelevant. It is the thought that such- 
and-such is the case that I am interested in communicating, and that is 
of philosophical relevance. 
Beliefs, Ideas and Philosophy 
To illustrate the point further consider a contribution to recent debates 
on practical ethics, Jonathan Glover's Causing Death and Saving 
Lives. 42 Glover describes his approach as rational - that is, in the area 
of killing and saving lives "... the right thing to do has been identified 
with what creates (in a broad interpretation of this phrase) the best 
total outcome". 43 One of the general criticisms he defends such an 
approach against is scepticism about arguing for a set of moral beliefs. 
Glover's choice of an example of such criticism is, a comment of 
Hegel's in the preface to P. R. Hegel's scepticism concerns particular 
philosophers' attempts to say how the world ought to be: 
Whatever happens, every individual is a child of his time; 
so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in 
thoughts. It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy 
can transcend its contemporary world as it is to fancy that 
an individual can overleap his own age, jump over 
Rhodes. If this theory really goes beyond the world as it 
is and builds an ideal one as it ought to be, that world 
exists indeed, but only in his own opinions, an 
42 Penguin, 1977. 
431bid. pp. 286. 
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insubstantial element where anything you please may, in 
fancy, be built. 44 
Glover replies: 
But this scepticism of Hegel's seems to rest on the 
dubious assumption that new ideas about how the world 
ought to be cannot influence what in fact happens.. . This 
doctrine of the impotence of ideas rests on one of two 
beliefs. One is that, in matters of morality, people can 
never be influenced by each other's beliefs. The other is 
that our moral beliefs and attitudes never determine what 
we do. 45 
Glover is seriously amiss in his understanding of the point being made 
by Hegel. This, however, is not to say that Glover merely misses 
Hegel's point, for if we consider what Glover says about Hegel and 
'new ideas' we will see that this is yet another example of the broad 
sweeping criticisms of Hegel which fail to take into account the details 
of what he is actually saying. Serious readers of Hegel will be hard put 
to find him dismissing the efficacy of new ideas, but he does question 
the assumption that such ideas are the sole products of the 
philosopher's mind. In particular he scorns those who 
... 
fancy that ideas and ideals are something far too 
excellent to have actuality, or something too important to 
procure it for themselves. This divorce between idea and 
reality is especially dear to the analytical understanding 
4 Quoted by Glover, pp. 32. 
45 Ibid. pp. 32-3 
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which looks upon its own abstractions, dreams though 
they are, as something true and real, and prides itself on 
the imperative "ought" which it takes especial pleasure in 
prescribing even on the field of politics. As if the world 
had waited on it to learn how it ought to be, and was 
not! 46 
The task of philosophy is to grasp in thought what is the case, and not 
what ought to be the case. There can be no doubt that I might 
influence other people by my ideas, beliefs and opinions, and that 
there is something in the claim that those ideas, beliefs and opinions 
have a say in what I do. But this is true whether or not my ideas, beliefs 
and opinions are right or wrong, true or false. If my ideas, beliefs and 
opinions are right and true, then they are in an important sense not my 
ideas, even though it is I who express them. That is to say, they are 
true and right of that which they reflect, the subject or state of affairs of 
which they are expressive, irrespective of the fact that I express them. 
And in this sense they are not 'new', although they may well be newly 
expressed, or the way in which I express them a new way doing so. All 
that has happened is that I have captured in thought and language 
what already is the case ('X is right or true'). What is of interest 
philosophically is that they are right and true, and not that they are my 
ideas, beliefs or opinions, and in this latter sense philosophy is not at 
all concerned with ideas, beliefs and opinions. 47 That what I think is 
right and true is incidental and arbitrary to the truth of what I think: 
46 Science of Logic Tr. A. V. Miller (Allen & Unwin, 1969), #6. Henceforth SL. 
47 This is one reason why Hegel employs the capital in 'Idea', i. e. to distinguish 
between an idea that the Cartesian legacy tells us we 'have in our heads' (something I 
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An opinion is a subjective idea; an optional thought, an 
imagination, which I have as so and so, while someone 
else can have it differently. An opinion is mine, it is not an 
inherently absolute thought. But philosophy contains no 
opinions; there are no philosophical opinions. If a man, 
even if he be an author of a history of philosophy, talks of 
philosophical opinions, we detect in him at once a lack of 
elementary education. Philosophy is an objective science 
of truth, a science of its necessity, of conceptual knowing; 
it is no opining and no web-spinning of opinions (SL, pp. 
17). 
Hegel's targets in the remarks that Glover uses are those who would 
have it that, for instance, Plato's Republic was an attempt at 
constructing an ideal state, rather than an "... interpretation of the 
nature of Greek ethical life" (PR, pp. 10) or those who themselves 
would construct a theoretical utopia and call it an exercise in 
philosophy. Thus Hegel's attack is not so much directed against moral 
beliefs and new ideas, but rather those writers who fancy that 
philosophy can provide a blueprint for a totally new ethical life. 
The Actual and the Ideal 
Consider Hegel's understanding of Plato's Republic as an 
"interpretation of the nature of Greek ethical life". The Republic 
attempts to capture the objective moral principles of the good state, 
shall take up further in the concluding chapter of Part One) and an Idea which is the 
expression of a true thought. 
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those upon which the Greek city state were based and which were 
expressed in its laws. However, within that state there was also a 'new' 
principle coming through, a principle that Plato perceived as corruptive. 
The objective moral principles of Greek ethical life were under threat 
from the moral relativism (Hegel calls this 'subjectivism') expressed in 
the teachings of the Sophists. For Hegel, Plato was correct to dismiss 
this as the pivot for ethical understanding, but he was in error to 
dismiss it altogether as having no place in the state. 
In his consideration of Plato, Hegel affirms his general approach that 
treats the state and its laws as being of a rational nature, and as such 
the state and law are represented as mind in its actuality. However, 
what is rejected by Hegel is that Plato does not allow a place for the 
individual in that he retains slavery, rejects private property, 48 and 
gives the guardians the power of assigning social position and 
employment. For Hegel, this involves a rejection of individuality, the 
concept of freedom, a concept that is realised in the actual laws and 
institutions of the state. However, the concept does find expression, 
albeit abstractly, in the teachings of Socrates based on the Delphic 
oracle's 'Know thyself: 
As one of the commoner features of history (e. g. in 
Socrates, the Stoics, and others), the tendency to look 
deeper into oneself and to know and determine from 
within oneself what is right and good appears in ages 
when what is recognised as right and good in 
48 Hegel appears to have The Republic in mind here, although Plato only restricted 
property ownership to the guardians. However, in The Laws 739b if. the stranger 
eulogises the prospect of shared, rather than private, property. 
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contemporary manners cannot satisfy the will of better 
men. (P. R. # 138) 
In The Republic the concept of freedom is abstract in that it gets little 
recognition in the formulation of the laws of the state. 
What we see here, according to Hegel, are the obligatory laws of 
Greek ethical life being challenged by the idea that laws be adhered to 
conscientiously rather than merely because they happen to be the laws 
of the state. 49 But this demand that the laws be adhered to 
conscientiously did not issue from the minds of philosophers, but is 
something that is central to the concept of freedom. Again, the concept 
of freedom is not the product of a particular philosopher, but is central 
to the concept of man. Hegel is not here advocating, prescribing, that 
we adopt the concept of freedom as some sort of moral principle, but 
making a descriptive observation about the nature of human beings. 
For Hegel freedom is something that is a corollary to the concept of a 
rational human being. When freedom fails to get recognition in the 
laws and constitution of a state ('mind in its actuality'), then that state is 
not what it ought to be and individuals (or group, class, etc. ) are not 
being treated in the way they ought to be. A similar point about 'new 
ideas' is made by Socrates when he describes himself as a midwife 
bringing to birth the ideas already embryonic in men's minds. 50 
49 We see this conflict implicit in the thoughts of Socrates in his last days: although he 
argued that he had done no wrong, Socrates took the hemlock as a good citizen. The 
following point concerning freedom will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two. 
50 This relates to Plato's theory on the reminiscence of ideas from a previous life. See 
especially Socrates' questioning of the slave about geometrical propositions in the 
Meno 82, Plato's Dialogues tr. B. Jowett (Oxford 1891,3`d ed. ). See also Theaetatus 
210. Hegel remarks: it is the assisting into the world of thought that which is already 
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Thus for Hegel the task of a philosophical consideration of ethics is not 
to produce ideas and theories, derived from abstract principles, about 
how we ought to go about our lives, but to explicate ethical concepts in 
their relation to what is meant by being a rational human being. If 
human beings are rational, then they are not in need of philosophy - by 
way of abstract ideas, principles, theories - to provide them with 
rationality. Similarly, any truth that ethical concepts have will not be on 
the grounds that they are deducible from either faculties of the mind or 
abstract principles, but on the grounds of the Actions and activities 
which constitute the actual expression of those concepts. Thus the 
'new idea' of Ancient Greece was not the sole product of a 
philosophical mind, although it is true to say that various thinkers 
attempted to capture in thought the relationship between rational 
Action and activities and the ethical community - laws, customs, 
associations, relationships. Not until we come to Aristotle do we see a 
comprehensive attempt at showing such a relationship. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explored Hegel's view of philosophy against the 
background of 17th Century epistemology and metaphysics. The latter 
produces a metaphysics of mind that renders human beings as 
essentially distinct from one another, individual hexes of reason and 
desire. Such a way of thinking then leads to an attempt to grasp the 
nature of morality in one or other of these faculties of the mind, in 
doing so abstracting morality from the social, historical, political context 
contained in the consciousness of the individual - the showing from the concrete, 
unreflected consciousness, the universality of the concrete. " LHP vol. 1, pp. 402. 
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of human conduct. For Hegel, the rationality of human beings is not 
located in individual minds, nor their morality located in abstract 
principles and theories. Individuality is indeed an aspect of human life, 
but not in the sense of an abstract individuality derived from individual 
minds; rather, it is a feature of the social, historical, political community 
- i. e. the ethical life - in which human beings conduct themselves. It is 
within the ethical community that individuality is expressed. 
It is this starting point - the proposition that man is essentially a social 
creature - which distinguishes the thought of Aristotle and Hegel from 
the history of thought that follows Descartes' starting point. From the 
latter perspective, much criticism has been levelled at Hegel for 
subsuming the individual under the authority of the state, and with 
respect to Aristotle it is claimed that there are problems assimilating 
the individual with a general conception of eudaimonia. In the next 
chapter I shall show that this involves a misunderstanding of Hegel (a 
later chapter showing a similar misunderstanding with respect to 
Aristotle). 
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2. ETHICS AND THE INDIVIDUAL: LAW, REASON AND FREEDOM 
IN MORAL LIFE 
Introduction 
The argument of the Cogito produces a picture of human beings as 
being in possession of individual 'minds' with the capacity to reason, 
this being what ultimately distinguishes man from other animals and 
the world in general. Although the inference involved in the Cogito 
attracted many critics, the view that we possess some such thing 
(whether in the form of analogies such as a tabula rasa, a block of 
marble, or as an 'understanding' furnished with categories, to name 
just a few attempts to grasp what it was) attracted general consent. 
Despite some important attempts in the 20th Century (influenced 
mainly by the work of Wittgenstein and Ryle which, otherwise, has 
largely been ignored) to rid philosophy of such thinking, the general 
idea that there is something 'in us' within which reason and desire are 
located still holds sway. 
In contrast, the starting point for Aristotle and Hegel is the proposition 
that man is essentially a social creature, and "The rational end of man 
is life in the state... " (PR #75[A]). This proposition is not something that 
is grounded by philosophy, in the sense that the argument of the 
Cogito is the ground upon which the view that human beings are 
essentially individual consciousnesses is based. Rather, philosophy - 
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in its treatment of the concepts of mind, Action, ethics, politics, etc. - 
reflects and assimilates it. In doing so philosophy is reflecting and 
assimilating the rationality of mind, etc. as expressed in the world, 
rather than providing a rationality for mind etc. by way of abstract 
reasoning. It is in this reflecting and assimilation that Hegel says 
philosophy is concerned with what is (and it is in this sense that we can 
say that, for Hegel, propositions of philosophy are of the form 'This is 
how things are'). In a philosophical account, the philosopher is 
reflecting and assimilating that of which he speaks in thoughts and 
words. 
Neither does the proposition that man is essentially a social creature 
represent merely a particular view on ethics and politics. Hegel 
certainly does not have an a priori conception of man as possessing 
some such thing as a 'mind'. This would involve the sort of abstract 
and metaphysical thinking that he was so critical of in his predecessors 
and contemporaries. In his discussion of the philosophy of mind in 
EPS Hegel takes as his starting point man in relation to, and 
assimilation of, his environment. The Phenomenology is a logical 
survey of the attitudes and relationships of human beings to one 
another. In a sense, we don't have 'minds' until we start acting and 
thinking in the world in which we are situated. ' That is to say, mind is 
I In On Certainty (tr. G. E. M. Anscombe and D. Paul, Blackwell 1969) Wittgenstein 
quotes from Goethe's Faust: "... und schreib getrost 'Im Anfang war die Tat' [and write 
with confidence 'in the beginning was the deed']". This relates to the general point 
made throughout this thesis of how philosophical language often becomes abstract and 
loses sight of its subject-matter. In his discussion paper "Cause and Effect intuitive 
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indicative of purposeful Action or, more precisely, purposeful Action is 
mindfulness. Thus, in PR what we get is a discussion of mind in 
relation to the historical, social, ethical and political institutions that 
have developed through purposeful Action. This is the basis of Hegel's 
discussion of reason, law and freedom, carried out in contrast to the 
abstract nature of the discussions of his predecessors and 
contemporaries - the subject of the present chapter. 
My considerations will show that a deep misunderstanding lies at the 
root of a particularly entrenched view of Hegel, i. e. that the ultimate 
justification of law and ethics is provided by the state and society to 
which they belong. More importantly, however, they will show that our 
reasonings - our reasons and motives for acting - are socially 
constituted. 
State, Society and the Individual 
One consequence of taking the proposition that man is essentially a 
social creature as merely a particular position on ethics and politics, 
rather than as a logical basis for a discussion on the nature of ethics 
and politics, is that it is thought to entail holding the social - the 
community, society, state, etc. - as having ethical and political primacy 
over the individual. This is something that Hegel in particular has been 
accused of sanctioning. Here I shall argue that such accusations are 
based on misunderstandings and confusions of what he actually says. 
awareness' (in Philosophia vol. 6,1976, pp. 420) Wittgenstein writes: "Language - 
want to say - is a refinement, 'Im Anfang war die Tat'". I shall return to this point in the 
introduction to Part Two of the thesis. 
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The Social Contract and Arbitrary Morality 
In the field of moral, social and political philosophy, one of the major 
consequences of viewing human beings as primarily individual was to 
raise questions about the nature, origin and justification of the state 
and its laws. Given that we are primarily individuals, what is the origin 
of that which holds us together in commonwealth, the state and its 
laws, and wherein lies its authority? 
It has recently become very fashionable to regard the 
state as a contract of all with all. Everyone makes a 
contract with the monarch, so the argument runs, and he 
again with his subjects (PR #75 [A]). 
When the philosophers of the era of the 'thinking understanding' 
turned their thoughts to moral and political philosophy, almost 
invariably they turned to the idea of some sort of social contract. This 
is witnessed in the works of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and 
Fichte, to name some. For Hegel, however, "This point of view arises 
from thinking superficially of a mere unity of different wills" (Ibid. ), 
another example of thought based on abstract reasoning and logical 
inferences (PR #258). Crudely speaking, such reasoning starts with 
the proposition that humans are essentially individual and, faced with 
rules and laws that hold them together in a common purpose, draws 
the inference that the state must be based on some form of contract. 
Hegel's dissatisfaction with contract theory is two-fold. Firstly, the 
reasoning behind it makes morality, law and the state contingent and 
arbitrary. That is to say, in contract, two parties come to an agreement, 
and the contract is contingent upon the willingness of the two parties to 
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come to an agreement. Thus, there may, or may not, be a contract. To 
carry this over to morality, law and the state is to suggest that there 
may or may not be morality, law and state, contingent upon the 
willingness of the individuals involved to come to some sort of 
agreement about particular morals, laws and state. Secondly, it is 
clearly empirically false: it cannot lie in the arbitrariness of the 
individual's will "... because we are already citizens of the state by birth" 
(PR #75 [A]). 
Hegel's view of the task and scope of philosophy has led to many 
confusions amongst his commentators, especially in the areas of 
ethics and politics. Here I shall concentrate on one particular 
confusion, which concerns supposed implications of his view of 
philosophy. This will not only answer some of the charges that have 
been made of Hegel under such confusions. It will also (and more 
importantly) give a clearer idea of: 1) the relationship between the 
individual and social life, the central thread of Hegel's treatment of 
ethics and politics (a project that will be undertaken in relation to 
Aristotle in Chapter Seven); and 2) one of the main strands of the 
current thesis, viz. that often the ways of thinking, the lines of 
reasoning, that philosophers get caught up in, determines thought 
about mind, Action, ethics, politics, etc., rather than mind etc. 
determining thought. That is to say, that of which philosophy 
purportedly speaks is often merely a reflection of ways of thinking, 
rather than thought reflecting that of which it speaks. 
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Hegel and His Critics: the state, duty, and the individual 
The general confusion to which I refer has two closely related aspects. 
Firstly, it is said that Hegel's view of philosophy implies political 
conservatism: if philosophy does only describe things as they are and 
not advocate how they ought to be, Hegel's description of ethical life is 
of such a nature that there is no justification for change. Moral and 
ethical values are determined by the society and state in which we live, 
and there is nothing over and above to appeal to in order to justify 
changing what we might see as an unjust aspect of that society. The 
second aspect of the confusion is that this implies an extreme moral 
relativism. Thus, for instance, if a society practices slavery, or 
discriminates against a particular racial group, then such practices are 
right for that particular society for right is right precisely because the 
particular society says it is. 
Such charges are based on two short-comings in commentators' 
reading of what Hegel says. First of all, those who accuse fail to take 
seriously what Hegel sees as the task of philosophy, what it can and 
cannot do. This failing is often due to not reading what he says closely 
enough. Secondly, they fail to grasp the relationship between the 
individual and the state/ society in general, remaining on the level of 
viewing these categories in terms of a dichotomy - something that has 
been a feature of philosophy, in different forms, throughout its history. 2 
In his Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard expresses concern at the 
prevailing Hegelian orthodoxy of his day which, he believed, found no 
2 Hegel sees this dichotomy as one particular form of the logical categories of the 
general and the particular (SL), other forms being the one and the many, universal and 
particular, substance and attribute (LHP). 
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place for the individual in its assessment of ethics. For Hegel, 
according to Kierkegaard, "The ethical as such is the universal"3 and 
this universal is the social morality of the day; to be ethical is to 
submerge and, in an important way, lose oneself in that morality. 
The single individual... is the individual who has his telos 
in the universal, and it is his ethical task continually to 
express himself in this, to annul his singularity in order to 
become the universal. 4 
This view of Hegel might be illustrated by passages such as the 
following: 
Whether the individual exists or not is all one to the 
objective ethical order. It alone is permanent and is the 
power regulating the life of individuals. Thus the ethical 
order has been represented by mankind as eternal 
justice, as gods absolutely existent, in contrast with which 
the empty business of individuals is only a game of see- 
saw. (PR #145 [A]) 
The right of individuals to be subjectively destined to 
freedom is fulfilled when they belong to an actual ethical 
order, because their conviction of their freedom finds it's 
truth in such an objective order, and it is in an ethical 
order that they are actually in possession of their own 
essence or their own inner universality. (PR # 153) 
3 Fear and Trembling and Repetition ed. & tr. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton, 1983), pp. 54. 
4 Ibid. 
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The idea that morality requires that the individual submerge and lose 
himself in the prevailing social morality seems to come over clearly in 
Bradley's considerations in `My Station and its Duties': 
In short, man is a social being; he is real only because he 
is social, and can realize himself only because it is as 
social that he realizes himself. The mere individual is a 
delusion of theory; and the attempt to realize it in practice 
is the starvation and mutilation of human nature, with total 
sterility or the production of monstrosities. 5 
Taken out of the context of Bradley's stated purpose in Ethical Studies, 
this comment suggests the following. To be moral is to lose one's self 
in the duties that my station and position prescribe for me, and thus 
lose my self in the social morality of the society and state in which I 
live. The worrying nature of such an idea comes out starkly in that it 
would suggest, for instance, that the judges at the Nuremberg war 
crimes trials were wrong to find the accused guilty, for what is right is 
right precisely in that state and society demand it, and thus the 
accused were merely fulfilling the duties as demanded by the state. 
Hegel seems to be saying much the same when he states: 
In an ethical community, it is easy to say what a man 
must do, what are the duties he has to fulfil in order to be 
virtuous: he has simply to follow the well-known and 
explicit rules of his own situation. Rectitude is the general 
character which may be demanded of him by law or 
custom (PR #150). 
5 In Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1927,2nd edition), p. 174. 
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However, to represent Bradley and Hegel in such a way involves a 
gross distortion and misreading. In the introduction to Ethical Studies 
Bradley states his purpose as to examining ethical concepts by 
following them to their logical conclusion, and not to put forward his 
own ethical views. 
The object of this volume is not the construction of a 
system of moral philosophy.... The writer's object in this 
work has been mainly critical. He sees that ethical 
theories rest in the end on preconceptions metaphysical 
and psychological. 6 
In 'My Station and its Duties' Bradley takes up where he left off in the 
previous Essay, a discussion of Kant's abstract and one-sided 'Duty for 
Duty's Sake', and looks at the notion of duty in its social context. As 
such, the theory exhibited in 'My Station' is the result of following an 
ethical concept to its logical conclusion, and although this represents 
an improvement it is nevertheless still one-sided, as he states in the 
next Essay, 'Ideal Morality'.? If we follow the logic, the way of 
reasoning, that an analysis of the principle of duty suggests, then it can 
be the case that there is no place for the individual in the scheme of 
things. That is to say, to concentrate on abstract principles and follow 
the way of thinking that those principles dictate often involves ending 
up in a position one does not necessarily want to be in. Contrary to the 
6 Ibid. Preface to the First Edition. 
7 Ibid., p. 214. It has been suggested that 'Duty for Duty's Sake' and 'My Station', and 
by implication 'Ideal morality', are separate Essays. Now this has some truth in it, but 
to view them as totally separate is misleading in that they represent developments. 
This is signalled for us by Bradley in the preface saying the Essays "... are so far 
connected that, for the most part, they must be read in the order in which they stand". 
Ibid., p. viii. 
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view suggested by a reading of 'My Station and its Duties' taken out of 
this context, Bradley remarks in the aforementioned note: 
A man can not take his morality simply from the moral 
world he is in, for many reasons. That moral world, being 
in a state of historical development, is not and can not be 
self-consistent; and the man must thus stand before and 
above inconsistencies, and reflect on them. This must 
lead to the knowledge that the world is not altogether as it - 
should be, and to a process of trying to make it better. 8 
To fail to mention this aspect of Ethical Studies is to misrepresent 
Bradley's purpose. 
Similarly we might randomly dip into the Philosophy of Right at any 
point and extract statements which would support the charges of 
conservatism. However, this would be to do an injustice to Hegel, and 
to distort his intentions, for in doing so we would be pulling such 
statements out of the context of the development of his argument, for 
the Philosophy of Right is essentially the development of the concept 
of right (PR #2). Consequently, to use a particular statement as some 
sort of last word is quite unjustified. Kierkegaard's account of the fate 
of the individual in a society where the state and its laws holds 
absolute sway is indeed a worrying prospect. But to suggest that this is 
what Hegel is saying is a serious mis-reading of Hegel. 
,,, ýe 
8 Ibid. p. 204. 
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Law, Justification, and The Task of Philosophy 
Such a mis-reading involves concentrating on the abstract distinction 
between the individual and the state, the private person and the laws, 
rather than looking to the historical and social context from which they 
have been abstracted. Hegel certainly recognises the possibility of 
unjust laws. At PR #3 (a paragraph that those who accuse Hegel of 
conservatism and quietism would do well to read closely) he says: 
If inclination, caprice, and the sentiments of the heart are 
set up in opposition to positive right and the laws, 
philosophy at least cannot recognize authorities of that 
sort. - That force and tyranny may be an element in law is 
accidental to law and has nothing to do with its nature.... 
It may well be the case that a ruler enacts a law purely to suit his own 
ends, whether in line with his own particular inclinations and likes and 
dislikes, or to increase his power to the detriment of the population at 
large. These are motives which philosophy does not recognise (i. e. as 
authorities) in that philosophy is concerned with the universal nature, 
i. e. the concept, of law as such, and not particular ways in which it has 
been employed. Particular laws reflect the particular circumstances of 
a society, the particular provisions that already prevail, often to quite 
outrageous and absurd results. Thus, Hegel tells us, in Roman law 
"... there could be no definition of 'man', since 'slave' could not be 
brought under it - the very status of slave indeed is an outrage on the 
conception of man... "(PR #2). Again, the Romans introduced 'empty 
verbal distinctions' and 'downright foolish subterfuges' in order to 
satisfy the laws of the day. 
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A particular law may be shown to be wholly grounded in 
and consistent with the circumstances and with existing 
legally established institutions, and yet it may be wrong 
and irrational in its essential character, like a number of 
provisions in Roman private law which followed quite 
logically from such institutions as Roman matrimony and 
Roman patria potestas (ibid. ). 
Hegel's grievance with patria potestas was that it allowed a father to 
sell his children, the further ramifications of which were (as with slaves, 
which they therefore effectively became) that male offspring who were 
thus sold never became persons in law, and the only property that they 
could own was that gained through war. 
Later, with the growing feeling for rationality, the 
unethical provisions of laws such as these and others 
were evaded in the course of their administration, for 
example with the help of the expression bonorum 
possessio instead of hereditas, and through the fiction of 
nicknaming a filla a filius. This was referred to above (see 
remark to paragraph 3) as the sad necessity to which the 
judge was reduced in the face of bad laws - the necessity 
of smuggling reason into them on the sly, or at least into 
some of their consequences. Connected with this were 
the terrible instability of the chief political institutions and 
a riot of legislation to stem the outbreak of resulting evils 
(PR #180). 
Hegel's point here is that considering the corrupt and unethical basis 
upon which later Roman jurists had to work on, certain rather peculiar 
looking moves, e. g. the creation of certain fictions, can seen to be 
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justified under the circumstances. But given this, it would be ludicrous 
to suggest that such moves could be justified as a general principle in 
legislation. But outrageous and absurd as these might be, they are not 
the concern of philosophy. 
For sure, a philosophical attitude can recognise injustice, but to do 
something about it involves Action, whether political, legislative, 
demonstrative, etc. - not something that is the result of philosophy9. 
The latter is concerned with the concept of right [Recht, law], and not 
particular ways in which it has been employed in specific laws. It is 
through a philosophical account of law by which the relationship, rather 
than the apparent opposition, between the individual and the state can 
be grasped. 
Laws and Law Makers: ethical conflict, reason, and the end of the 
State 
The distinction between the concept of right and the particular ways 
that it has been employed in specific laws is central to an 
understanding of what Hegel is attempting to do in the Philosophy of 
Right as a whole. The specific laws that have been enacted are the 
concern, not of philosophy, but of the historian of law (as undertaken 
9 This is the point of Marx's 11th Thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only 
interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it. " Early Writings, tr. R. 
Livingstone & G. Benton (Penguin, 1974). This does not say that philosophy should 
change the world, only that it merely describes it. Marx may well have come to think 
that philosophy was of no use in that it does not change the world, but only in that it is 
not the sort of thing that is going to change the world. If so Hegel might be accused of 
being conservative for doing philosophy rather than manning the barricades, say, but 
that would be a charge to Hegel the person, and not his philosophy. The latter, after all, 
only interprets the world. 
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by Montesquieu in L'esprit des Lois), or the student of positive law, 
whose interests lie in the legal provisions of a particular state or 
society. If justification is sought with regard to specific laws as they 
have been enacted in history, then we need to take heed of what 
Montesquieu teaches us. Although his work was historical, he 
nevertheless expressed 'the genuinely philosophical position', 
... namely that 
legislation both in general and in its 
particular provisions [positive law] is to be treated not as 
something isolated and abstract but rather as a 
subordinate moment in a whole, interconnected with all 
the other features which make up the character of a 
nation and an epoch. It is in being so connected that the 
various laws acquire their true meaning and therewith 
their justification (PR #3). 
That is to say, whether a specificlaw in a particular society at any 
given time is meaningful (i. e. adequate to the intentions of the 
legislator) or just, requires looking at the historical and contemporary 
circumstances which led to its enactment, what it was designed to 
achieve and the motives that lay behind its enactment. 
These laws are positive in so far as they have their 
meaning and appropriateness in contemporary 
conditions, and therefore their sole value is historical and 
they are of a transitory nature. The wisdom of what 
legislators and administrators did in their day or settled to 
meet the needs of the hour is a separate matter and one 
properly to be assessed by history. History's recognition 
of it will be all the deeper the more its assessment is 
supported by a philosophical outlook (Ibid. ). 
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Thus, although L'esprit des Lois is an account of the historical 
appearances of law, and thus is not a philosophy of law, it is assisted 
by Montesquieu's philosophical observation that specific laws have 
their meaning and value in the historical and contemporary conditions 
in which they appear. But "Natural law, or law from the philosophical 
point of view, is distinct from positive law... " (Ibid. ), in that philosophy is 
concerned with the concept of law rather than the particular provisions 
made in its name. What, then, other than the particular provisions that 
have been enacted, is the concept of law, and what is Hegel getting at 
in suggesting that the philosophical point of view is synonymous with 
'natural law'? Let us consider this from the relationship between the 
two - the concept of law and positive law, i. e. law as posited in a 
specific provision. 
Law, Authority and Conflict 
One of the ways in which Hegel illustrates the difference between 
natural and positive law is the conflicts that appear in the Greek 
tragedies. The exemplar of this for Hegel is Sophocles' Antigone. In 
acting against Creon's proclamation that the corpse of Antigone's 
brother Polynices is not to receive rites and burial, Antigone conforms 
steadfastly to the laws of the gods and tradition. "... you had the gall to 
break this law? " asks Creon of her. She replies: 
Of course I did. It wasn't Zeus, not in the least, 
who made this proclamation - not to me. 
Nor did that justice, dwelling with the gods 
beneath the earth, ordain such laws for men. 
Nor did I think your edict had such force 
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that you, a mere mortal, could override the gods, 
the great unwritten, unshakeable traditions. 
They are alive, not just today or yesterday: 
they live forever, from the first of time, 
and no one knows when they first saw the light. 10 
Here natural law, the unwritten, the given, is in conflict with the posited 
law of a ruler, and "This [natural]law is there displayed as a law 
opposed to public law, to the law of the land" (PR #166). But this public 
law, enacted and posited by Creon, was itself an infringement of what 
was hitherto a public law of the land, namely the law that decreed that 
the bodies of enemies should be buried. "This is the supreme 
opposition in ethics... " (ibid. ). The specific reference of this natural law 
is the family, as it is Antigone's and Ismene's duty as the last females 
of the family to apply the rites and bury the corpse. This duty is laid 
down by the gods, and over-rides any man made law: to fail in this duty 
would be treacherous - Ismene refuses, but "No one will ever convict 
me for a traitor" says Antigone. " 
It is important to take note here that Hegel does not see a 
philosophical solution to the conflict between Antigone and Creon, i. e. 
that philosophy can adjudicate one to be right and the other wrong. It is 
10 The Three Theban Plays, Tr. Robert Fagles (Penguin Classics, 1984) p. 82. We 
should not be put off here by the fact that Antigone expresses laws, for Hegel natural, 
through religion, for Hegel sees religion as a way of capturing natural laws mediated by 
divinity, whereas philosophy attempts to grasp them directly: "In their religions peoples 
have deposited their thoughts about the being of the world, the Absolute, what exists in 
and for and by itself, their convictions about the cause, the being, the substance of 
nature and spirit, and then their views on how human spirit or nature is related to these 
matters, to God and the truth". IHLP, pp. 123-4. 
11 Op. cit. p. 61 
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the conflict itself that is of interest to Hegel, as it expresses the relation 
between two natural forms of association. On the one hand, Antigone 
rightly expresses duty towards family, but this does not validate the 
implied universal of 'Duty to the family before state'. On the other hand, 
Creon is correct in saying that in the state lies the security of 
individuals and family, but that does not entitle him, or the state in 
general, to show such disregard for the institution of family. The family 
is 'natural' in that it is a way in which we individuals pursue our 
interests and satisfy our needs, and as such the state needs to 
recognise and respect this: 
What is of the utmost importance is that the law of 
reason be shot through and through by the law of 
particular freedom, and that my particular end should 
become identified with the universal end, or otherwise the 
state is left in the air. The state is only actual when its 
members have a feeling of their own self-hood and it is 
stable only when public and private ends are identical. It 
has often been said that the end of the state is the 
happiness of its citizens. That is perfectly true. If all is not 
well with them, if their subjective aims are not satisfied, if 
they do not find that the state as such is the means to 
their satisfaction, then the footing of the state itself is 
insecure (PR #265 [A]). 
The importance of the conflict between Antigone and Creon for Hegel 
is that it illustrates various aspects of the nature of law. One of those 
aspects is that when the state disregards the aims of individual citizens 
in its proclamations it gives itself the appearance of an `objective 
ethical order that stands over the subjective aims of the citizens in a 
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relationship of authority. But this is only how it appears to be, for what 
it is in fact doing is undermining the security of the state in its proper, 
i. e. actual, form where the laws, particular expressions of the law of 
reason, "be shot through and through by the law of particular freedom, 
and that my particular end should become identified with the universal 
end". 
In considering what Hegel is saying here we should resist thinking in 
terms of the problem as a failure in the ruler or law maker to bridge the 
gulf between the state and the individual, as if the state and individual 
are distinct phenomena, with the (good) law as that which joins them in 
union. What in fact has happened is that Creon, by his proclamation, 
has created the gulf between state and individual, and has thus 
created a situation in which the state is not actual, but is 'left in the air'. 
In this sense, the distinction between individual and state, the starting 
point of social contract theories and abstract theories of morality, is in 
fact something that is brought about by the enactment of a bad law. 
Another important aspect of the nature of law that Antigone illustrates 
for Hegel is that often law is taken for granted. In everyday life we don't 
constantly ask about the justification or rationality of the laws. In a 
sense, we take them as given. Only when Creon acts against given 
and established laws and customs does Antigone raise the question of 
the justification of that which Creon desecrates, and all that she can 
say on that score is refer to them as "the great unwritten, unshakeable 
traditions. They are alive, not just today or yesterday: they live forever, 
from the first of time, and no one knows when they first saw the light". 
The question of justification is raised, but she does not reason about 
that, but accepts them on the basis that they are the edicts of the 
gods. In this she follows them 'unselfconsciously' (PR #144 [A]). 
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On the other hand, Creon's proclamation shows the self-conscious 
aspect of the law, in that it was a conscious enactment. However, his 
enactment was not true to the concept of law, it was not "shot through 
and through by the law of particular freedom" which is the basis of the 
actual (i. e. good) state. The proclamation was motivated by his 
particular desire to disgrace the memory of Polynices, in doing so 
bringing about his own demise and undermining the secure footing of 
the state. 
Hegel's point here is that the conflict arises because neither of the two 
protagonists refer to the 'law of reason' for justification, but appeal to 
different 'authorities' as intermediaries. Antigone appeals to tradition 
and the gods, but to attempt to justify something because it has always 
been so, or because the gods have ruled that it should be so, is to 
resort to authorities rather than to consider whether it is reasonable. 
Similarly Creon justifies his Action because he is the ruler, the law 
maker, but that does not necessarily entail that the proclamation is a 
reasonable one. Reason is in no need of intermediate authorities or 
external criteria, for what is reasonable is reasonable on its own 
account. 
Established Law and the Spirit of Reflection 
That Hegel sees no philosophical solution to the conflict is due to the 
fact that a resolution requires an Action, an Action that relates to, has 
reference to, and is motivated by, the circumstances of the situation at 
hand - details which will be the reference point of the assessment of 
reason. However, what the example does bring out is that it raises the 
question of the justification of particular laws, and brings into question 
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the extent of the authority of rulers. In acting as he did, Creon himself, 
acting out of his individual interests, raises the question of the extent of 
his own authority in relation to the authority of common, 
unselfconscious custom and tradition, appealed to by Antigone ("No 
one will ever convict me for a traitor". My emphasis). Whatever Actions 
are taken to resolve conflicts such as this, they will always be open to 
the assessment of reason. With the laws of the land, whether in the 
form of accepted custom and tradition, or in the form of the edicts of 
rulers, 
... 
they arouse the spirit of reflection, and their diversity at 
once draws attention to the fact that they are not 
absolute. Positive laws are something posited, something 
originated by men. Between what is so originated and 
man's inner voice (i. e. reason] there may be an inevitable 
clash or there may be agreement. Man does not stop 
short at the existent, but claims to have in himself the 
measure of what is right (PR p. 4 [A]). 
Whatever 'authority' is appealed to in justification of a particular law or 
state, reason is on hand to question it. When a ruler, or rulers, act in 
their own private interests and contrary to the interests of the end of 
the state - i. e. 'the happiness of its citizens', man being social by 
nature - merely on the grounds that they are the rulers, then they bring 
into question the justification of their own government. The fact of 
being in authority as government is no good reason for any laws that 
may be enacted, and similarly just because something has been 
traditionally so and customary is no good reason for it to be so now 
and in the future. 
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Supposed justifications such as these deny the 'spirit of reflection', 
reason, and thus run counter to the proposition that man is a rational 
creature. The very notion of an external criterion to which reason 
appeals is to afford that criterion an absolute authority over reason. For 
then reason is justified in its considerations if, and only if, those 
considerations refer to that criterion as their authority. Thinking and 
acting that rests on a criterion external to the particular and specific 
circumstances, the basis of an assessment of practical reason, is the 
true source of relativism. 12 
In starting their analyses with the abstract categories of the individual 
and the state, social contract theorists attempted - in the notion of 
contract - to find a principle to mediate between ruler and ruled. This is 
in itself unsurprising in the historical context of the era of Locke, 
Rousseau, Kant etc. Hegel's complaint was that they did not go far 
enough in their analysis. The historical circumstances of the period 
were such that traditional authority, and the extent of the authority of 
those who ruled over individual members of society, came into 
question. But this distinction between authority and the individual in the 
historical events of the time, was not due to the lack of a theory that 
would bridge the gap. Rather, it was due to the fact that the rulers had 
ruled badly, and had thus themselves brought up the question which 
was to be answered in, e. g. the events of the French revolution. 
12 Such relativism is reflected in many areas. Politics has its ideologies, religion has its 
gods, morality has its principles: this ideology, this god, this principle is the justification 
of what it is good and right to do, and what is good and right is only so in relation to this 
criterion. But the history of humankind has shown, in the form of opposition and dissent, 
that in the light of the 'spirit of reflection' such justifications are inadequate to the role 
that they pretend to. 
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The distinction between individual and authority is a feature of 
situations where things are not as they ought to be; taking them as a 
fundamental feature of the human condition is to abstract them from 
this context. A further move in such abstract reasoning is to think of 
rules and laws as primarily imposed on individuals, rather than as an 
inherent and central feature of purposive Action. Certainly history is 
awash with examples where rules and laws have indeed been 
imposed, but the concept of a rule and law is not the invention or sole 
possession of those relatively few who have been in the position to 
make such impositions. Acting according to rules and laws is, rather, 
the distinguishing factor of purposive Action, the thread (as it were) of 
the practical business of life. 
Rules, Laws and Ethics: the rational and the actual 
In his consideration of law Hegel points to a similarity between the laws 
of nature and the laws of the land: just as we consider the laws of 
nature as given, it is also the case that, as members of social 
communities, there are laws of the land that are given, whether we 
agree with their specific content or not. However, this not a fact in the 
sense of a brute fact, something that is given independently of human 
life, but is a fact in virtue of the rationality of human life. Consider 
games. Chess, football, etc. involve particular rules that are intrinsic to 
the playing of those games (e. g. someone who doesn't move the rook, 
bishop etc. in the established ways is not playing chess). These 
particular rules are the expression of, and thus presuppose, 
. 
the 
concept of a rule. But whereas it would make sense to ask who 
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invented chess, football, etc., and when they were invented, asking 
who invented the concept of a rule, and when it was invented, is 
baffling. For Hegel, the fact that there are laws is something that is 
given in that the concept of law is a given. This is itself a particular 
feature of the fact that man is rational: the existence of laws is the 
expression of reason. 
Over the years the rules of many games and sports have undergone 
change, for many different reasons. Often, though, this is because they 
gave an unfair advantage to one contestant (team etc. ), or because, 
for instance, a particular rule gives room for unfair advantage, or a 
contestant has found a way to use a particular rule for their own 
advantage. That is to say, change has come about because there is a 
better, fairer, way to play, i. e. something isn't right. In this way, the 
rules have aroused the 'spirit of reflection', not only in that something 
isn't quite right, but also in cases where contestants have found a way 
around the rules. This is also the case with law. Changes are made 
because they don't do what they are supposed to, or certain parties 
have been able to manipulate them, i. e. particular laws may not reflect 
the spirit of the law - something is not right. The actual content of a 
specific law may well be unethical, tyrannical, unjust, etc., and this will 
'arouse the spirit of reflection' as to its validity. But 
In nature, the highest truth is that there is a law; in the 
law of the land, the thing is not valid simply because it 
exists [in terms of its specific content]; on the contrary, 
everyone demands that it shall comply with his private 
criterion. (PR preface, p. 4 [A]). 
In questioning a specific law, it is not that we are questioning the 
existence of a law, only it's specific character. In questioning a law 
118 
thus, in suggesting that it is a bad, unjust, law, we are saying that it is 
contrary to the very idea of a law, contrary to reason. Here there is a 
clash 
... between what ought to be and what is, between the 
absolutely right which stands unaltered and the arbitrary 
determinations of what is to be recognized as right.... But 
it is precisely in these clashes between what is absolutely 
right and what arbitrariness makes pass as right that 
there lies the need for studying the fundamentals of right. 
In right, man must meet with his own reason; 
consequently, he must consider the rationality of right, 
and this is the task of our science in contrast with the 
positive study of law which often has only to do with 
contradictions (Ibid. ). 
The positive study of laws is concerned with the specific content of the 
laws, whereas philosophy is concerned with the rationality of the fact 
that man lives by laws (i. e. the concept of right, ethics). This is what 
Hegel means by the concept of law, philosophy being concerned with 
that aspect of how we live that is captured in thought. 13 That is to say, 
the concept of law is not merely thought, it is lived. This is essential to 
13 Here we can see that the usual meaning of the term 'idealism' as applied to Hegel is 
a misnomer ideas are not something that float around in our heads, or in some ghostly 
fashion above man and the world, but are lived. Further, I would suggest that Hegel's 
reply to Marx and his 11th Thesis on Feuerbach would be something to the effect that 
whereas philosophy is concerned with that aspect of life that is captured in thought, 
"You (i. e. Marx] are concerned with that aspect of life that is captured in doing'. It would 
seem that Marx either did not see, or at least did not accept, this point, for he spends 
much of his time attempting to develop a theory of praxis, a sort of fusion of thought 
and Action. But for Hegel human Action is praxis - why join something that is not 
separate? 
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grasping what Hegel is getting at throughout his work: philosophical 
thinking is not just coming up with certain ideas or conceptions, but the 
grasping of something quite real and actual: 
It seems to be opening wide the door to casual opinion to 
hold that thought is to be pre-eminent over the right, yet 
true thought [i. e. philosophical thinking] is not an opinion 
about the thing but the concept of the thing itself (Ibid. ). 
It is in this sense that Hegel considers philosophy is concerned with 
natural law (natural in the sense that it is a specific form of reason), 
with the given, how things are rather than how they ought to be. And it 
is in this way that philosophy is not primarily concerned with 
justification in the same way in which we address how things ought to 
be. To look for the justification of law, or right itself, would be to 
question whether we are right to organise ourselves in ethical 
relationships, involving institutions, practices, laws, etc. as opposed to 
asking whether this institution, this practice, this law, is right. This in 
turn would involve asking for the justification of ethics itself, and to do 
this would be to question whether we have free will. The answer to this 
question would be of the form 'This is how things are', rather than how 
they ought to be. This is far as we can go - to talk about the 
justification of how the will is would be to ask whether we ought to be 
free, which implies that this is something we have a choice about. 
To speak about ethics is to pre-suppose the will (and by this is meant 
free will, for "Will without freedom is an empty word... " PR #4 [A]) - not 
an abstract entity that we as individuals 'possess' (a point I shall raise 
more fully in Chapter Three), but the fact that we do organise our lives 
in particular ways, that we do conduct ourselves in ethical ways, that 
we do condemn and commend Actions, that we have ethical 
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institutions and laws, etc. Here we are talking about how things are, 
about something that is given, philosophy being a reflective activity 
(reflecting on how we are, what we do). In that we are talking about 
something that is given, our discussion is then in a sense about natural 
law. 
The relationships and institutions - morality and ethics, property, the 
family, work, law and legal provisions and organisations, the particular 
offices of the state - are all 'natural' in that they are all the particular 
expression of reason. Not reason in the abstract, i. e. as somehow 
distinct from these particular expressions, as reason for Hegel is 
practical reason: these relations and institutions are rational means by 
which we pursue and satisfy our needs and desires, and it is this sense 
that "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational" (PR 
preface, p. 10). 
Purposive Action, Rationality and Freedom 
In the previous chapter I claimed that for Hegel freedom is a corollary 
to the concept of a rational human being. 14 That is to say, if we are to 
accept that human Action exhibits rationality, the details of which are 
the subject of the second part of this thesis, then we are, pari passu, 
saying that such Action is free Action. 
14 Chapter One above, p. 92. 
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Abstract Reason and Concrete Freedom 
Hegel's discussion of freedom, like many of the topics he treats in the 
Philosophy of Right, is in places quite difficult to grasp. One of the 
main reasons for this is that it is very much a response to the treatment 
afforded to the topic by Kant and those who claimed to have 
developed his thought (in particular, Jacobi and Fries). The 
conclusions that they had come to Hegel regarded as abstract, 
whereas for Hegel "Truth in philosophy means that the concept and 
external reality correspond" (PR #21[A]). In showing the abstract 
nature of that conception of freedom, and showing its inadequacies, it 
is "... the truth in the form of a result that we are looking for... [and] the 
development we are studying is that whereby the abstract forms reveal 
themselves not as self-subsistent but as false" (Ibid. #32 [A]). 
The truth about freedom, for Hegel, is not something that is deduced 
or arrived at by way of abstract reasoning, but from an account of that 
in which freedom is claimed to be exhibited. It is in this way that Hegel 
differs quite radically from his predecessors, which can be illustrated in 
the following way: if someone were to claim 'Man is free', the correct 
response would not be, 'Well, show me your thinking on this' but 'Show 
me where that freedom (the predicate of your proposition) is exhibited'. 
The former will result in abstract reasoning, whilst the latter will refer to 
human conduct. 
Hegel will not be in disagreement with the conclusion of such abstract 
reasoning - so long as it is that 'Man is free', of course. What he would 
disagree with, however, is the claim that this sort of reasoning is a full 
account of freedom. We have already seen this in relation to 
Descartes Cogito: by abstracting himself from the external world 'and 
all that that has influenced him, Descartes produces the Cogito which 
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represents the potential, possibility, of thought; not actual thinking - 
only the abstract possibility of thought. The world in which thinking and 
willing (in the sense of rational Action) actually takes place thus stands 
distinguished from ("stands over against me" PR #4[A]) the Cogito, 
thinking as mere possibility of thought. 15 
When I say 'I', I eo ipso abandon all my particular 
characteristics, my disposition, natural endowment, 
knowledge, and age. The ego is quite empty, a mere 
point, simple, yet active in this simplicity (Ibid. ). 
That this is an abstraction, and that this abstraction is not the full and 
true account, is to be seen in the fact that I abandon etc., I am "yet 
active in this simplicity". That such an abstraction is a possibility of 
thought - as opposed to the possibility of thought, which suggests the 
contradictory idea that a possibility can exist as a possibility alone - is, 
on the other hand, a positive philosophical development: "With 
Descartes, thinking begins to plumb its own depths" (ILHP, p. 183). 
One particular aspect of Cartesian philosophy Hegel is highly critical of 
is the distinction between thought and will, especially when will is 
accounted for by the same sort of reasoning as that afforded to 
thought by Descartes. That is to say, when will is considered as an 
... unrestricted possibility of abstraction 
from every 
determinate state of mind that I may find in myself or 
which I may have set up in myself, my flight from every 
content as from a restriction. When the will's self- 
determination consists in this alone, or when 
15 In Chapter Three, I will discuss the Cartesian conception of will in more depth in the 
context of Hegel's account of will. 
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representative thinking regards this side by itself as 
freedom and clings fast to it, then we have negative 
freedom, or freedom as the Understanding conceives it 
(PR #4). 
In a similar way as the Cogito, this conception of will is the result of 
abstract reasoning, i. e. the result of thinking. It is abstract in that it is 
reduced to being only a possibility, that from whence all particular, 
actual, willing comes; it is that which determines particular acts of will, 
distinct from those particular acts themselves - in the philosophy of 
Fichte, the ego (PR #6). However, in that it is the result of abstract 
reasoning, i. e. thinking, it is itself also an act of will. Rather than being 
the possibility of willing, that from whence all particular willing comes, it 
is itself a particular instance of willing - "... the content of something 
thought... something established by our activity" (PR #4[A]). 
Will and Freedom and Character 
What we see here is Hegel's criticism of the way of reasoning that 
leads to the conclusions reached about the nature of thought and 
willing. His main concern in Philosophy of Right, however, was how 
this conception of will involves a one-sided conception of freedom, and 
how this translated into ethics. By 'one-sided' is meant that this 
conception of freedom is not wholly false - after all, the conception of 
will on which it is based is arrived at by way of thinking, which itself, 
being an activity, is itself indicative of freedom. But it is indicative of 
only one aspect of freedom, i. e. "... negative freedom, or freedom as 
the Understanding conceives it". 
This negative freedom, or freedom as the Understanding 
conceives it, is one-sided; but a one-sided view always 
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contains one essential factor and therefore is not to be 
discarded. But the Understanding is defective in exalting 
a single one-sided factor to be the sole and the supreme 
one (PR #5[A]). 
Hegel's point in referring to this conception of freedom is that it follows 
from a logical error in the thinking about will, a logical error that leads 
to claiming this view of freedom to be the whole truth of the matter. 
The logical error is this: in that it is the result of thinking, it is in that 
sense a determination, it is arrived at by a determination of thought, 
but the conclusion to this thinking is exalted as that which is the very 
possibility of thought, i. e. the fully undetermined will which determines 
itself (thus Hegel's frequent references to 'self-activity') in particular 
ways. To think is to determine oneself, to restrict oneself to thinking 
this. The undetermined possibility negates its 'undeterminedness' into 
thinking this, but such philosophical reasoning fails to recognise that 
this supposed indeterminateness is itself arrived at by a particular way 
of thinking, i. e. a negation. The logical error consists in the supposed 
starting point - the possibility of thought, of willing - itself being a result. 
When it comes to looking at the freedom of will, it turns out that 
freedom consists in the possibility of an individual determining himself, 
acting, in particular ways. My freedom consists precisely in the 
indeterminateness of my will. Certainly, I am an individual born in a 
society that has a particular history, social and political structures 
organised according to particular values, etc. But all this is incidental 
and accidental: as a rational, thinking, being the essential thing is that I 
am free to adopt or reject the ethical realm in which I am situated, and 
this would be true in whatever particular society I was born in. 
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There is certainly some truth in this. As an individual I can do very 
much as I please. For instance, I could arm myself with all sorts of 
implements and go on a killing spree. For sure, there are laws and 
moral codes that forbid my doing this, but I can ignore them - they do 
not physically restrict me (at least until I get caught), and it is up to me 
whether I shall be deterred by these laws and codes. Laws and moral 
codes are valid to me only if I recognise them as valid; so long as I 
realise that I may be punished should I get captured ('Don't do the 
crime if you can't do the time'), or socially ostracised, then they have 
no deterrent effect - that is down to me. I am free to do what I like. 
Many people find such thinking morally frightening as well as morally 
abhorrent, and understandably so. It is a reminder that there are many 
aspects of life - constant and frequent and regular features of everyday 
life that because of their constancy etc. we take for granted and feel 
secure about - that on reflection have no secure and safe bases. This 
sort of concern is something that is not restricted to people on the 
street, but is found expressed in philosophy and literature. For 
instance, Simone Weill reports of an occasion crossing a bridge, and 
the thought coming to her "Why doesn't that man coming towards me 
rip my face off? "16 In Albert Camus' L'Etranger Meursault stands 
pointing a gun at an Arab, saying to himself "you could either shoot, or 
not shoot". At that moment, whether he shoots or not does not matter 
to him. 17 Many aspects, practices, activities, that we feel secure in in 
our everyday lives are based on deep-seated beliefs that we hold, and 
16 An experience related by Peter Winch in a talk to the University of Southampton 
philosophy society, 1986. 
17Albert Camus The Outsider (Penguin, 1983), p. 5 
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the "The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing". )$ 
Those aspects, practices, activities, involve innumerable individuals 
any of whom may at anytime commit some horrific deed. But why is it 
that, on the whole at least, people don't? For moral theorists the 
question is : what is it that, on the whole at least, makes people moral 
and lawful? 
This, however, is a question that arises out of a confusion, a confusion 
based on the idea that freedom consists solely of the individual's 
potentiality. If freedom of will, to be free, means anything then it surely 
requires the exercise of will, thinking or doing something. As we have 
seen, on a personal level thinking of myself as mere potential, 'I can do 
what I like', is thinking something, and thus is not mere potential. If it 
consists in my potential to think like this, then there is no will involved - 
"My willing is not pure willing but the willing of something" (PR #6[A]) - 
it doesn't make sense to speak of free will. Indeed the very idea turns 
out to be contradictory and nonsensical. 
Freedom of Will in Social Context 
There is some sense in 'I can do what I like', however, and Hegel's 
point that it is itself a negation and an act of will is illuminating. It is a 
negation in that it is a rejection, and it is an act of will of sorts in that it 
is an attitude that I adopt. That it is to say, it is a rejection of 
something, an attitude towards something, and it is a rejection and 
attitude that is dependent on that something. 'I can do what I like' only 
makes sense in the context of certain activities and practices that I 
18 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, Tr. G. E. M. Anscombe & D. Paul, ed. G. E. M. 
Anscombe & G. H. Von Wright (Blackwell, 1969) #166. 
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might do, and it is something about those activities and practices that 
motivates the rejection and attitude. Thus, in an important sense, an 
acquaintance with those activities and practices is a prior requirement. 
The sense of, and my ability to say, 'I can do what I like' arises out of 
the fact that I am a member of a moral community rather than an 
abstract individual as the mere potential for acting. 
Ethical Life and Habituation 
Weill's answer to her own question is illuminating here. But why would 
the person walking towards me rip my face off? The question is not so 
much 'Why doesn't he? ' but 'Why would he? '. There might be reasons 
and purposes to serve as to why he might (she might, for some 
reason, provoke great anger and hatred in him), but it would be odd to 
ask for reasons and purposes why, walking past her, he doesn't. 
Acting involves reasons and purposes, and they pertain to my 
surroundings and environment, 'external' to me as an individual as 
potential. These reasons and purposes are more often than not 
located in the activities and practices that constitute the moral 
community in which I live. It is this community which provides the 
context within which reasons and purposes can be my reasons and 
purposes. 
This relationship between individuals and the activities and practices of 
the community in which they live involves important implications for 
how we account for freedom. Not until I have learnt, habituated, come 
to some sort of acquaintance with these activities and practices can 
engage in such activities and practices for my reasons and purposes. 
Some sort of knowledge or acquaintance is required of these activities 
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and practices in order for me to make informed decisions about which 
of them are going to satisfy what I want. In this sense, the freedom 
that is indicated in 'I can do what I like' is born of the learning of, 
habituation in, the activities and practices that it may or may not 
engage in. However, when engagement does take place, it will be due 
to the reasons and purposes involved in the activities and practices 
engaged in, those reasons and purposes therefore becoming mine. 
It is not until I have learnt, come to some sort of acquaintance, with 
these activities and practices, and am thus in a position to make 
informed decisions and choices in relation to them, that I am 
considered free in a moral sense. The grounds for moral 
commendation and condemnation are the reasons for my doing 
something and the purposes I choose to pursue. My decisions and 
choices, the reasons for my Actions, the purposes I pursue - these 
constitute my character (moral or otherwise), my 'selfhood'. In judging 
me you are judging them. Take them away and the criterion for 
judgement goes with them. My 'self, then, is not something that 
inheres in me as a human being, but is a development born of my 
engagement with the world, the moral community in which I live - my 
personality and character. The self, ego, etc. as mere potential is 
something arrived by way philosophical abstraction. 
We can see the reasoning that renders human beings as essentially 
individual in the consequent theory of the social contract. Clearly, such 
reasoning goes, we are all individuals (a claim of extreme empirical 
naivete), so how is it that we live according to morals, rules, laws, in 
community with one another? Social contract is the answer that 
historically many philosophers have come up and, as we have seen in 
the Introduction, an idea that still has much influence. Locke moves 
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from envisaging a time when men got together and agreed on laws to 
the notion of tacit agreement, and with Kant we get an hypothetical 
agreement: if we were all to consider the rationality of the moral law, 
then we would (in virtue of having reason in common) agree with it. 
Perhaps the most logically and ethically absurd conclusion of this way 
of thinking comes out in Rousseau, according to whom 
... what 
is fundamental, substantive, and primary is 
supposed to be the will of the single person in his own 
private self-will... Once this principle is adopted, of course 
the rational can come on the scene only as a restriction 
on the type of freedom which this principle involves... (PR 
#29). 
Freedom consists in the expression of the private will of the individual, 
but what if the interests of the general will conflict with that of an 
individual? In such a case, the individual does not see his 'true' 
interests, and we must force him to be free. 19 The logic of the freedom 
of the private will fails to hold its place, overturned by the general will, 
and the gap between the individual and the general is bridged by the 
dubiously absurd notion of forcing someone to be free. 
Agreement and Social Life 
Taking Hegel's principle that although a particular piece of reasoning 
may result in untenable views and absurd consequences it doesn't 
necessarily follow that it is totally false, we can see that there is 
19J-J Rousseau The Social Contract tr. Maurice Cranston (Penguin classics, 1968), 
Book 1, Chapter 7. 
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something important in social contract theory. Rather than contract, 
which has quite formal connotations, there is clearly something 
important in agreement in human relations. Most obviously, there is 
agreement in language. This is something that goes across the board: 
I do not refer to particular languages (English, French, etc) but to 
language per se: in principle, particular languages and the meanings 
involved can be translated between one another. But here we are not 
talking about agreement in the sense of contract, for the question 
'When did we first agree to use language? ' seems a particularly odd 
one. The idea of an hypothetical agreement seems no more than a 
superficial attempt to explain away a difficulty, and all it seems to do is 
brush aside something that is philosophically important. It would be 
more pertinent to say that 'There is agreement in language', rather 
than 'We agree in the use of language'. This rids us of the idea of 
'coming to an agreement' without fudging the issue. Furthermore, if we 
rid ourselves of the idea that human beings are essentially individual, 
then there is no need to have recourse to ideas of 'coming to an 
agreement' in an attempt to explain what it is that 'joins' us together. 
Language, though, is much more than a series of words - it is not 
something that we have in addition to being human. Language is an 
activity rather than something that merely describes activity - language 
that describes an activity (e. g. a football match) is a particular use of 
language. As such it can give us some insight into the morality of our 
activities and practices. When I make a promise I do not do something 
and add the words 'I promise to... '. If asked why I had kept my 
promise, the reply would be 'Because I said I would! '. Here there is a 
danger in trying to say more than this, which can lead us into 
abstraction. 'But didn't you feel a moral obligation to keep your 
promise? ' In the normal run of things I do not feel a moral obligation to 
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keep my promises; any moral feelings that I have come on the scene 
when I fail to keep a promise, or when I consider not keeping it. But 
that I have these feelings is indicative of my general agreement with 
the practice of promise-keeping, although that is not something that I 
have at some point agreed to do. The abstraction comes out in the 
notion that, in the same way that language is often thought of, moral 
obligations attach to our activities and practices. 
Why do we keep our promises? Why do we tell the truth? These are 
odd questions to ask, as they can be taken to point to reasons for 
doing so, perhaps reasons that indicate functions. If someone were to 
reply that they keep promises and tell the truth in order to get on with 
their fellow human beings, unless he were making a general 
philosophical statement about what it is to be human, we would be 
pushing him to abstraction by asking such an odd question. This being 
pushed to abstraction might be shown in the difficulty he has in finding 
an answer; he has taken the question to point to reasons that act as an 
anchor, so to speak, to promise-keeping and telling the truth. Many 
moral theorists look in the same direction: just as social contract 
theorists look for reasons as to how a mass of individuals are joined 
together, so moral theorists look for moral ideas that act as anchors to 
moral conventions. The person who answers 'In order to get on with 
my fellow human beings' has, in a sense, turned back on himself: 
promise-keeping and telling the truth are particular ways of getting on 
with our fellow human beings; the latter does not add anything further - 
the two come hand in hand. Similarly with the moral theorist who 
searches for moral ideas that underpin moral conventions: if the former 
relate in any way to the latter, then they will be particular features of 
the moral conventions being considered. 
132 
Moral Questions: activities, practices, and conventions 
That such questions as to why we keep promises can lead us to look in 
the wrong place comes out when we consider that we are generally 
interested in asking why certain individuals don't keep their promises, 
don't tell the truth, etc. (and this partly explains the oddity of questions 
as to why we do). It is only against the background that promise- 
keeping and truth telling is very much the rule that we ask such 
questions. In our Actions we do not act in a void, but act in relation to a 
given situation - activities, practices, conventions. This is also the case 
for the moral philosopher, for if moral ideas and principles are to have 
any validity then they must have reference to something given. 
Abstract principles, which refer to nothing specific, also produce 
nothing. Commenting on Kant's universalizability principle and the 
demand that it be absent of contradiction, Hegel says: 
The absence of property contains in itself just as little 
contradiction as the non-existence of this or that nation, 
family, & c., or the death of the whole human race. But if 
it is already established on other grounds and pre- 
supposed that property and human life are to exist and 
be respected, then indeed it is a contradiction to commit 
theft or murder; a contradiction must be a contradiction of 
something, i. e. of some content presupposed from the 
start as a fixed principle (PR #135). 20 
20 The point that Hegel makes here is very much in the same vein as Anscombe's, 
when she writes of Kant: "His rule about universalizable maxims is useless without 
stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to 
constructing a maxim about it". 'Modern Moral Philosophy', in Ethics, Religion and 
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To say that a person has acted wrongly is to say that he has acted 
contrary to a given activity, practice, convention, and in an important 
sense such a deed is parasitic on the given. 
There are many activities, practices, conventions that are agreed ways 
of going on wherein to do wrong has a different signification than those 
that make up the specifically moral background of a community. 
Consider mathematics. When we go wrong in a calculation we 'go 
wrong' in the sense of making an error or mistake. 'What's the good in 
doing that? ' is out of place in this context. There would be no purpose 
in doing wrong, and it is difficult to see why anyone would want to. On 
the other hand, if I borrow money from a friend 'promising' to pay it 
back, but without any intentions of doing so, then I am using the 
practice of promise keeping in order to get money for nothing. That is, 
my Action is parasitic on a given practice. 
'Why do you keep your promises? ' In a sense, if a useful answer could 
be given of this question, then it wouldn't involve moral reasons. That 
is to say, being asked to morally justify the practice of promise keeping 
- i. e. and not just the 
keeping of promises - would be perplexing. I 
might give moral reasons why I refrain from not keeping my promises. 
It is in the light of not keeping promises that we raise 'the moral' in 
relation to promise keeping. If it could be imagined that there was a 
situation whereby no one had ever broken a promise, then the practice 
could perhaps not be regarded as a specifically moral practice. But this 
Politics (Blackwell, 1981), p. 27. Hegel's general criticism of the abstract nature of 
Kant's approach to ethics, is brought out by Williams in relation to modern moral 
philosophy, which, '... in its more Kantian forms... is governed by a dream of a 
community of reason that is far too removed, as Hegel first said it was, from social and 
historical reality and from any concrete sense of a particular ethical life... '. B. Williams, 
op. cit. (note 34, Chapter One) Postscript, p. 197. 
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is an unrealistic scenario - hence the cautionary 'could perhaps' - for 
we know enough about human beings to know that 'I will' can always 
turn out to be I won't' - that the promise won't be kept. The important 
point about this is that it is not arbitrary, i. e. someone just happened to 
not keep a promise, and others followed having 'discovered' a way of 
getting something for nothing. Given the ability of human beings to 
reflect on and invest certain practices with various reasons and 
purposes (i. e. freedom), then the possibility of not keeping a promise is 
a necessary feature of the practice of promise keeping. 21 
This necessary feature is not, of course, just a feature of promise 
keeping, but is a condition of freedom itself. Indeed, it is in effect a 
condition in the sense of a restriction. One aspect of Hegel's 
dissatisfaction with the view of the will as mere potential is that such a 
view makes morality arbitrary. This runs against Hegel's general claim 
that morality and ethical life are a necessary feature of rational Action 
(and thus human life), but more importantly it turns out to be false 
when subjected to analysis. Thus it is not just a moral concern of 
Hegel's (in the sense that 'it is the wrong sort of attitude to adopt 
towards morality'); it is also a thesis that logically does not hold up. 
My freedom, the thesis goes, consists in my potential, 'I can do what I 
like'. Granted, in my surroundings there are numerous customs, 
activities, and practices - an historical, social and political community in 
which I am born. This is given - it is not something that has come 
21 Here we have a specific example illustrating that realising (as opposed to the mere 
potential of) one's freedom is something that is learnt: a child may utter the words I 
promise... ', but not until he has learnt the activity of promise keeping will the words 
mean anything to him; and only then will he be in a position to abuse the practice. 
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about by my will or freedom. However, as a free individual I might 
choose to engage in this community, or I might not. 
But this is clearly false. What is also given to me is that I am a creature 
of needs and impulses, and the fulfilling of these requires that I act. 
am not self sufficient in my potentiality - it has to be realised somehow, 
I have to engage in the world in which I live. Of course, I may 'drop 
out', but this already presupposes that I have engaged and have been 
involved with fellow human beings in learning the skills by which I am 
to be self-sufficient, and to make such a decision as, and learning of 
the possibility of, 'dropping out'. 
More importantly, freedom as mere potential involves the possibility of 
being amoral, the view that engaging in morality is a matter of choice. 
But, given that we do not live in a moral vacuum, that we have 
engaged and been involved with fellow human beings, to take no 
further part in moral relations would suggest adopting some peculiar 
state of inertia. What this would involve is puzzling, but it would seem 
to suggest, on one level, to put myself at the mercy of my needs and 
impulses - i. e. I would die. On another level, to do nothing would 
involve a decision, and it is difficult to imagine reasons why I might 
make this decision that did not refer to the world in which I live - in 
which case, my decision would be determined by that world. Freedom 
as mere potential renders morality as arbitrary, as a matter of choice - 
an idea that is ultimately as logically incoherent as the idea of freedom 
upon which it is based. 22 
22 It is the 'contract in social contract theory that is the most puzzling in this context: 
contract is generally understood as an arrangement agreed between two parties, an 
arrangement that will exist only on the basis that the two parties choose that it shall 
exist. What is puzzling is the suggestion implicit in contract theory that the existence of 
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In the abstract consideration of freedom there are then three factors 
identified. Firstly, there is the freedom of potentiality, captured in the 
attitude 'I can do what I like'. But, when we consider it more closely, 
there are two sorts of restrictions on this potentiality: the needs and 
impulses that require fulfilling in order to live (and surely if freedom is 
to mean anything it must minimally involve the freedom to live); and a 
given historical, social and political community consisting of customs, 
traditions, activities and practices, which is not of our choosing. 
However, if we are to be free in the sense of not being at the mercy of 
our needs and desires, and at the mercy of the elements that may or 
may not provide for them, then we also need the means by which they 
are to be satisfied. That is to say, "... the impulses should become the 
rational system of the will's volitions" (PR #19). This 'rational system', 
though, is already in place in the customs, traditions, activities, 
practices of the community in which we live. It is such customs, 
activities and practices - in "right, property, morality, family, state, and 
so forth"(/bid. ) - that the system of needs is organised, the rational 
means by which our needs and impulses are fulfilled. As these means 
improve and develop, and the basic needs are comfortably provided 
for, it is taste, utility, pleasures and enjoyments which are then the 
object of these means (PR #190 [A]). 23 
This complex arrangement and organisation of activities and practices 
- i. e. the state - is the rational expression of our needs, wants, desires, 
morals, ethics, the state, etc. exist only on the basis that human beings have chpsen 
that they shall. Presumably, we might have chosen not to have them. 
23 The passage quoted here will be looked at more closely in Chapter Seven. 
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enjoyments, etc. and the truth of the freedom of wiII, 24what Hegel often 
refers to as 'mind objectified', and 
... 
it is only as one of its members that the individual 
himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an 
ethical life .... [His] particular satisfaction, activity, and 
mode of conduct have this substantive and universally 
valid life as their starting point and their result (PR #258). 
That is to say, the satisfaction of my needs and wants, the intentions, 
purposes, reasons, etc. that pertain to them, are located in the 
arrangement and organisation of the social community. However: 
The state is no ideal work of art; it stands on earth and so 
in the sphere of caprice, chance, and error, and bad 
behaviour may disfigure it in many respects. But the 
ugliest of men, or a criminal, or an invalid, or a cripple, is 
still always a living man. The affirmative, life, subsists 
despite his defects, and it is this affirmative factor which 
is our theme here (PR #258 [A]). 
Thus, Hegel repeats the advice of the Pythagorean to a father who 
asked how best to educate his son in ethical conduct: "Make him a 
citizen of a state with good laws" (PR #153). 
24 We might challenge the person who claims his freedom by 'I can do what I like': 
'Well prove it - do something (which will presumably show that you can do what you 
like) - make it true'; freedom as mere potential "... is the will's abstract certainty of itself, 
but it is not yet the truth of freedom, because it has not yet got itself as its content and 
aim... " (PR #15). To repeat an earlier quote, "Truth in philosophy means that concept 
and external reality correspond" (PR #21). 
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Conclusion 
Hegel's central proposition concerning ethics is that the rational end of 
man is life in the state. In this chapter I have illustrated that Hegel does 
not so much provide an argument for this, but rather shows that this 
proposition is something reflected in ethical relations and the 
organisation of the state itself. For Hegel, the task of philosophy is 
precisely this: to reflect and assimilate the reason present in human 
affairs, rather than to provide abstract arguments that attempt to justify 
particular theories of those affairs. 
The failure to grasp Hegel's view of the task of philosophy has lead 
many of his commentators to accuse him of extreme relativism and of 
political conservatism. Such accusations are based on the sort of 
abstract reasoning that is the very target of his critique of philosophical 
thought from Descartes' Cogito to Kant and his followers. In the fields 
of ethics and politics, such abstract reasoning hinges on a false 
dichotomy between the individual and morality, ethics and the state. 
Certainly history has shown that tensions arise between the state and 
its individual members, often leading to great social upheaval. But this 
is due to the Actions of those in power, and not to the want of a theory 
of morality or social contract theory. Such theories are themselves the 
logical result of the abstract reasoning which sees human beings as 
primarily and essentially individuals. 
In the philosophical reflection and assimilation of the law and reason in 
human affairs, we can see that ethical conflict (epitomised, for Hegel, 
in Sophocles' Antigone) often arises out of particular habits, customs 
and laws that are established in specific social and historical contexts. 
Consequently, Actions, and not general theories, are required for their 
solution. In this is contained Hegel's response to those who would 
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charge him of conservatism: just because a particular practice, 
custom, law etc. is established, is not in itself a justification for it's 
continued existence. The practices, customs, laws of human beings 
must constantly satisfy reason and the spirit of reflection. To rest on a 
particular doctrine, ideology, or theory would be precisely to annul 
reason and reflection, and what is right, ethical, good, would be relative 
to that doctrine, ideology or theory. 
The freedom that such reason and reflection involve is based on a 
practical grasp of circumstances, and consequently there must be 
something to reason about and reflect on. This something is provided 
by the social context of human affairs. More often than not freedom is 
argued for by abstract reasoning, which takes individuals out of the 
very context within which such freedom can be exercised. As we shall 
see in the next chapter, this is also the case with many discussions of 
the will. 
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3. WILL, ETHICS AND ACTION 
Introduction 
The most striking and obvious similarity between Aristotle and Hegel is 
their view of the relationship between ethics and politics, which is 
brought out in their proposition that humans are essentially social and 
political creatures by nature. A less apparent, but nonetheless 
important, observation is that neither Aristotle nor Hegel give direct 
accounts of `the will'. Aristotle's discussion of the voluntary/involuntary, 
distinction and of choice takes place within the context of the 
conditions of Action, 'the will' not given the status of a subject in its 
own right. This contrasts starkly with much philosophy that followed on 
from Descartes' work. What follows from Descartes' work represents 
Hegel's point of departure: following a critique of the abstract thinking 
of his predecessors and contemporaries that affords 'the will' a subject 
in its own right, Hegel goes on to discuss willing, purpose, intention, 
etc. in the social context of Action. 2 
1 Interestingly Rackham (Loeb Classics Library, 1934) comments on the opening 
passage of book III: hekousion' and 'akousion' are most conveniently rendered 
'voluntary' and 'involuntary' but the word 'akousion' suggests 'unwilling' or 'against the 
will'... ". 
2 PR consists of three parts. In the first two parts Hegel gives a general consideration 
of the concepts of ethics, will, and freedom, and how these affect considerations of 
purposive Action and moral conduct. The present project is concerned specifically with 
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The specific details of this general observation concerning Hegel's 
critique of abstract thinking come out in a consideration of practical 
reason and Hegel's teleological account of purposive human Action. 
However, in his concern for both the state of philosophy and the 
historical circumstances in his own day, 3 Hegel's preliminary critique of 
conceptions of will can be seen as clearing the ground for a proper 
consideration of will in its concrete expression in Action. The form of 
that critique is much the same as his criticism of views of freedom, 
discussed in the previous chapter: abstract reasoning renders a 
conception of will that is likewise abstract. This charge of abstraction 
involves considerations that are familiar to criticisms in the 20th Century 
of the philosophy of mind that dates back to Descartes. 
Hegel and the Philosophy of Mind 
Firstly, however, I shall give a brief overview of the aim and purpose of 
Hegel's discussion, and a brief sketch of his own account of mind. This 
sketch can only be brief, for if it is being claimed that such concepts 
these considerations, and their place in their social context. In part three of PR Hegel 
goes into the details of how the concept of will works out in the particular details of 
ethical life - the family, civil society, and state - which will not be discussed here. This 
thesis is concerned with the first two parts in their relation to Aristotle's view that ethics 
is an introduction to politics, i. e. a consideration of the conditions of Action. To go into 
the particular details of how will works out in the family, civil society, and state would 
thus go far beyond the parameters of this thesis. 
3 Throughout PR Hegel makes quite scathing remarks about his contemporaries, the 
general gist of which are that they took Kants considerations to absurd conclusions. 
This poverty in philosophy, as Hegel saw it, was particularly prevalent in Germany. See, 
for instance, 'Inaugural Lecture at Heidelberg', in IHLP. 
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can only be truly captured in their practical and social context, then the 
truth of this proposition will only be seen in the detailed exposition of 
those concepts. In doing this, however, it will then be possible to 
consider the details of the arguments. 
Thinking and Willing: theoretical and practical mind 
One of the central ideas that Hegel criticises in the philosophy of mind 
prevalent in his day was the distinction between thought and will: 
The following points should be noted about the connexion 
between the will and thought. Mind is in principle thinking, 
and man is distinguished from beast in virtue of thinking. 
But it must not be imagined that man is half thought and 
half will, and that he keeps thought in one pocket and will 
in another, for this would be a foolish idea. The distinction 
between thought and will is only that between the 
theoretical attitude and the practical. These, however, are 
surely not two faculties... (PR #4 [A]). 
Whilst it is perfectly reasonable to consider thought in the sense of 
thinking without physically acting in the world, to then make the move 
to say that thought and will are two distinct faculties is a move in 
abstraction. This comes out when we consider that "A man... can (not] 
be theoretical or think without a will, because in thinking he is of 
necessity being active" (Ibid. ). Hegel is here as much concerned about 
the way in which such conclusions as the distinction between thought 
and will are arrived at as the conclusions themselves. As we shall see 
later on in the present chapter, this has quite significant implications on 
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reasoning and logic, and that which it speaks of - implications that are 
familiar to philosophy in the 20`x' Century. 
For the time being, however, this point of Hegel's offers an insight to 
his dissatisfaction with the abstract nature of the prevailing philosophy 
of mind. That is to say, such thinking is indicative of the treatment 
given to a cluster of related concepts, such as mind, will, freedom, and 
how these work in accounts of Action. In discussing these concepts 
Hegel is clearing some ground in order to show that these "... abstract 
forms reveal themselves not as self-subsistent but as false" (PR #32 
[A]). in bringing these concepts down from the abstract level we will 
then be able to see them in their true, i. e. concrete, practical and social 
context. 
A preliminary idea of the practical and social context of Hegel's view of 
mind can be had from his view that mind is reason in the world. This 
relates to his initially curious comment that the "... impulses should 
become the rational system of the will's volitions" (PR #19). What he is 
saying here is that, in the abstract, the needs and desires that human 
beings have (impulses) are fulfilled by engaging in the world. This is 
how we might express the fulfilment of our natural or animal instincts. It 
is abstract in that it is an expression that abstracts from the fact that we 
are rational creatures, and that rationality has a bearing on how we 
fulfil our instincts, desires, needs, etc. This comes out when we 
consider that the ways in which we fulfil these involve activities, 
practices, arrangements, institutions, etc. - i. e. rational systems. 
Our engagement in these activities etc. - in such forms as education, 
work, leisure, etc. - involves engaging in the rationality of them. In this 
sense, will is practical mind, "... the truth of intelligence" (PR #4), and 
engaging in such activities involves assimilating, and reflecting in our 
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engagement, the rationality of those systems. Thus, in order to act 
freely requires knowledge of the rational system that is our society, and 
such knowledge is a prerequisite for engaging in the business of 
everyday life. 
As we have seen in Chapter Two above, the truth of freedom is not 
established by logical inference and deduction, but by acting in the 
world (the truth of freedom is thus practical in the same way that the 
truth of intelligence is practical mind). If freedom means anything, it 
must minimally involve the fulfilling of needs, desires, etc., and that is 
something we do by engaging in the activities etc. that constitute the 
rational system that is our society. Freedom, then, is participation in 
the business of everyday life, which gives us a preliminary account of 
Action as the fulfilling of needs, desires, etc. by means of activities of 
the rational system. 
Preliminary though this is, it carries with it a practical account of mind: 
it is only when I come to know, when I assimilate, and reflect in my 
conduct, the rationality of such activities, that I can be said to be acting 
mindfully. Furthermore, it shows that the concepts of mind, knowledge, 
will, freedom and Action hang together, precluding questions of 
individual definitions ('What is mind... knowledge... will... freedom? ') that 
often lead to abstract reasoning. But looking at how we are often led 
astray can itself be illuminating. 
Act and Action: philosophy and moral conduct 
In looking at philosophical considerations of ethics the concern here is 
for specific types of conduct, and this is reflected in the empirical, i. e. 
non-philosophic, concern for conduct. For instance, ethics is 
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concerned for the most part with statements within which the verb is of 
the active form, just as a court of law is interested in (as a philosopher 
might put it) whether the verb in 'He killed Smith' can also operate in 
terms of 'murdered'. I say 'for the most part' in that this does not 
exclude certain cases wherein the verb operates in the passive sense: 
the significance of 'fell' in 'The soldier arrived at his post for duty and 
fell asleep' and 'The soldier finished his duty and went home and fell 
asleep' is clearly quite different, and the contexts clearly mark out the 
ethical significance of both the statement and conduct. Take another 
example. In Mental Acts Geach clearly wants to say something quite 
specific about 'acts of judgement' and that is determined by particular 
philosophic interests, but in ethics we are concerned with 'acts of 
judgement' in so far as they have some empirical implication4 (Jones is 
judged to have murdered Smith, and consequently ends up in jail). 
The above considerations might be looked at as an analysis carried 
out on two different levels: what is actually, physically, done, and what 
is said of what is done. Philosophy is concerned with what is said, in 
that what is said often involves judgement, which in turn involves 
thought and reasoning. Hegel's concern with this is that often the way 
in which we think and reason can lead us to lose sight of that of which 
we speak, resulting in a discourse that radically differs from the 
discourse from within which it begins. 'Thought', 'reasoning', 
4 'Mental acts' of judgement - what someone thinks and (equally important) feels about 
something or other - might have empirical significance of a sort in the sense that certain 
of them are indicative of an individual's character. The importance of this will feature 
prominently in Chapters Four and Five. 
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`judgement' and 'Action' take on significations other than those 
involved in their original context. 5 
In Chapter One we saw how Descartes' line of reasoning led to a 
discrepancy between what he says and that of which he speaks. Faced 
with a question by Burman on the problem of the interaction between 
minds and bodies, he admitted that there was no problem in 
experience. The problem arises out of his method of reasoning. But 
such discrepancies can arise in more subtle ways. 'Ordinary language' 
philosophy of the present century is also vulnerable. Consider the 
following. In a review of J. L. Austin's How To Do Things With Words 
Walter Cerf points out that there is something peculiar in substituting 
'performing an Action' with 'performing an act', a peculiarity which is 
carried over from the expressions 'saying something' and 'performing a 
speech act'. 
Within everyday discourse 'performing an act' 
means.. . any sort of 
behaviour that is the taking over of a 
role or the putting on of a show. Acts performed in this 
sense - the act, say, of the trapeze artist - have a strong 
action character, and, sounding very much alike, the 
ordinary 'act' thus sneaks in place of 'action' without 
raising suspicion. Once in place, it is in fact employed by 
Austin in an entirely different way, completely 
unacceptable in ordinary discourse. Yet this new way 
remains undetected because it is a way philosophers are 
in fact quite familiar with - familiar, though, not in 
everyday discourse, but in learned discourses of 
5 The language game in which they are to be applied is missing" - Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, #96 
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metaphysics, epistemology and philosophical psychology 
... 
To 'perform an action', in the familiar everyday sense, 
has become 'to perform an act' of traditional 
metaphysics, epistemology and psychology.. 
Cerf is particularly concerned with speech acts. Here the concern is 
ethics, and thus we are interested in the doing of something in a way 
that we are not interested in 'performing an act'. That is to say, ethics - 
both philosophical and empirical - is not - to much interested in 
metaphysical, epistemological and psychological definitions of Action 
but the classification of instances of Action (in terms of being good, 
evil, right, wrong) as issuing from judgements that have empirical 
implications. 
The implications of this on how 'Action' is to be understood here are 
quite significant. The main topic of the present chapter is will, and for 
Hegel will is a feature of Action. In saying this I am not saying Action 
involves something called 'will'. Rather, instances of Action are such in 
virtue of their being 'willful', and not in virtue of their being reconcilable 
with, or satisfying, a particular definition or theory of Action. This is 
particularly pertinent in ethical discourse. When a particular deed is 
judged, definitions and theories of Action are not at issue; what is at 
issue is what is done in this deed. In substituting for the particular 
details of what is done a general conception of Action in an analysis of 
an ethical judgement, the essential aspect of that judgement is lost, 
and the discourse takes on a different form. What is then at issue is 
not what is done, but the general conception of Action. 
6 In K. T. Fann (ed. ), Symposium on J. L. Austin, op. Cit. p. 364. 
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Of course, most human behaviour would fall into the category of 
'willful', and this is not a concern for ethics alone. The point, however, 
is that in judging certain behaviour to be good or evil, right or wrong, 
'willfulness' is a primary consideration, and our judgements on this will 
determine whether or not any given behaviour can be considered an 
instance of Action. When we say 'This Action is wrong' the scope or 
parameters of the Action in a person's behaviour will be determined by 
the degree of 'willfulness': °present in the behaviour under consideration. 
Many things may be done by me during a given period of time, not all 
of which will necessarily be wrong, although it may well be the case 
that during that period as a whole I was involved in wrong Actions. 
Further, however, not everything that resulted from my behaviour that, 
under different circumstances, would be deemed to be wrong will be 
necessarily captured within the scope of my Action in that under these 
circumstances they may not have been 'willful'. The 'Action' itself will 
be defined by what we have to say about it, in our judgement of the 
'willfulness' present. 
Consider the matter in the following way. Will is something that is 
predicated of Action, and not a subject term (e. g. 'Will is... '). This would 
seem to beg the question 'What is Action such that it can be 
described? ' Well, Action is that which is judged, in ethical judgement, 
to be predicable by'willful', 'voluntary', 'intentional', 'chosen'; 'good' and 
'evil', 'right' and 'wrong' etc. - i. e. 'Action' is indicative of a doing the 
scope of which is reflected in the degree to which these predicates are 
judged to be pertinent. But notice that this is not reducible to the 
proposition that ethical and moral judgement is all about what we are 
saying of the Action, our putting various characteristics on it - but 
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rather it is what we are saying of the Action itself, i. e. we are talking 
about characteristics of someone's behaviour.? 
Many of the problems that arise in philosophy do so precisely because 
we allow a gulf to form between what we say and how we think, and 
that of which we speak and think. To be wary of this is something we 
might take as a general warning from Hegel's philosophy as a whole. 
This is the basis of his criticism of the abstraction in his predecessors 
and contemporaries. 
Will in Abstraction: thought and language 
The main thrust of Hegel's criticisms is that past and contemporary 
work in the area of will tends to discuss 'the will' as something or other 
that human beings have or possess, even though this is rarely 
intended to mean that we have or possess a will in the sense of having 
or possessing arms and legs, or material goods. Will, for Hegel, is a 
feature of acting, the latter taking place in an ethical community. To 
treat will in isolation of this context is to abstract, and thus discussions 
fall into the difficulties of trying to identify 'the will' without the attendant 
reificatory implications. 
This is something that can be illustrated by everyday use of language. 
When we use the definite article, the term that accompanies it usually 
has the function of a noun, i. e. denotes an entity of some sort or 
7 This point relates to what Hegel calls the 'speculative proposition', in which he is 
critical of traditional subject-predicate logic where, for instance, the predicate is some 
sort of abstract quality which is attached to the subject. This is something I shall come 
to shortly. 
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another. 8 Given this it would appear that speaking of 'the will' invites a 
series of embarrassing questions: what sort of entity is 'the 
will'?... Where is it located?... What does it look like?, etc. 
Here attention can only be drawn to the fact that if you 
say 'The will is universal, the will determines itself the 
words you use to describe the will presuppose it to be a 
subject or substratum from the start. But the will is not 
something complete and universal prior to its determining 
itself and prior to its superseding and idealising this 
determination. The will is not a will until it is this self- 
mediating activity, this return into itself (PR #7). 
On the one hand, Hegel here guides us away from a conception of will 
which would result in the need to provide answers to embarrassing 
questions, that is he declares the will not to be a subject or substratum 
to which predicates can be attributed in the way that they are to entities 
denoted by the terms accompanying the definite article. This point can 
be demonstrated in terms of what Hegel calls the 'speculative 
proposition'. Traditional logic treated the subject of a proposition as 
something to which certain qualities or attributes were attached, and in 
consequence the subject was given the status of some sort of 
substratum or entity that existed independently in one way or another. 
But for Hegel the subject is nothing other than what is or can be truly 
said of it. Hegel uses statements about God as an example: 
In a proposition of this kind one begins with the word 
God. This by itself is a senseless sound, a mere name; 
8 Indeed, Hegel's point about abstraction is not dissimilar to the point that Ryle makes 
about reification in The Concept of Mind (Penguin, 1972). 
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only the predicate says what he is and fills the name with 
content and meaning ... 
9 
Again, with a proposition such as 'The rose is red' the rose does not 
exist independently of 'redness', as if the latter is some sort of abstract 
idea or quality that human beings attach to it. The proposition 'The 
rose is red' is a statement about the rose, which does not confer upon 
it the status of a substance or a member of a class of substances; and 
redness is something that inheres in the subject, and not something 
conferred upon it by way of our ideas. 
Language like this looks upon the subject as self- 
subsistent outside, and the predicate as found 
somewhere in our head. Such a conception of the relation 
between subject and predicate however is at once 
contradicted by the copula 'is'. By saying 'This rose is red', 
or This picture is beautiful', we declare, that it is not we 
who from outside attach beauty to the picture or redness 
to the rose, but that these are characteristics proper to 
these objects. (EPS #166. ). 
To talk of will as if it were such a subject or substratum is for Hegel to 
abstract, in that to isolate will from the contexts to which the term 
pertains, and to refer to will as a capacity in isolation to the various and 
specific ways that this capacity is fulfilled, is itself a piece of 
philosophical abstraction-10 
9 From the Phenomenology, translated by W. Kaufman in Hegel. - Reinterpretations, 
Texts and Commentaries (Weidenfeld, 1966), pp. 392 and 394. 
10 1 would not want to argue here that this sort of reasoning can be attributed to 
Aristotle, but notice that he would want to satisfy himself that the attributes 'voluntary', 
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In the same way in which such abstract talk renders freedom as a 
mere potentiality, will is rendered as some sort of faculty for the 
possibility of Action. This helps to bring out Hegel's (what can at first 
seem obscure) claim that will is something which determines itself, 
supersedes and idealises this determination, and yet is nothing prior to 
its doing this. A person must will something, determine himself in a 
particular way before it makes sense to talk of will in the first place: 
My willing is not pure willing but the willing of something. 
A will which... wills only the abstract universal, wills 
nothing and is therefore no will at all. The particular 
volition is a restriction, since the will, in order to be a will, 
must restrict itself in some way or other (PR #6[A]). 
There are two points to be brought out of this. 
In every day discourse we talk of will in terms of voluntariness, choice, 
intention, etc. (e. g. 'Did he do that voluntarily/by choice/intentionally? ') 
This is to say, in talking of will we often do so in the context of asking 
whether a particular deed was a particular act of will. Moreover, the 
terms 'voluntary', 'choice', 'intention' etc. - and similarly 'will' - can only 
operate in the context of a specific Action, a particular Action which is 
brought under consideration. These terms do not work in the context of 
generalised types of Action: it makes no sense to ask whether 'killing' 
is the sort of Action that is voluntary, chosen, intentional, etc. precisely 
because these terms play a role in establishing whether this particular 
instance of killing is a murder, i. e. whether it was an act of will, and the 
sorts of things considered in answering such a question are the sort of 
'chosen', etc. were applicable before considering conduct to be an instance of Action 
proper. 
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things that are left behind, so to speak, by generalised types of Action 
such as that referred to by 'killing'. 
The second point concerns Hegel's consideration of his 
contemporaries' discussion of this issue, i. e. those who fail to take into 
account the above considerations, and would consequently identify the 
will with the Individual ego (in particular, Hegel had Fichte In mind). 
This type of identification is what Hegel refers to as the abstract 
universal: 'abstract' in that it is considered purely as a capacity, 
'universal' in that qua capacity it is willing nothing in particular. " Hegel 
is not denying that there is an aspect of will in this, but rather that this 
is to consider the matter in abstraction. Indeed, it is only in that I, as an 
individual, can will something that it is possible for me to consider 
'myself in this abstract way. Hegel explains this with reference to the 
first-person pronoun: 
When I say "I", I eo ipso abandon all my particular 
characteristics, my disposition, natural endowment, 
knowledge, and age. The ego is quite empty, a mere 
point, simple, yet active in this simplicity (PR #4[A]). 
Active in that it is something I do, i. e. I abandon all my particular 
characteristics, etc. and thus this is not a 'pure' will, but a will that wills 
something. It requires an act of will in order for any individual to 
consider himself in this manner. 
II The emphasis I put on 'in particular' relates to the point below, i. e. that nonetheless it 
is an act of will. 
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Will in Practice and Will in Thought 
Not only were the sorts of views that Hegel considered features of 
academic life, but they were also views that gained expression in 
practice - in terms of both polemical writings about the relations 
between the individual and the modern state, and in Action motivated 
by such considerations. Thus consideration of the Individual ego and 
the individual person was a feature of both academic and ethical life. 12 
After all, Hegel would have it that if an academic account of ethical life 
is to have any validity at all then the terms in which that account is 
rendered need to have reference to particular instances within the 
ethical life it purports to give an account of. 
One example Hegel uses to illustrate the tendency to identify will with 
the ego is the Hindu practice of contemplation; 
Among the Hindus-the highest life is held to be 
persistence in the bare knowledge of one's simple 
identity with oneself, fixation in this empty space of one's 
inner life, as light remains colourless in pure vision, and 
the sacrifice of every activity in life, every aim, and every 
project (PR #5[A]). 
More importantly for Hegel, identification of will with the individual in 
the sphere of political Action can be the source of great upheaval. 
12 Throughout PR Hegel refers liberally to contemporary political and ethical Actions 
and events that are motivated by, or justified in terms of, certain philosophical positions. 
Indeed, as Hegel considers ethics to be concerned with particular Actions and not 
theoretical or generalised categories or types of Action, such Actions and events play 
an important role in illuminating Hegel's philosophical approach. 
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... the phenomena which it has produced both in men's 
heads and in the world are of a frightfulness parallel only 
to the superficiality of the thoughts on which they are 
based (PR # 29). 
The phenomena 'in the world' that Hegel refers to are the Actions of 
the reign of terror following the French revolution, where the 'abstract 
conclusions' of the type of thinking put forward, by Rousseau and 
Fichte in particular, came into power, affording 
... 
for the first time in human history the prodigious 
spectacle of the overthrow of the constitution of a great 
actual state and its complete reconstruction ab initio on 
the basis of pure thought alone, after the destruction of all 
existing and given material. The will of its re-founders was 
to give it what they alleged was a purely rational basis, 
but it was only abstractions that were being used; the 
Idea was lacking; and the experiment ended in the 
maximum of frightfulness and terror (PR #258). 
Hegel also claims in PR #258, that the identification of will with the ego 
can also be seen to be the source of the notion of political freedom 
which issues out of nihilism, which calls for the destruction of any thing 
that has order, as order involves particularity which contrasts with and 
is felt to threaten the universality of the ego: it is threatening in that 
order demands conformation to particular, specified types of activity, 
which is thus a restriction on the individual as an independent ego 
I 
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which has freedom defined in terms of its universality - i. e. lack of 
restriction. 13 
Thus, in criticising the widely held views of his time Hegel did not hold 
that these views were wholly mistaken, totally devoid of truth. His 
contention was that such ideas only represent a particular way in which 
individuals could employ themselves; the freedom implied in equating 
the will with the ego does represent certain possibilities, certain ways in 
which it is possible for human beings to think and act. The point is, 
however, that all these represent particular acts of will. These are only 
negative possibilities, shown in the examples of Hindu contemplation, 
political terror, and nihilism; more importantly the element of truth in 
such ideas is forcefully brought out in the most negative of human 
possibilities, for 
In this element of the will is rooted my ability to free 
myself from everything, abandon every aim, abstract from 
everything. Man alone can sacrifice everything, his life 
included; he can commit suicide (PR #5[A]). 
Hegel's concern with past and contemporary accounts of will was not 
restricted to ethics and practical considerations of life, however. Hegel 
was also concerned with epistemological and metaphysical accounts of 
will. Whether will is accounted for in terms of empirical evidence, or in 
terms of 'the will's' intrinsic nature, there are considerations which limit 
the validity of such accounts. The evidence or proofs which support 
these accounts do not stand up to scrutiny. 
13 A particular example of how this line of thought can result in such arguments would 
be The Ego and its Own by Max Stirner, a contemporary and sometime intellectual 
combatant of Marx. 
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If we consider will to be some sort of individual ego, much of what is 
meant by this term is some sort of self-awareness or self- 
consciousness. But examples of activities where there would appear to 
be little trace of self-awareness or self-consciousness, as something 
experienced, are much more common, i. e. activities where we are 
unaware of our willing but which nevertheless we would consider to be 
acts of will. In our thoughts and activities our attention is focused on 
what it is that we are thinking or doing. Whether I am trying to 
remember something, calculating a mathematical problem, or fixing a 
leaking tap, my attention is focused on the past event or mathematical 
problem or leaking tap. In such exercises I am not conscious of my 
willing, or of my will or ego. It may be I, a particular person, who is 
thinking these thoughts or fixing this tap, but 
When I run after a street-car, when I look at the time, 
when I am absorbed in contemplating a portrait, there is 
no I. There is consciousness of the street-car to be 
overtaken etc. 14 
In our day-to-day activities - which occupy a great portion of our lives - 
there is little evidence of a self-conscious willing, a willing that can be 
captured in terms exclusive to those that describe what it is that is 
thought or done. 
Although often quite scathing of his contemporaries, Hegel was not 
unsympathetic to the aims of past philosophers. Human activity has 
been traditionally distinguished from the activity of animals: human 
activity involves reason and rationality; there is an element - some sort 
14 J-p. Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego tr. F. Williams & R. Kirkpatrick (New York, 
1951), p. 40. The points raised here are related to the discussion in Chapter Five. 
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of rational element - present in experiences of humans of which there 
is scant evidence in the activity of brutes. From this have come many 
attempts to isolate this element, throwing up such concepts as the 
soul, the ego, the self, i. e. that which does the willing. 
Kant captures this tradition particularly well. In his discussion of the 
'unity of apperception' he clearly distinguishes between the 'I think' and 
that which is thought or experienced. Kant claims the 'unity of 
apperception' to be one of the essential ingredients of the very 
possibility of experience; to be more precise, the possibility of 
individual experiences: It must be possible for 
... the 
"I think" to accompany all my representations; for 
otherwise something would be represented in me which 
could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to 
saying that the representation would be impossible, or at 
least would be nothing to me. 15 
A representation thus has two essential ingredients: that which is 
represented in the unity of the manifold, that which is seen or thought, 
and the consciousness, the 'I' that sees or thinks, that which marks off 
the representation as that of a particular individual, as my perception or 
thought. 
For the manifold representations, which are given in an 
intuition, would not be one and all my representations, if 
they did not all belong to one self-consciousness. 16 
15 Critique of Pure Reason tr. N. Kemp Smith (Macmillan, 1982), 8131-2. 
16 Ibid. B132. 
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Of course, it would be difficult to make sense of the claim that there 
are perceptions, thoughts, sensations, etc. which are not the 
perceptions, etc. of a particular subject, and thus there would appear to 
be something necessary about what Kant is getting at. However, the 
problem with this account is the way in which Kant goes about 
explaining it. There can be little doubt that there is something about 
such experiences which constitute them as being experiences of some 
particular individual, but instead of focusing on what it is about those 
experiences which necessitates that they be the experiences of a 
particular individual Kant, in aiming to fulfil his intentions stated in the 
introduction to Critique of Pure Reason, attempts to show how such 
experiences are possible at all. This formulation of the question 
requires a quite specific sort of answer, relating to the kind of beings 
who have such experiences, and the answer that Kant gives is that the 
self-conscious ego - the 'I think' that marks off self-consciousness - 
must attach to that of which it is conscious, i. e. that which is perceived, 
thought, etc. 
Willing, Acting and Experiencing 
Hegel's charge of abstraction relates precisely to this sort of move to 
metaphysics. That is, attempting to explain something in isolation to 
that which is a defining characteristic, attempting to explain will or 
consciousness in terms which exclude the consideration that willing is 
nothing other than the willing of something. To think of will in terms of 
its being a noun is clearly misleading, but at the same time it is worth 
emphasising the term's root in the verb form - to will, to do, i. e. we are 
concerned with what experiences, acts, and Action involve. 
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Descartes, Spinoza and Kant 
Hegel's position on these issues might be illuminated in the context of 
a philosophical debate which had its immediate antecedents in 
Descartes and Spinoza. In rejecting Descartes' distinction between 
"... the perception of the understanding and the Action of the will"17 
Spinoza claims that the very idea of their separate status is 
incomprehensible, for 
The intellect and the will are related to this idea or volition 
as rockiness is related to this or that rock, or as man is 
related to Peter or Paul. 18 
Ideas or perceptions already involve the will in the having of them, they 
are affirmations which do not require a consequent act of will to 
pronounce them true. Our ideas and perceptions may be false, but this 
is due to our having inadequate knowledge of things about which we 
are having ideas, or that we are perceiving, and not an erroneous use 
of the faculty of will. Thus in an important sense knowledge (adequate 
or inadequate) is a prior requirement to our having ideas or perceptions 
which are in any way coherent at all. I cannot think of something about 
which I have no knowledge. I may recall seeing something of which I 
have no knowledge, but it is difficult to understand what I am to think 
about it, other than to think about how I am to make sense of it, 
understand it. For Spinoza, talk of the will or faculty of willing is an 
17 Principles of Philosophy tr. V. R. and A. P. Miller (Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1983), 
1,32. 
18 Ethics tr. R. H. M. Elwes (Dover 1955), 2, Prop. 49 Coroll. 
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abstraction, 'will' being a general term that says something about the 
ideas or perceptions that we have. 
Kant's view on the matter is somewhat different from this. The proof 
that a representation is a representation of a particular individual lies in 
the transcendental deduction of the necessary conditions of 
experience, the 'understanding' of the subject giving form to the objects 
of perception. But the point which Kant overlooks is that the 
representation - the experience - itself indicates the presence of the 
subject, without the aid of a deduction. In other words, in order for the 
representation to have the semblance of a coherent form it is a 
necessary pre-requisite that I have some knowledge of the objects (or 
some of the objects) which constitute the representation. I accompany 
all my representations accordingly as those representations involve my 
knowledge of what it is they are representing (which is part of the 
meaning of Spinoza's 'Knowing involves knowing that you know'). 
Faced with something or a situation of which I have no knowledge, I 
may be curious, bewildered, apprehensive, fearful - descriptions of 
myself being' in such a situation - due to my lack of knowledge. The 
connection between perceiving something and knowledge Hegel puts 
metaphorically, but the point is made: 
The variegated canvas of the world is before me; I stand 
over against it.... I am at home in the world when I know 
it, still more so when I have understood it (PR #4[A]). 
Curiosity, bewilderment, apprehension, fear, pertain to experiences 
where I am at odds with the objects I perceive, where there is a clear 
distinction between myself and 'the world', the situation I am in, a 
distinction that is felt and not only thought. But such situations are 
unusual - for the most part, I am at home in the world in that 
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experiences involve knowledge and understanding of what it is I am 
experiencing. 
When we talk about the having of ideas and perceptions - especially 
with regard to 17th Century philosophers - there is a tendency to 
overlook the point that for the most part those ideas and perceptions 
involve our active participation, and the notion of experience which 
follows from overlooking this point is devoid of the involvement of he 
who experiences. But in my desires, hopes, aspirations, etc. I am 
present, not as a transcendental adjunct, but in what is desired, hoped 
for, aspired to. That is to say, in wanting something it is not that I want 
something to happen to me, as an 'I' divorced from all feelings, 
sensations, etc. On the contrary, it is because of the feelings, 
sensations, etc. derived from such experiences and the activities they 
involve that such activities are desired, and furthermore that such 
experiences and activities are participated in at all. This is something 
that is captured in the motives, purposes, intentions which 
experiencing this or that involve. 
Practical Knowledge and Action 
From this we can throw a little light on Hegel's claim that the will is a 
"self-mediating activity", a "return into itself' (PR #7). 19 In doing so it is 
illuminating to look at Aristotle's practical syllogism. 
As in a demonstrative syllogism the practical version involves a major 
and minor premise, and a conclusion. In the practical syllogism 
19 What follows owes much to a reading of Anthony Manser's 'Hegel's Teleology' in 
Hegel's Philosophie Der Natur, ed. R-P. Horstmann & M. J. Petry (Klett-Cotta, 1986). 
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however, the conclusion consists of an Action (NE 1147a28), and this 
Action issues from certain characteristics of the premises. That is to 
say, the major premise says something about the end of the agent ('All 
sweet things ought to be tasted') and the minor premise involves a 
relation between the end and a particular object ('This X is sweet'), i. e. 
the object is a means for fulfilling the end expressed in the major 
premise. A person who holds 'All sweet things ought to be tasted', 
confronted by an object that is sweet will thereby act - "... the agent, if 
he has the power and is not prevented, must immediately act" (NE 
1147a30). 
However, this necessity of Action (problems regarding which I shall 
discuss in Chapter Six), is complicated by man having a rational as 
well as appetitive part to the soul. This rational element in Action 
compounds the complication, but it carries a point with interesting 
consequences. In the acting the means is often a particular object, an 
object with specific characteristics relating to the end of the agent. But 
one thing that reason enables us to do is to use objects in a way that 
does not necessarily correspond to what might be considered their 
natural characteristics or the purpose for which they are designed. I 
can use a spade for many tasks other than that of digging. In effect, 
the object is, in a sense, transformed in that it is vulnerable to the use I 
put it to - it is vulnerable to my purpose. "... when I use it I `negate' its 
particular characteristics in the sense that I change them to suit my 
purpose" (PR note to # 59[A]). 
This is one aspect of what Hegel calls putting "my will into something" 
(PR #58), and is an important element in his explanation of property 
ownership. However, the important point for present purposes is that in 
'putting my will' into something, in using an object, everything that 
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appears in the practical syllogism relates directly to the agent. That is 
to say, the relation between means and end has been transformed: 20 
in an important sense the means is no longer external to the end, 
precisely in that it is my will - end - that determines its use, and thus 
the relation of means and end is internal to my ends and their 
fulfilment. This point is not too dissimilar to that made by G. E. M. 
Anscombe when she says: 
We must always remember that an object is not what is 
aimed at is; the description under which it is aimed at is 
that which it is called the object. 21 
It is in this sense that Hegel speaks of the will as a 'return to itself, a 
'self-mediating activity'. The end of my willing is that which is willed by 
me, which is to say that in such willing I am myself the end. My activity 
is self-mediating. But this is something that is arrived at via the object, 
and that object, 'the description under which it is aimed at', is 
determined by what it is I want from it. At an abstract level, I may be 
said to have potential; but it is only by way of Acting in the world that I 
achieve actual willing - in Hegel's terms, the truth of willing. 
The essential point in this is that Hegel's analysis of purposive Action is 
derived from the logic of what is done, and what is involved, in Acting 
20 Manser makes the same point, but in doing so he brings out a further point: "The 
means is no longer something external, it is 'informed with purpose' and in a sense 
becomes part of the agent's body". Op. cit. p. 268. This latter point will come into play in 
Chapter Five. 
21 Intention (Oxford, 1963 2nd ed. ) p. 66. 
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itself, as opposed to the logic of a particular theory of Action. 22 
Similarly with the practical syllogism: it is the logic of Action that is the 
criterion of its validity, not the demands of some sort of formal logic. 
Thus the discussion and analysis is determined by that of which it 
speaks, rather than determined by the demands of an abstract 
conception of reason or logic. In this way Hegel distances himself from 
the 17th Century tendency to consider will as an attribute of individual 
human beings, something they possess, and from 18th Century and 
contemporary thinkers' attempts to account for the will as either a 
metaphysical ego or epistemological subject. 
Here is a development of a point raised in Chapter Two with regard to 
Hegel's view of will. The opposition (rather than analytic distinction) 
between the individual will and the state which philosophers have often 
emphasised comes out as a contractual relation, in an attempt at 
reconciliation, involving individuals who have - actually, theoretically or 
hypothetically (e. g. Rousseau) - come together and formed - actively or 
tacitly (e. g. Locke) - in a common union. The next logical step from this 
is to isolate the individual will from the relations which form the ethical 
community and we are left with the nexus of individual agency. But for 
Hegel this is an example of "abstract reasoning" (PR #258), which 
ignores the observation that an act of will is only such in the context of 
ethical relations, that we are born into, and brought up to act within the 
context of, an ethical community, and that acting at will is something 
22 When dealing with a particular philosopher in, say, the history of philosophy, it may 
well be useful shorthand to refer to 'Plato's/Aristotle's/Descartes'/Kant's theory of ... ' 
etc. But to carry that over into saying that their aim was to produce a 'theory' is to claim 
something that involves a series of considerations which are not going to be satisfied by 
a piece of shorthand. When it comes to analysing Plato's etc. account of this or that, 
then the shorthand of the label 'theory' has outlived its usefulness. 
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that individuals come to do through a practical understanding of the 
relations that constitute the community. 
Agency, Self-awareness, and The Ethical community 
In deriving his discussion of will from the context of ethical life Hegel 
opens up an avenue for a discussion of Action, something that can be 
seen in the light of modern discussions on purpose, motives, intention, 
etc. Such discussions aim at establishing some element of agency in 
Action, which was clearly the aim of Hegel's contemporaries of whom 
he is so critical. But the harshness of that criticism should not 
overshadow the point that Hegel was, to an extent, sympathetic with 
this aim. Hegel's criticism is that this was pursued by way of abstract 
reasoning, that philosophers often resort to logical inference where 
straightforward observation of what is involved in purposive Action 
provides a clearer insight. 
Abstract Action and Concrete Action 
An act of will is something that is done, and it is considered to be an 
act of will in that it is done in an ethical community, a community of 
which the agent has a practical understanding. In other words, we are 
concerned with agency in that it is a feature of Action, which takes 
place within an ethical community, and thus to attempt to account for 
will in isolation of this context and then attempt to introduce this 
abstract notion of will, in the form of agency, back into an ethical 
context amounts to being misled by abstract reasoning, failing to see 
the wood for the trees. 
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It is important to emphasise here that Hegel is talking about both a 
cognitive and a practical understanding that informs Action. Kant 
brings out the former, but does so only formally in terms of the 
possibility of experience. Hegel's account comes in the light of 
experience in that abstract cognitive reasoning is itself only a possible 
experience, experience involving a practical cognition. 23 When we 
consider that a practical understanding of the ways in which we act 
involves desires, motives, intentions, etc. in the execution of such 
Actions, then it can be seen that in coming to an understanding of the 
ethical relations of a community - such as to participate in it - involves 
my becoming aware of my agency as expressed in those desires, 
motives, intentions, etc. That is to say, agency, and the awareness of 
one's own agency that acts of will involve, is not something that needs 
to be introduced into an account of experience - it is already present in 
that experience involves an active, cognitive agent, such as is present 
in Action. 
In the Politics24 Aristotle says that man is a political animal in that 
individuals have in common the ability to perceive good and evil, 
justice and injustice, etc., and "It is the sharing of a common view in 
23 For Hegel logical reasoning, for instance, is a practical activity, i. e. it has a purpose, 
aim, an end to attain, but this is not to say that logical reasoning is an Action. This will 
depend on the circumstances in which it takes place: although we wouldn't speak of 
logical reasoning, exercising one's mind on the relations between abstract objects (or 
however logical reasoning might be described), in terms of right and wrong, a minimum 
of consideration will show that doing such a thing in certain situations might well be the 
subject of ethical judgement Take another example: even within Buddhism it would be 
considered wrong to meditate in certain situations. 
24 All references, unless otherwise indicated, will be to the Penguin (1981) edition, tr. T. 
Sinclair. 
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these matters that makes a household or state". 25 Hegel makes a 
similar point: "It is the nature of humanity to press onwards to 
agreement with others; human nature only really exists in an achieved 
community of minds" (PS p. 43). Hegel's general point about the 
relationship between individual and state can be drawn from this: to 
seek philosophical, ethical or political enlightenment by emphasising 
one aspect of the distinction between the individual and society or 
state over the other is the source of many a confusion and error. 26 
More importantly here, however, is that these comments from Aristotle 
and Hegel give us a lead in showing how an account of reason, mind, 
will, and Action can be drawn from their true, i. e. concrete, practical 
and social context. 
The first point to make is that here the question is not how might we 
account for the mind, will, etc., which abstract reasoning then attempts 
to answer by constructing a theory of mind, will, etc. Such a move is 
implicit in Kant's attempt to account for the possibility of experience, for 
example. The account, rather, will be drawn from how mind, will, etc. 
give an account of themselves, and the latter will be the criteria for the 
truth of how we think, speak, of them. From this perspective mind, will, 
etc. are not things that we have in the sense of potentialities for 
engaging in the world, but are aspects of the actual engagement in the 
world, the Actions in which they are instanced. 
By 'the world' is meant the world in which human beings live, a world 
that consists of a network of customs, practices, activities, institutions, 
that reflect the needs, wants, desires, purposes, ambitions, that we 
25 Ibid., 1253a. 
26 In Chapter Seven I will show the importance to an understanding of eudaimonia of 
focusing on the relationship between these in more detail. 
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pursue. This is not the mundane world of abstract reasoning, over 
against which humankind stands as a creature possessed of individual 
minds and reason. The world into which we are born, and in which we 
conduct ourselves, is a rational system organised around needs, 
wants, desires, etc. Whether we are speaking of the ways in which we 
extract fuel and power, and deliver it to our homes; forms of 
transportation and communication; institutions of education and 
training; systems of justice: these all add up to a rational system that 
reflects our needs and wants, and are the means by which we pursue 
them. The social context within which we conduct ourselves is, so to 
speak, 'the rational system of the will's volitions'. That is to say, will is 
an aspect of that system in the engagement that is required for the 
existence, and continued existence, of that system. 
In this sense, the world in which we live, engage in, is thus the world of 
mind. In saying this, however, mind is not some sort of ethereal 
intelligence or spirit that pervades our lives, distinct from the particular 
ways - practices, activities, customs, etc. - in which it is instanced. 
This would be a further abstract distinction, and is the source of the 
confusing and unhelpful label of 'Idealism' that is often attributed to 
Hegel. Participating, engaging in, and reflecting those practices, etc. in 
our participation and engagement, is the mindful pursuit of needs and 
wants, i. e. purposive Action. Such practices, activities, customs, etc. 
are expressive of the agreement achieved within a community, an 
'achieved community of minds'. 
It is only against such a background, within such a context, that we can 
'perceive good and evil, justice and injustice'. That is, 'the sharing of a 
common view in these matters' is the basis from which we can pick out 
particular instances of Action for moral and ethical praise and 
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condemnation. However, such a common view has its basis in the 
nature of purposive Action, something that can be overlooked in the 
search for the basis of a common morality. 
Common Consent, Moral Propositions, and Judgements 
Consider the following from the preface to PR. In deciding the nature of 
his conduct and what his position in life is to be, the 'unsophisticated 
heart' bases his decision on what is publicly accepted as good and 
true. The problem here, according to Hegel, is that those who seek the 
good and true in this manner "... are in the position of not being able to 
see the wood for the trees". He continues: 
... the only perplexity and 
difficulty they are in is one of 
their own making. Indeed, this perplexity and difficulty of 
theirs is proof rather that they want as the substance of 
the right and the ethical not what is universally 
recognised and valid, but something else. If they had 
been serious with what is universally accepted instead of 
busying themselves with the vanity and particularity of 
opinions and things, they would have clung to what is 
substantially right, namely to the commands of the ethical 
order and the state, and would have regulated their lives 
in accordance with these. (PR pp. 3-4) 
The line of reasoning of the 'unsophisticated heart' is quite 
straightforward: morality pertains to the relationships that exist between 
individuals, how they think about and act towards one another, and 
thus an account of what is moral is to be based on a consensus 
hominum, on what is generally accepted as good and true, and only on 
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such a basis can we derive the principles on which we ought to lead 
our lives. 
It might be suggested here that Aristotle might be worthy of the 
appellation 'unsophisticated heart' - after all, throughout NE does he 
not often seek guidance from commonly held views? However, such a 
suggestion is misconceived in failing to recognise that Aristotle's 
ultimate concern is with what is voluntary or involuntary, whether what 
is done is done through choice, i. e. an act of will. There may be various 
opinions about the good or evil of a particular deed, but what is 
ultimately in question is - and this is something that often features in 
attempts to justify opinions on such matters - whether or not what was 
done was done voluntarily or not, was an act of choice, an act of will. 
Again, there may well be differing opinions on what constitutes 
voluntary or involuntary conduct, or what an act of choice or will 
involves, but voluntariness, choice and will are common criteria in 
making judgements about the ethical worth of Actions. 
Of course it may well be suggested that this does little towards 
establishing what exactly it is that makes something good and right, or 
what Hegel means by 'Right'. But Hegel raises the question of "... how 
it is possible, in an infinite variety of opinions, to distinguish and 
discover what is universally recognised and valid? " (PR p. 3). On the 
other hand it can serve to illuminate one of the main problems of an 
account of morality based on a consensus hominum. It is not a moral 
problem, or a problem about morality, that such thinkers are faced 
with, but a misconception in their approach to the subject matter. A 
sociology could perhaps produce a general exposition of the norms of 
behaviour and deviations from such norms in a particular society, but 
this would be inadequate to the purpose of the philosopher. What is of 
172 
concern to the latter is what it is about such behaviour that marks it off 
as right or wrong, good or bad, and this is not the sort of thing that is 
captured in observations of behaviour patterns. It may be true to say 
that the majority of the population conduct themselves in the right 
manner, but this does not inform us as to why this is the right manner 
in which people ought to conduct themselves. 
The pitfalls and mistakes of this sort of approach become clearer the 
more we investigate. On the basis of such an approach would come 
mere descriptions of Actions as 'right' or 'wrong', rather than 
judgements, for the subject of such predication would not be particular 
acts but general types of acts. Thus propositions such as 'Killing is 
wrong', 'taking another's possessions is wrong', etc. would result. The 
problem here of course is that, according to general opinion, there are 
certain situations in which killing is right (or at least not wrong, e. g. 
when involuntary), taking another's possession is right, etc., and what 
is required in order to arrive at valid judgements is reference to 
particular and specific circumstances. But it is not that our vocabulary 
is deficient in its capacity for such reference, for the terms 'murder and 
'theft' refer to specific circumstances in particular acts of killing and 
taking of another's possessions that mark them off as wrong. More 
precisely judgements such as 'murder' and 'theft' make reference to 
the voluntariness, the choosing, i. e. the will of such Actions and the 
persons who execute them. 
Thus the focus is not so much on ethical propositions, which state the 
validity of certain descriptions of general types of acts, the sort of 
propositions that moral theory tends to seek and produce. Rather the 
focus is turned on judgements that state 'This (particular act) is wrong'. 
Again, this is what Aristotle appears to be getting at with his claim that 
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ethics cannot go beyond the general in its recommendations, the 
situations and circumstances of human affairs being so various (NE 
1094b11ff. ). 27 However, this does not preclude us from looking at the 
conditions of Action and the conditions of judgements about specific 
instances of Action. 
Indeed, there are matters in the conditions of Action and judgement 
that need to be clarified before consideration of substantive moral 
propositions can be entered into, and in this what is being put forward 
by Hegel is not so far removed from debates from our own not too 
distant past. In her paper'Modern Moral Philosophy' Anscombe writes 
In present-day philosophy an explanation is required how 
an unjust man is a bad man, or an unjust action a bad 
one; to give such an explanation belongs to ethics; but it 
cannot even be begun until we are equipped with a 
sound philosophy of psychology. For the proof that an 
unjust man is a bad man would require a positive account 
of justice as a 'virtue'. This part of the subject-matter of 
ethics is, however, completely closed to us until we have 
an account of what type of characteristic a virtue is -a 
problem, not of ethics, but of conceptual analysis - and 
how it relates to the actions in which it is instanced: a 
matter which I think Aristotle did not succeed in really 
making clear. For this we certainly need an account at 
least of what a human action is at all, and how its 
description as "doing-such-and-such" is affected by its 
27 A theme that will feature throughout the present work. 
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motive and by the intention or intentions in it; and for this 
an account of such concepts is required. 28 
The important point here is that an analysis of the concepts of motive, 
intention and Action is required, and on this Hegel is equally adamant. 
However, it is hoped that it will become clear that an analysis of these 
would constitute an ethical analysis, and that an ethical analysis 
without this would be inadequate, focusing on Actions as some sort of 
events devoid of motives and intentions. 'Killing' describes such an 
event, but it is devoid of any reference that gives ethical force to the 
term 'murder'. Such considerations will allow us to approach the 
question of what it is to be virtuous - or what 'type of characteristic a 
virtue is. But an important difference between what Anscombe is 
saying and the view of Hegel centres on the former's claim that this is 
not a problem of ethics, 29 but of conceptual analysis: for Hegel the 
concept of a virtue could only have meaning in relation to the 'actions 
in which it is instanced', and it would be difficult to see what a 
conceptual analysis would consist of without such a context. Thus it is 
a problem of ethics in that it directly relates to human Action, and 
hence the logical starting point for Hegel is will. 
Conclusion 
Hegel's philosophical treatment of mind arises out of his criticisms of 
the abstract nature of the discussions of his predecessors and 
contemporaries, and we have seen how philosophical discourse can 
28 In Ethics, Religion and Politics (Blackwell, 1981), p. 29. 
29 Of course, in suggesting that this is a 'problem of ethics' I am not suggesting that it 
is an ethical or moral problem - something we might get into a moral dilemma about. 
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lead to a gulf between how we speak of certain phenomena and that 
of which we speak. Human beings are indeed rational, but this is not 
necessarily to say that they are possessed of some kind of thing that is 
distinguished from their engagement in the world in which they live. 
Human reason is, for Hegel, primarily practical reason, something that 
is evident in the ways and means by which human beings pursue their 
needs, desires, ambitions, etc. that constitute the society in which they 
live. 
In treating mind in this manner, Hegel shows that will is similarly not 
some abstract entity that we are in possession of, but is rather a 
aspect of purposive Action engaging in the customs, practices, 
activities of social life. Consequently, morality - reflecting on such 
engagement and conduct - is itself an aspect of mind, and as such it 
requires a closer look at the particular details of Action. That is to say, 
a discussion of Action and ethics necessarily brings up considerations 
such as reason, desire, purpose, intention, etc. and what they show us 
in conduct and ethical judgement. To these I shall turn next. 
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PART TWO: ARISTOTLE, HEGEL AND THE CONDITIONS OF 
ACTION 
In Part One of this thesis I have concentrated mainly on Hegel's view 
of the task of philosophy, reflected in his critique of the abstract 
reasoning that he claims permeates the period of philosophical 
discourse from Descartes to Hegel's contemporaries. For Hegel, the 
task of a philosophical discourse is to reflect and assimilate that of 
which it speaks, rather than to provide arguments for that discourse's 
subject matter. In this way, Hegel claims, philosophy reflects the 
reason that is the subject matter's own, and not the reason that 
determines particular ways of thinking about it. The latter approach to 
philosophy, although it may produce valid points, often only results in 
one-sided and therefore abstract conclusions. 
Thus, in the particular chapters of Part One we have seen how 
philosophical accounts of mind, morality, ethics, will, freedom and 
Action often lead to conclusions that abstract these from the social and 
historical context within which they are situated. Under the influence of 
17th Century epistemology and metaphysics, human beings have been 
rendered as essentially individual minds, partitioned into separate 
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faculties of reason and desire, and abstract principles (e. g. duty, utility, 
contract) have been sought to provide the basis for a common, social, 
union. This comes over particularly forcibly in discussion of ethics and 
politics, where the individual stands opposed to the state, society, 
social life into which they are born. Will, freedom and reason have in 
this way been divorced from their practical context, the context within 
which they are exercised. 
The difference in approach of Aristotle and Hegel lies in their central 
proposition that man is essentially a social and political creature. This 
proposition is not something that is grounded by an abstract argument, 
but is expressed in human conduct itself. Of course, this is not to say 
that what is said in a philosophical discourse is not to be grounded by 
some sort of argumentation or justification. The point is indicated in a 
comment by Wittgenstein: 
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes 
to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' 
striking us immediately as true, i. e. it is not a kind of 
seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the 
bottom of the language-game. ' 
That is to say, the ultimate grounds of what is said in philosophical 
discourses about human conduct are to be located in particular 
I On Certainty #204. 
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examples of human conduct. 2 This itself indicates another important 
difference: the reasoning that holds together a particular philosophical 
discourse does not have a particular conception of reason or logic to 
satisfy; what it must satisfy is the reason expressed in its subject 
matter, in this case the reason expressed in human conduct. 
As a corollary to Hegel's critique of abstract reasoning I have argued 
that, as a result of such abstract reasoning, much philosophical 
discourse develops a language that loses sight of its subject matter. 
This is something, I shall continue to claim in Part Two, which still 
pervades much of 20th Century philosophical accounts of Action and 
ethics. This is not an entirely new claim, although it is something that 
has not been pursued at any length. It was certainly a concern that 
occupied Wittgenstein in his post-Tractatus writings. Indeed, it is 
perhaps a reaction to the Tractatus, and, in particular, to Frege's 
attempt to develop the mathematical theory of functions to investigate 
the logical structure of the concepts expressed in natural language. 
Baker and Hacker nicely sum up the consequences of Frege's work on 
this for us: if we then look to [the resulting] quantification theory to 
discover the 'real logical forms' of our thought, we mistake a 
deliberately distorted reflection for the object reflected". 3 My point is 
the same: if we demand that philosophical discourses satisfy particular 
ways of thinking, particular theoretical and abstract conceptions of 
2 "'Im Anfang war die Tat' [In the beginning was the deed]", see note 1, Chapter Two 
above. 
3 G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Frege: Logical Excavations (Oxford 1984) p. 391. 
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reason, what is then reflected (e. g. mind, will, Action, ethics) is 
distorted by those particular conceptions. 
In Part Two of the thesis I shall pursue the exploration of this theme in 
looking at particular features of human conduct. Often, modern 
accounts of certain features of human conduct, and their implications 
on morality and ethics, demand satisfaction in terms of quite strict and 
formal (and, therefore, abstract) conceptions of particular details of 
those features of conduct. 
In looking at Hegel's considerations on the will, freedom, reason and 
Action, in the preceding chapters the main feature has been that they 
have been accounted for in their practical, social, context. It has been 
the logic of will, freedom, reason, and Action that has been reflected in 
those accounts, rather than the demands of a formal, abstract 
conception of logic. Structuring philosophical discourse by what human 
conduct itself expresses, I shall claim in the forthcoming chapters, is 
one of the most illuminating features of Aristotle's work. This forms a 
contrast with the work in moral philosophy which emphasises formal 
methods of reasoning, as discussed in the Introduction. 
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4. REASON AND DESIRE IN CHARACTER AND ACTION 
Introduction 
In this chapter I shall consider various aspects of the logic of human 
conduct in order to illustrate the role that reason, desire, knowledge, 
belief, and related phenomena play in moral and ethical life. This will 
be an investigation into the logic of human conduct, rather than a 
discussion of the logic of the concepts of reason, desire, etc. which 
might then be employed to furnish theories of Action and ethics. The 
aim here is to show how the quest to produce formal theories and 
principles can result in refining and defining this cluster of concepts to 
such an extent that discussions lose sight of their original subject 
matter. Instead of discussions of reason, desire, etc., what is sought is 
a rational and logical rigidity that is difficult to reconcile with the 
reason, desire, etc., as exhibited in human conduct. 
For present purposes, I shall limit myself in this chapter to making 
some general observations on the tendency towards rationalisation 
and abstraction, illustrated by considering various areas of 
philosophical debate. The emphasis shall be on illustration, for I shall 
steer clear of definition as this is itself often the cause of problems in 
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analysis. However, two specific points will come out of this. a) 
Discussions that aim to establish particular moral theories and 
principles overlook the importance of moral character to the nature of 
morality, thereby highlighting the abstract nature of such an aim; b) 
Good and evil are characteristics of purposive Actions, rather than 
determinations of theoretical thinking, and the possibility of doing good 
and evil Actions is to be seen in the nature of what is involved in 
conscience. These two points can be seen in some general and 
preliminary considerations of akrasia and acting with a bad 
conscience, subjects which will be given more detailed consideration in 
Chapter Five. 
The Characterisation of Action and Moral Character: desire, 
reason and knowledge in human conduct 
In Chapter Three I claimed, in line with Hegel's overall view that the 
task of philosophy is to assimilate and reflect how things are, that the 
practical syllogism rests on the logic of Action, rather than on a formal 
and abstract conception of logic or reason (see above, p. 165). The 
practical syllogism is a central part of Aristotle's discussion of human 
conduct. Often, however, misunderstandings about what he is saying 
arise precisely because many commentators demand that an account 
of human conduct should satisfy a quite formal and abstract 
conception of reason in an analysis of the practical syllogism. Such a 
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conception of reason itself often rests on an abstract distinction 
between desire and reason. 
If, as Anscombe says, a fundamental concern for ethics is to get clear 
about what type of characteristic a virtue is (see note 28, Chapter 
Three), then we need to take account of the character of the Action in 
which virtue is present, and the moral character of the agent. That is to 
say, desires, feelings, etc. are integral to a person's moral character, 
and reason and desire are not as easily distinguishable in nature as 
formal analysis might suggest. The hard and fast distinction between 
reason and desire is something that prevails in modern philosophy, but 
it is also made by commentators on Aristotle. As we have seen in the 
Introduction, for many influential moral philosophers reason is the true 
arbiter of morality (e. g. Hare, Nagel, Rawls, Scanlon). Desire and 
willing, however, are matters of psychology or the language of 
psychology (Hume and Hare respectively), or developed into neo- 
Humean theories of motivation, ' and thus are taken out of the context 
of personal experience and social institutions that constitute moral life. 
Desire in Moral Character 
Moral character is a constant feature throughout NE. Given this, it is 
somewhat surprising that many commentators fail to take seriously the 
1 C. f. Michael Smith's The Moral Problem (Blackwell, 1994). I shall raise a few points in 
relation to this in the conclusion. 
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importance of the role Aristotle sees in the discussion of character. 
More often than not, this is due to commentators wanting to derive 
from NE a formal account of conduct as an external event in the world, 
rather than as account of human conduct as an indication of a 
person's moral character. Consider, for example, a remark by Anthony 
Kenny: 
The opening passage of book iii [of NE] has only a 
punning reference to 'passion and action' to link the topic 
of voluntariness with that of virtue. 2 
In particular, the problem relates to Aristotle's stipulating that how a 
person feels after an Action is relevant to questions of voluntariness. 
Rosalind Hursthouse sketches out the problem as it is seen by those 
who are unhappy with such a stipulation: 
"Feelings are relevant to questions of voluntariness", it 
might be said "only in so far as passion prior to or during 
action might excuse the action or make it involuntary. So 
to bring in how the agent feels subsequent to the action, 
as in 1110b18-19 and 11 11a20 is simply a mistake". 3 
As Hursthouse points out, failure to take Aristotle seriously here is a 
failure to take seriously that we are dealing with character, and not 
merely acting in terms of an external account of what is actually done. 
2 A. Kenny in Aristotle's Theory of Will (Duckworth, 1979), p. 3. 
3 R. Hursthouse in 'Acting and Feeling in Character: Nichomachean Ethics 3. i. ' in 
Phronesis Vol. XXIX, No. 3,1984, pp. 254-5. 
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In the passage at NE 1110b18-19 Aristotle says that how a person 
feels subsequent to an Action has a bearing on whether it is to be 
regarded as voluntary or involuntary. Now, if we were concerned with 
Action only in terms of what is done, on its effects or consequences, 
its formal character (an external description of what is done) - say, for 
instance, for purposes of establishing a theory of responsibility4 - then 
it would seem that feelings after the event are irrelevant. But the very 
fact that Aristotle does consider them relevant indicates he is more 
concerned with moral character - the motives, desires, feelings, 
reasons, that are characteristic of a person's conduct. Here, as 
throughout NE, Aristotle is not so much concerned with a definition of 
Action by which we might determine what counts as good or bad, as 
with the sorts of characteristics from which Actions issue. 
Abstract Reason and Moral Theory 
This concern with the types of characteristics from which Actions issue 
marks off a significant difference between Aristotle's concerns and the 
emphasis on reason in modern moral philosophy. Aristotle is 
examining the logic of human conduct, the logic it expresses in virtue 
of moral character, rather than looking to establish a theory of Action 
4 For those commentators who consider that book III of NE principally sketches out a 
theory of moral responsibility, see e. g. Kenny, op. cit., T. Irwin 'Reason and 
Responsibility in Aristotle' in A. 0. Rorty (Ed. ) Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (California 
1980), Randall R. Curren 'The Contribution of Nicomachean Ethics iii 5 to Aristotle's 
Theory of Responsibility' in History of Philosophy Quarterly vol. 6, No. 3 July 1989. In 
contrast see Hursthouse, op. cit. 
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that will yield formal principles which can then be employed to 
determine what it is good to do and what it is bad to do. The 
difference can be made more explicit from a point made by Peter 
Winch. Discussing the difference between a parent who engages with 
his child spontaneously, and one who engages with his child because 
he thinks he ought to, or out of duty, Winch says: 
I am not trying to replace Kant's contention that acting for 
the sake of duty is the only kind of behaviour which is 
good without qualification with the counter-contention that 
acting spontaneously is the only kind of behaviour which 
is good without qualification. On the contrary, my 
contention is that there is no general kind of behaviour of 
which we have to say that it is good without qualification. 
Kant's mistake, that is, lies in trying to fill out the view that 
only the good will can be called good without qualification 
with a positive account of the kind of behaviour in which a 
good will must manifest itself. All we can do, I am arguing, 
is to look at particular examples and see what we do want 
to say about them; there are no general rules which can 
determine in advance what we must say about them. 5 
Of particular interest here is the negative emphasis that Winch places 
on 'must'. Theories of Action and theories of morality are at their most 
5 P. Winch, 'Moral Integrity' in Winch, Ethics and Action (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1972), pp. 181-2. 
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abstract when it is thought that they must satisfy either some sort of 
logical or metaphysical justification: in the case of Action, for instance, 
a theory must satisfy the inference of formal syllogism that is brought 
into considerations of practical reason; 6 in morality, Kant attempts to 
derive morals from reason alone. Such justifications are not going to 
be derived from the study of human conduct, for formal logic and 
metaphysical reasoning are not features of conduct. This is why 
Aristotle rightly emphasises, throughout NE, that the study of ethics 
can only give guidance for the most part. 
The demands of satisfying a formal conception of logic and 
metaphysical justification in theories of Action and morality are 
indicative of the hard and fast distinction between reason and desire. 
Whether desires, feelings, appetite, etc. are going to feature in a 
particular theory or not, ultimately that theory must satisfy the 
demands of abstract reason. I say 'abstract' reason, for it is not the 
reason that is found in human conduct, but a conception that has been 
purified, refined, for the purpose of satisfying formal logical conditions 
and argumentation. The reason present in conduct is purged of the 
desire element and elevated as the arbiter of what is to count as good 
or as bad. 
Often the reasons for my conduct are my desires, without such 
conduct necessarily being unreasonable or irrational. Distinguishing 
the rational- or 'reason'- content from the 'desire'-content in the desires 
61 shall discuss this point in greater depth in Chapter Six. 
187 
that are my reasons for acting, is often impossible, precisely because 
such a project is misconceived in assuming that human conduct can 
be accounted for in terms of the analytical distinctions of 'reason' and 
'desire'. On the basis of such a distinction Action becomes a 
specialised term in a language that loses sight of its original subject 
matter. 
In the area of moral philosophy, such a language renders the 
predicates 'good' and 'evil' as abstract terms that are attached to 
Actions, very much in the manner of basic subject-predicate logic. It is 
against such a background that I claim that in Aristotle and Hegel we 
get discussions that are determined by the logic of Action, and in 
which we can see that 'good' and 'evil' function in the Actions in which 
they are instanced. When it comes to questions of 'good' and 'evil', the 
description 'That was good/evil' says that 'good/evil' is characteristic of 
the Action, rather than something that, after abstract consideration, or 
measured against an abstract rule or principle, we merely want to say 
of the Action. Again, if it is merely a matter of what we want to say, 
morality itself becomes arbitrary (see Chapter Two, pp. 98ff. Also, see 
p. 134): 'Do we want to say anything, and if so which particular moral 
principle or theory should we invoke? ' However, this ignores the fact 
that in purposive Action what is done is done with the agent knowing 
the Action as good and evil, a knowing that is not the result of, or 
determined by, or an appeal to, abstract reasoning or principles. 
188 
Knowledge and self-awareness in Human Conduct 
For both Aristotle and Hegel knowledge is central to Action, knowing 
what is, and what is not, in our power to do. This self-awareness itself 
accounts for the ethical nature of human conduct - acting well or 
badly, the good or evil character of Action. Hegel says, "... when we 
speak of good, we mean the knowledge of it" (PR #139fA]). Here 
Hegel is not saying that in having knowledge of good we have 
knowledge of an abstract concept or category. Good, for Hegel, is not 
a predicate that attaches, in the sense of formal subject-predicate 
logic, to an Action. Good, rather, is the character of the Action, the 
deed, what is done, as opposed to an abstract category under which 
we place some Actions, and not others. Thus, when 'we mean the 
knowledge of it, it is not 'good' as such that we have knowledge of, but 
Actions which are of that character. The self-awareness of Action is 
knowledge of what is, and what is not, in my power to do as good and 
as evil, and not necessarily a philosophical insight into what good and 
bad consist of. 7 
This has important consequences for the analysis of Action, and the 
nature of the knowledge involved in our knowing what is and is not in 
our power to do. A closer look at what is involved will uncover a source 
of much confusion in philosophical accounts of morality. 
7 If such a thing is to be had. Philosophers certainly ask more questions about good 
and evil, but it is yet to be proved that they therefore have a greater insight. 
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One understanding of `knowledge', the knowledge of what is, and what 
is not, in our power to do, is based on what is physically possible for 
someone to do. On such a basis, the assessment of a person's ability 
to do something will take into account certain physical characteristics 
(e. g. strength, manipulative skills) and cognitive abilities (e. g. to 
manipulate tools, machinery, other people, with certain ends in view). 
On these grounds, I know that it is in my power to do all sorts of things. 
I could, for instance, go out into the street with my grandfather's old 
rifle and fire it at anybody who crosses my path. I know the rifle works, 
I know what it is capable of doing, I have the physical strength to wield 
it and pull the trigger -I know that such an Action is within my power. 
This assessment of what is in my power to do is something that can be 
carried out by a stranger, someone who has just met me. This, 
however, says something important. The assessment would be made 
on the basis of my being a human being with certain physical and 
cognitive capacities, and not on consideration of the person G. P. What 
has not been accounted for is that I am a person with moral character, 
and that my perspective on what is and what is not in my power to do 
is a moral perspective. As G. P., I know that it is not in my power to do 
such a thing. It may well be the case that I know I can do some things 
that others find morally repugnant, that others know are not within their 
power to do. But that also takes into account that I am a person with 
moral character. Making an assessment of what is and what is not in 
my power to do without consideration of this, is to make an 
assessment of an abstract human being, with certain physical and 
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cognitive abilities. It would not be an assessment of G. P. - the 'self in 
self-knowledge, that which refers to G. P., drops out of account, leaving 
only an abstract human being. Without considerations of character, we 
are abstract individual human beings - but no such things exist. 
That this is an abstract human being follows directly from the notion of 
'knowledge' that is being employed. On the surface, it would very 
much seem that the analysis of our knowledge of what is, and is not, in 
our power to do is an example of practical reasoning. That is, it 
focuses on particular capacities that are the means by which it is 
possible to attain certain ends. But this is not the case. Precisely 
because the analysis is carried out on purely physical grounds stripped 
of the moral character of a particular person, the reasoning is itself of 
an abstract, rather than a practical, nature. I can certainly sit at my 
desk and reason about my strength and manipulative skills, concluding 
my reasoning on these that I could physically go out and commit 
murder. In this sense, it might be said that I 'know' that it is within my 
power. But I also know that I could not do that, in virtue of knowing 
myself as the particular person G. P. The 'knowledge' and the so-called 
practical reasoning that is involved in analysing an abstract human 
being is far removed from the knowledge that real persons have of 
themselves, and the practical reasoning involved in actual instances of 
human conduct. 
This process whereby aspects of human conduct and experience are 
rendered abstract is particularly widespread in much modern moral 
philosophy, the result of focusing on constructing moral theories and 
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the establishing of moral rules and principles. As a result human 
beings are viewed as abstract entities, and what counts as moral 
Action is derived from a rational assessment and application of those 
theories and principles. Moral character does not come into the 
equation. This leads to a very peculiar outlook: human beings are not, 
per se, moral beings; they have to make themselves so by way of 
rational calculation. We do not, per se, view the world we that live in 
morally; rational calculation will tell us the right way to view it like that. 
Human conduct is not, per se, moral in character; that is something 
given to it as a result of rational calculation. 
However, for both Aristotle and Hegel, good and evil have their origin 
in human conduct, and not in abstract human thought. Furthermore, 
human beings conduct themselves in particular social situations, 
consisting of quite definite customs, habits, practices, laws, etc., from 
which the particular contents of human conduct are taken. The choices 
a person makes are the mark of his character (NE 1111 b6), and to 
choose involves choosing from something. These customs, etc. 
constitute the range and context from which choices are made. It is 
only within such a context, against such a background, that questions 
about good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice arise. To 
recognise such moral distinctions and judgements involves 
conscience. 
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Conscience, Action and Character in Moral Life 
Purposive engagement in an ethical community involves being of a 
certain moral character, which in turn involves knowing Actions, 
activities, practices, etc. as good and evil in themselves, rather than 
having abstract conceptions of good and evil, under which headings 
human conduct is categorised. Good and evil are characteristic of 
Actions, rather than abstract concepts or categories that are 
predicated of certain deeds by way of some sort of faculty, or formal 
logical operation of reason. Good and evil, this amounts to saying, 
originate in human conduct, and not abstract reasoning about human 
conduct. This practical knowledge of good and evil involves 
conscience and, for Hegel, it is in having such a conscience that 
"... both morality and evil have their common root" (PR #139). 
The aim of Hegel's discussion of conscience is to bring out the 
practical (or, as he would say, 'concrete') nature of good and evil. I say 
'bring out' quite specifically, for good and evil are already in, so to 
speak, Action, the philosophical task being to expose or show this. 
Doing so involves saying something more on the way in which reason 
and desire are employed in discussing human conduct, in particular 
the conception of reasoning involved in moral philosophy. This, in turn, 
has some interesting implications for the nature of judgement. 
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Conscience: the origin of good and evil 
Paragraph 139 of PR demands close attention. Here Hegel expands 
on his claim that to have conscience is, eo ipso, to be capable of good 
and evil8. The passage is lengthy, so rather than quote it in full I shall 
note its most pertinent points. The possibility of evil, Hegel says, 
comes about in the form of 
... the opposition of the natural level and the inwardness of 
the will. In this opposition, the latter is only a relative and 
abstract subjectivity which can draw its content only from 
the determinant content of the natural will, from desire, 
impulse, inclination, & c. 
By 'inwardness of will' and 'subjectivity' Hegel means the individual 
human being who has needs, desires and impulses to pursue and 
fulfil. 'Inwardness of will' is 'relative and abstract' because what Hegel 
is doing is analysing down the concept of Action into the two aspects 
under which it can be grasped in thought, i. e. in terms of needs, 
desires, impulses, etc., and in terms of reason, which involves self- 
consciousness, i. e. the recognition of these needs, etc. Hegel goes on 
to say that desires, impulses, etc. may be recognised as either 'good' 
or'evil', but in attributing good and evil we are saying something quite 
specific about the sort of Action we are attributing them to. That is to 
say, in attributing good or evil to instances of conduct, we are saying 
8 Here I shall restrict myself to conscience in the sense of self-conscious awareness 
and knowing. Problematic conscience will come into play in Chapter Five. 
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that such instances reflect some further aspect which takes them out 
of the category of acting through impulse and desire (as, for instance, 
infants and animals do, although because of this impulsiveness we do 
not consider their conduct in terms of good and evil). We might say: 
under the description 'fulfilling a desire' an Action is neither good nor 
evil, but it may well be either of these under the description of an 
assessment of the rationality of the Action. This rationality involves 
being aware of desires, impulses, etc., and also being aware that they 
may be either good or evil, as 
... good... comes on 
the scene as the opposite extreme to 
immediate objectivity, the natural pure and simple [i. e. 
impulsively 'fulfilling a desire'], and as soon as the will is 
reflected into itself and consciousness is a knowing 
consciousness. 
Being able to apply the terms 'good' and 'evil' in relation to my desires 
involves being aware, conscious of the desires, impulses, etc. (as 
opposed to unconsciously acting upon them) that I may attribute 'good' 
and 'evil' to; and also being aware that this is something I can do, 
which involves, so to speak, my reflecting on my own capacities (this 
being part of what Hegel means by will returning into itself - e. g. PR 
#7). 'When man wills the natural, it is no longer merely natural'. We 
reject the appeal to impulse and desire in excusing behaviour precisely 
because the recognition of those desires and impulses itself involves 
the possibility of not acting in that way. 
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The two aspects of purposive Action which come out in analysis, 
desire and reason, are something that, in self-consciousness, we are 
aware of: 
Man is therefore evil by a conjunction between his natural 
or undeveloped character and his reflection into himself; 
and therefore evil belongs neither to nature as such by 
itself - unless nature were supposed to be the natural 
character of the will which rests in its particular content - 
nor to introverted reflection by itself, i. e. cognition in 
general ... (ibid. 
) 
Here Hegel is not so much concerned to sketch what the 'doing of evil' 
involves, but rather to set out the nature of human conduct, showing 
the grounds for our acting well or badly, employing the terms 'good' 
and 'evil' of Action (the foregoing quotation being an explanation of in 
what 'both morality and evil have their common root'). In doing so he 
comes from the claim that individuals act both in terms of desire, 
impulse, etc. - often considered to be 'natural', shared with animals - 
and in terms of reason, leading to the overall claim of the paragraph 
that it is only in that desires, impulses, etc. are the object of rational 
consideration, a feature of rational Action, that evil appears on the 
scene. 
Keeping in mind, then, that Hegel is concerned with the origin of the 
concepts of good and evil, and not their application to any particular 
types of Action, the argument goes something like this. Action can be 
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characterised both in terms of reason and in terms of acting out of 
desires, impulses, etc. Suppose we tried to characterise a human's 
conduct just in terms of the latter. Then it would not merely be the 
case that there are no reasons for my behaving impulsively, but that, 
considering the sort of creature that I am, it would not make sense to 
ask for my reasons for behaving in the way I did: in this sense, it might 
be said that it would be 'natural' for me to behave in this way. If asked 
to give reasons why I behaved in this way, either the questioner is 
ignorant of the sort of creature I am, or he is asking me to justify or to 
explain why I behaved as I did. But in this characterisation I acted 
impulsively, without having reflective, conscious reasons for my 
conduct, and thus the question makes no sense, in the same way that 
it makes no sense to ask for an infant's or animal's reasons for what 
they do. To ask such a question implies that in some sense or another 
I chose to act in that way, but the point is that the sort of behaviour 
that we have in mind here is not that which involves reason in the 
choosing to do it, but is behaviour of an impulsive kind. An account of 
my behaviour here is given in terms of the needs, desires, etc. that I 
have in virtue of being the sort of creature I am. 
Reason and Desire in Action 
Now it would be an impossible task to try to illustrate this point with an 
example of Action, precisely because the account has been sketched 
specifically leaving out another essential aspect of Action: rationality. 
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Not only do we act by impulse, but by reason also. That is to say, we 
not only conduct ourselves in order to fulfil certain desires, but we also 
employ different means by which those desires can be fulfilled. This 
would be an Action carried out by way of practical reason. But this is 
not to say that reason is something that we have over and above the 
'natural' element of desire, for 
In everything human it is thinking, thought, which is the 
effective thing. An animal lives too, it shares needs, 
feelings, etc. with man. But if man is to be distinguished 
from animal, his feelings must be human, not animal, i. e. 
thought must be implicit in it. An animal has sensuous 
feelings, desires, etc., but no religion, science, art, or 
imagination. In all these thinking is at work.... 
We have will, vision, etc. and oppose them to thinking, 
but thinking determines not only thinking but the will, etc. 
too, and when we look at it more closely we come to the 
knowledge that thinking is not something particular, a 
special force, but the essential and universal thing from 
which everything else is produced (IHLP pp. 54-5). 
Thus Hegel is not saying here that this sort of reason separates us off 
from our natural tendencies, that it somehow frees us from nature, for 
here we are talking about something that is quite natural to us, self- 
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consciousness - something which Anscombe describes usefully as 
'knowledge of the object that one is, of the human animal that one is'. 9 
Considering a passage from Aristotle's discussion of voluntary and 
involuntary conduct can further illuminate this point: 
It is probably wrong to say that acts due to temper and 
appetite are involuntary; for on this view in the first place 
the capacity for voluntary action will not extend to any 
animal other than man, or even to children; and secondly, 
when we act from appetite or temper are none of our 
Actions voluntary? (NE 1111a24 - 28). 10 
Voluntary Actions are those in which "the originating cause lies in the 
agent himself' (1111a23), and thus there is nothing peculiar in saying 
that someone acted through desire or temper and acted voluntarily, 
precisely because that someone is the sort of creature who has 
desires. Whether the conduct is a spontaneous outburst of temper or a 
calculated means of fulfilling a desire, it does not affect the question of 
voluntariness; for 
... what difference 
is there in point of voluntariness 
between wrong Actions that are calculated and wrong 
Actions that are due to temper? Both are to be avoided; 
9 'The First Person' in Guttenplan (ed. ), Mind and Language (Oxford, 1972), p. 62. 
10 In both the Loeb and Penguin editions 'appetite' is rendered as 'desire'. Aristotle 
himself uses epithumia, which usually indicates desire in general, i. e. appetite, rather 
than orexis which is generally used to indicate a specific desire. 
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and the irrational feelings are considered to be no less 
part of human nature than our considered judgements. It 
follows that Actions due to temper or appetite are also 
proper to the human agent. Therefore it is absurd to class 
these actions as involuntary (1111 a34 - b3). 11 
Here we must not construe Aristotle's mention of 'irrational feelings' in 
Humean or 'quasi-hydraulic' conceptions of desire-satisfaction. 
Desires are not bottom line forces that set reason off on its mission of 
fulfilment. The desires I have depend on what there is to be desired. I 
desire sweet things because there are sweet things. The discovery of 
sugar cane did not come about out of the desire of the people of the 
western world for sweet things, but it is a historical cause of the 
existence of the various sweet things there are to be desired. Here we 
have a process of rational appetition, the basis upon which the 
abstract distinction between reason and desire rests. Aristotle's point 
about voluntary Actions is that both desire and reason feature in an 
account of human conduct, and not in hidden forces. As to where 
morality and evil come into the picture, this requires a further point, 
11 Discussing force and involuntariness in NE Kenny (op. cit., pp. 35-6) puts Aristotle's 
point in the context of an opponent to his argument "... who is a determinist in respect 
of bad actions, and a libertarian in respect of good". I would suggest that in putting the 
point in terms of a philosophical argument we miss an important observation that 
Aristotle is making with respect to character and Action, viz. that how a person 
himself characterises his acts is itself an indication of his character as a person. This 
is a point that Hegel attempts to get over throughout his discussion of good and 
conscience (PR #129-40). 
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one that arises directly out of consideration of these two aspects of 
Action. 
The Logic of Reason and Desire in Action 
In analysing Action in terms of desire and reason, Hegel often employs 
the logical categories of particularity and universality. But although 
they are logical, i. e. technical, categories, in line with Hegel's view that 
the practical syllogism reflects purposive Action, they reflect the logic 
of Action. For instance, in Action involving the pursuit of a specific 
desire, 'particularity' can be seen in that the agent is concerned solely 
with the here and now, fulfilling this desire. Looking solely from this 
perspective, we see the agent's concern as focused solely on the 
particular aspect of the Action, that is, a fulfilment of his desire, the 
sort of attitude of which 'I just want this... ' is descriptive. The central 
thing about the Action is that it fulfils something that he wants. Here 
focusing on the desirability12 of the Action is to focus on its particular 
aspects - both in that it concerns a particular feature of the Action, that 
it fulfils a desire, and in that our interest in the Action is that it issued 
from a person with a particular desire. 
In considering purposive Action, however, there is more involved than 
merely the pursuit of desire in terms of the here and now. For 
12 Not in the sense of hairetos (choiceworthy), as employed by Aristotle. This will come 
into play shortly. 
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instance, a person is hungry, and so he eats. But there are various 
questions that could be raised, falling under the general heading of 
'right' - general in the sense of its not necessarily being the 'right' of 
morality. That is, questions as to whether this is the right time, place, 
food, etc. to eat. These are the types of questions that adults ask 
children to consider, in the hope that, eventually, they will ask such 
questions of themselves without prompting. Even better, we would 
hope that they so train and habituate themselves that the questions 
(ideally) never, or (at least) rarely, arise: feeling hungry will not 
automatically lead to wanting to eat when it is not the right time, place, 
food, etc. In other words, through training and habituation - much of it 
self-training and habituation - desire becomes 'right desire', rational 
desire, and Actions exhibit rational principle. 
It is this rational element to purposive Action that Hegel refers to as the 
'universal' aspect of Action. Thus, although Hegel discusses human 
conduct in terms of desire and reason, which in analysis can be 
distinguished, in purposive Action they are not clearly distinct, are not 
two distinct 'faculties', do not issue from distinct 'faculties'. In analysis 
we form categories, concepts, etc. out of them, and as such they are 
abstract categories: the danger lies in losing sight of what we are doing 
in the process of analysis, and assuming that the distinct categories, 
concepts, etc. that we form are distinct, or show the same degree of 
distinctness, in the subject matter that we are analysing. 
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Knowledge, Reasoning and Principle 
In forming categories, concepts, etc. in philosophical analysis the aim 
is to be as clear as possible about what we are saying about our 
subject matter. Those categories, concepts, etc. function, so to speak, 
as signposts that map out the path that our reasoning and arguments 
take in our discussions. However, in concentrating on producing a 
precise and clear map, the latter can become a refined version of the 
terrain that it covers. In doing so, anomalies often appear between our 
discussions and that which they address, and what is then sought is a 
sharper definition of the categories that are employed. This is 
particularly evident in considerations of Action and ethics: 
epistemological exactitude is demanded of the knowledge and 
reasoning involved in human conduct in attempting to come to terms 
with certain problems, a demand which often only throws up further 
problems13. 
Consider this in relation to the practical syllogism and something 
Aristotle says about akrasia. Aristotle identifies a universal proposition 
in the major premise, and in his discussion of akrasia he says that the 
incontinent person has a principle, a rational part to his soul (NE 
1102b15), by which he recognises the right thing to do. But he acts 
contrary to this, even though he knows what he does is wrong 
(1145b12.13). Similarly, in cases of bad conscience, Hegel recognises 
13 One way in which the search for such exactitude creates problems is in discussions 
of akrasia, a point I shall return to Chapter Five. 
203 
"knowledge of the true universal, whether knowledge in the form of 
merely a feeling for right or duty, or of a deeper cognition and 
apprehension of them" (PR #140[A]). Hegel takes care here in 
ensuring that we understand his use of 'knowledge' in a broad sense, 
and we need to take similar care in Aristotle also. In neither Aristotle or 
Hegel is there a specific or definite conception of knowledge involved. 
As we shall come to see, the significance of this comes out when we 
consider the way in which Aristotle distinguishes between himself and 
Socrates in employing `knowledge', a difference also reflected in their 
views as to how `principle' figures in human conduct. 
A great many of the arguments in NE involve Aristotle's invoking 'right 
principle'. 14 It turns up as the principle of virtuous Action, the basis of 
law and justice, a sign of good character, and yet we do not get a 
specific definition of what it is. However, I would suggest that to look 
for such a rigid definition would indicate that we have misconceived 
Aristotle's point. It is not something that can be formalised, but rather 
comes into play in particular circumstances: "... the temperate man 
14 Throughout the Penguin edition Thomson uses 'rational principle' and 'right principle' 
where most other translators use 'reason' and 'right reason'. For example, at 
1119b17, where Peters, Chase and the revised Oxford translation use the latter 
terms. For present purposes I shall substitute 'reason' and 'right reason' where 
Tredennick uses 'rational' and 'right principle'. As we shall see, this would very much 
seem to be substantiated by the context. 
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desires the right things in the right way and at the right time, and 
this... is prescribed by reason" (NE 1119b19). 15 
Action is the result of prohairesis, which involves deliberation 
(bouleusis), a particular employment of reason (logos), the latter also 
being present in akrasia. More importantly though, right reason (orthos 
logos) is in there too: 
... incontinent action 
is in a sense influenced by reason 
and opinion, contrary not in itself but only incidentally 
(because it is the desire, not the opinion, that is contrary) 
to the right reason. So this is [a]... reason why the brutes 
are not incontinent, viz. because they have no universal 
belief but only an impression and memory of particulars 
(1147b1-5). 
The incontinent act involves some sort of understanding and 
acknowledgement of rightness, which would come, say, in an account 
of the incontinent's universal beliefs. The dilemma for the incontinent 
is that his beliefs about how he ought to go on are challenged by his 
15 The point that the right principle is not something that can be formalised or written 
down, and the variety of uses that Aristotle puts it to might be understood in the 
context of the broad extension of logos: not only does it translate into a formal 
account of, say, a mathematical proposition (logon echein), and thus a technical 
principle that we might consciously employ when making calculations, but also into an 
account that can be given of something without it being a guiding principle of that 
something, c. f. NE 1102b32 - 3. Further still we would want to say that Action may be 
guided by principle, although in saying so we would not want to say that it is guided by 
205 
desire to do otherwise. Notice here that it is not necessarily the case 
that this involves knowledge of a particular principle, but only a belief 
or opinion (doxa), the latter involving right reasoning. That is to say, a 
belief or opinion about how we ought to go on involves some sort of 
grasp of the term 'right', without necessarily operating with a particular 
principle that determines what is right and what is wrong. But this does 
not preclude someone's knowing this to be an unworthy, 
dishonourable, dishonest, etc. thing to do. Now when we are talking of 
a situation where the agent is acting contrary to a specific duty, it is 
certainly the case that '/ ought not to do this', i. e. the 'ought' has a 
particular reference, but even here right reasoning involves the 
universal in that 'ought' implies rightness or correctness, and rightness 
and correctness imply a rule. Here the 'ought' has universal reference, 
the very context that provides for the possibility of 'ought' having 
particular reference. That is to say, 'ought' functions giving a universal 
sense to a statement where particular reference is made. 
When a person considers how he ought or ought not to behave, this is 
indicative of his character, which involves beliefs and opinions about 
the rights and wrongs of certain Actions, practices and activities. This 
is precisely because Actions, practices and activities imply a rule, right 
reasoning, rightness: in acting I am prima facie saying that it is fine, 
a particular, formalisable, principle. It is here that we can begin to see the tensions 
between modem Aristotelians and Kantians. 
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alright, ok, etc., to do this. 16 It is this universal aspect of Action which is 
expressed by 'ought', something that is also indicated in the 
judgements we make about the conduct of those whom we consider to 
be incapable of right reasoning: to excuse them thus arises precisely 
because what they did is something that ought not, as a rule, to be 
done; it is on the basis of this that the practice of excusing operates. 
On the other hand, with those whom we consider capable of right 
reasoning, it is precisely the possibility of there being a conflict 
between an individual's particular desires, as an individual, and the 
universal aspect implied by right reasoning that the'ought' arises. 
At NE 1134a35-b2 Aristotle broadens his use of right reason in 
discussing political justice. It is not the man we allow to rule, he says, 
but right reason, "because a man does so for his own interests"; 
whereas "justice is the good of others". At 1180a21 law is said to be 
the "pronouncement [logos] of a kind of practical wisdom or 
intelligence". 17 Clearly right reason is related to eudaimonia in its being 
the principle of virtue, i. e. the universal principle implied by virtuous 
Action. It is also, however, reflective of the ethical community, in that 
right reason involves "... perception [aisthesis] of good and evil, just 
and unjust, etc. ", it being "... the sharing of a common view in these 
161 say prima facie in that, of course, with the akratic it is expressly not the case that he 
thinks this is alright to do. The significance of this will come up shortly. 
17 Again, here, Aristotle is quite loose on what right reason involves, i. e. it is a kind of 
practical wisdom or intelligence. Right reason is not something definable in itself, for, 
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matters that makes a household or state". 18 Thus, right reason is the 
principle of justice and the rational basis for formal law. Yet the point 
cannot be reducible to a merely 'external' account of Action, to the 
claim that conduct is virtuous or vicious in that it occurs in the public 
domain. For such conduct will be considered an Action only in that we 
can attribute certain cognitive abilities to the agent, i. e. in virtue of his 
being someone who agrees in the principle implied by right reasoning, 
the principle of ethical community. 
Knowledge, Judgement and Character in Moral Life 
In Aristotle's discussion of virtue and right reasoning, there is an 
important difference between what he means and the sort of 
knowledge that Plato or Socrates had in mind. For them, the virtues 
are principles which are the object of knowledge, whereas for Aristotle 
they are not so much principles as character traits which imply 
principle. In the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle gives us some nice 
contrasts between himself and Socrates. Military courage is 
due to experience and knowledge, not (as Socrates 
said) of what is fearful, but of the resources they have to 
meet what is fearful. 
in relation to virtue, it is expressed in the sphere of activity and feeling (NE Book Two, 
chapter vii). 
18 Politics, 1253a17. 
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.... the 
Socratic saying that nothing is stronger than 
wisdom is right. But when Socrates said this of knowledge 
he was wrong. For wisdom is an excellence and not a 
species of knowledge, but another kind of cognition ... 19 
For Socrates virtue involves a quite formal knowing, i. e. knowing 
'objects', e. g. what is fearful, whereas for Aristotle knowledge in the 
sphere of virtue is not of this kind, but rather wisdom (phronesis). That 
is to say, knowledge in the sphere of virtue and its activity is not the 
knowledge of specific objects, and definite species of knowledge, as 
exemplified in the 'knower-known' dyad of epistemological theory; 
wisdom is a practical cognition, involving a grasp of circumstances 
indicating the right way to go on. 
The `Ought' of Judgement and Action 
In Hegel's characterisation it is also recognised that the person acting 
with a bad conscience need not know, in the strict sense, the right 
principle - he may have 'knowledge in the form of merely feeling for 
right or duty'. Action is rational for Hegel in that it issues from 
"purpose, as issuing from a thinker" (PR #119), and thinking involves 
thinking about "the universal side of action, i. e. the intention [i. e. what 
was intended by doing such-and-such]" (Ibid. ). The purpose and 
intention in Action reflect the practical knowledge in the agent in that it 
19 Oxford Revised edition, 1229a14 and 1246b33 respectively. 
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involves the knowledge that doing such-and-such will bring about more 
than the here and now of doing such-and-such: 
The discrete character of the external world shows what 
the nature of that world is, namely a chain of external 
relations. Actuality is touched in the first instance only at a 
single point (arson, for instance, directly concerns only a 
tiny section of the firewood, i. e. is describable in a 
proposition, not a judgement), but the universal nature of 
this point entails its expansion.... hence in murder, it is not 
a piece of flesh, as something isolated, which is injured, 
but life itself which is injured in that piece of flesh (Ibid. ). 
In intending to commit arson or murder I know that much more than 
this bit of wood or flesh is damaged. In this, thinking is involved, i. e. 
the Action issues as from a thinker and, further, a judgement is 
involved: a description of the Action would not be a mere proposition - 
'I set this bit of wood alight', 'I put the knife in this bit of flesh'; this 
would not be a full description of my Action. The descriptions 'I set fire 
to the house' and 'I murdered Jones' say that in putting the match to 
this piece of wood I burnt the house down, and in putting the knife in 
this piece of flesh I murdered Jones. The judgement involved in my 
Action is reflected in my practical knowledge: in order to burn down the 
house, in order to murder Jones (both of which are the originative 
causes, the purpose for doing this e. g. NE 1140b16), I ought to, 
should, do this. 
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Thus, the 'ought' or 'should' indicates the universal element in Action 
of the judgement involved in practical reasoning. In this sense, all 
purposive Action involves the judgement 'I ought or should do this', in 
that the 'ought' or 'should' conjoins doing this with my purpose, what I 
want to bring about, which is always (in purposive Action, ex 
hypothesi) more than doing this. It is also in this sense that, as 
Aristotle says at the beginning of Book One of NE, all rational activity 
aims at some good, and that this is the object of life, life being activity 
(NE I168a7). Similarly for Hegel: every Action has some positive end 
in that it involves changing a given state of affairs confronting the 
agent, and it is precisely this "... raising of the given to something self- 
created which yields the higher orbit of the good" (PR #123[A]). That 
is, changing a given state of affairs implies that the change that I 
create ought to be the case. 
It might be objected here that the 'ought' of a purely practical form of 
reasoning has been surreptitiously changed to that of the moral 
'ought', coming out fully in the claim that all Action aims at some good. 
But this is precisely what I am not doing. The 'good' that I am referring 
to here is that expressed in the question 'What is the good in that? ', 
and not the 'good' of abstract moral theory, or the 'good' of a moral 
principle arrived at by way of abstract reasoning. Of course, the 
question that still seems to remain is whether the 'good' that my Action 
aims at is good, and to some extent this is a valid question. But the 
tendency of moral philosophers to think of good as being something 
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over and above Action, activities, practices etc., reveals something 
peculiar in raising the question. 
The Practical Good and The Moral Good 
The demand for a specifically moral good in analyses of Action reveals 
a rather abstract conception of human conduct. In a statement such as 
'All Action aims at some good' the reference of 'all Action', that which it 
refers to, is, in the main, human activity in general. That is, examples 
of 'All Action' would take into account the practices, activities, customs, 
habits, of everyday human life, the activities that constitute the lives we 
lead. A great many of these are shared activities that we participate in, 
as a matter of course, as ways in which we go about satisfying our 
general needs, desires, etc. In doing so, we participate in such 
activities for some good, even if we don't actually think this every time 
we eat or drink, go to work, have a game of chess, get on a bus. As a 
matter of course, the question as to what is morally good about all of 
this does not arise. 
Nevertheless, the participation in such activities implies the judgement 
'This ought to be done', which comes out when the moral question is 
raised: 'Ought you to have done that? ' This is relatively rare, referring 
to particular Actions or activities ('ought you to do that sort of thing? '), 
against the background of a great many other Actions and activities 
where the moral question is not considered to be relevant or 
appropriate. Certainly, there are practices that have been hitherto 
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accepted and practised as a matter of course, and questioned as to 
whether they ought to be participated in. Tradition, custom and habit 
are no absolute justification for human conduct, the point that Hegel is 
making in his use of the phrase 'the spirit of reflection' (see Chapter 
Two above). But the peculiarity arises in attempting to come up with a 
specifically moral 'good' outside of such contexts, precisely because it 
involves looking away from contexts out of which the moral question is 
raised, contexts that (so to speak) give birth to the question. 
The result of this demand for a conception of the good as something 
over and above the details of particular Actions and contexts is, more 
often than not, a definition that, not surprisingly, bears little relation to 
the everyday lives of people who are, presumably, to live up to and 
instantiate such an exemplar. The further question is then often asked, 
`What sort of Action is it that would best accommodate the deliverance 
of this good? ', leading to a definition of Action which acts as a 
measure of good Action. The abstract nature of such reasoning is 
witnessed by its total impracticality: even if it were possible (which is 
extremely doubtful) to invoke such definitions into human conduct, 
moral life - the business of everyday life - would come to a standstill. 
Perhaps it will be said that this is not the point of moral theory, but that 
still leaves the question as to exactly what is the point of theorising that 
bears little resemblance to the moral life that people do lead. 
To what extent, then, is the question of whether the good of 
someone's activity is good, still a valid question? The answer to that is 
not by way of comparison with some abstract notion of the good or 
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Action, but to look to the actual, purported, good that an activity aims 
at. This is something that can only be evaluated within the context of 
the particular activity, for activities do not aim at an abstract notion of 
the good, but the good of that activity. It is specific Actions, activities, 
practices, etc. that generate the moral question, against the 
background of a vast network of Actions, etc., which constitute moral 
life. In a sense, the activity that generates the question stands out: 
When I will what is rational, then I am acting not as a 
particular individual but in accordance with the concepts 
of ethics in general. In an ethical action, what I vindicate 
is not myself, but the thing [done]. But in doing a perverse 
action, it is my singularity that I bring on to the centre of 
the stage. The rational is the high road where everyone 
travels, where no one is conspicuous (PR #1 5[A]). 
The 'good' of our Actions and the 'ought' of the judgement implied in 
them are thus primarily of a practical, rather than moral, nature. It is 
particular Actions that stand out against that background which bring 
about the moral tone to the 'good' and 'ought'. That is, morality is itself 
raised from the practical level of everyday life in cases of Action which 
do not sit comfortably in everyday life; or when the justification of a 
particular activity or practise, hitherto unquestioned, is raised. 
Certainly, difficult situations arise where we are prompted to ask the 
moral question -'How ought I act? ', but this is asked by someone with 
moral character who, on the whole, knows how he ought and ought not 
to act. This is indicated in that he gets on with the everyday business 
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of life, the 'good' and 'ought' of his Actions, activities, practices etc. 
not being such as to raise the moral question. 
`Ought' and `Good: moral ignorance 
On the other hand, the moral question `How ought I to act? ' is not 
appropriate to the person of bad character, for 
As a matter of fact, every bad man is ignorant of what he 
ought to do and refrain from doing, and it is just this sort 
of fault that makes people unjust and generally bad (NE 
1110b28). 
The ignorance involved here is not ignorance of certain things, i. e. the 
"circumstances and objects of the action" (NE 1111a18), but ignorance 
of the universal principle (1110b31). The licentious man, for example, 
even though he is led by his appetite (1119a1), is still calculative and 
thus, can ask how he ought to fulfil a particular desire. The difference 
between the licentious and the temperate man, for instance, is that the 
latter pursues desires and pleasure as right principle directs 
(1119a20). The difference here is that with the temperate man the 
question whether he ought to pursue a particular desire is open to him, 
whilst with the licentious person it is not so much a question of whether 
he shall pursue it, but how he ought to pursue it to get the maximum 
pleasure. With the temperate person the 'ought' has universal 
reference, 'Ought this to be done (here, now, if at all)? ', whereas the 
'ought' of the licentious refers only to his particular desires and to the 
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pleasures to be had. The defining character of the licentious person is 
self-indulgence (e. g., 1121b8,1119a1), the 'ought' in his reasoning 
operating solely in the pursuit of his own satisfaction, he being ignorant 
of the moral character of the 'ought'. 
The licentious man is carried away at his own choice, 
thinking that he ought always to pursue the pleasure of 
the moment; the incontinent man pursues it too, but has 
no such belief (1146b23). 
The question 'Is the good that my act aims at really good' is not the 
sort of question that the person of bad character is going to ask of 
himself. In many ways, it is a fruitless question to ask of him: the 'good' 
that we operate with is not the same 'good' with which he operates, for 
he is ignorant of its meaning and significance in terms other than when 
referring to his particular desires and pleasures. 
In discussing licentiousness Aristotle, in NE, focuses mainly on the 
person who constantly pursues the pleasure of the moment, the 
pleasurably self-indulgent. But self-indulgence can be seen operating 
at a more general level. For example, a person might think he ought to 
seek revenge for what he considers to be a wrong done to a member 
of his family. But the motive would be to satisfy his desire for revenge, 
for a wrong done to his family, the nature and severity of that revenge 
determined by his feelings about the supposed wrong done. In this 
sense, he is the law, he is the one who determines the scope of the 
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'ought'. For the weak-willed, however, the 'ought' does not have this 
personal determination. 
This is what distinguishes between the licentious and the weak-willed: 
the latter do use the term `good' in the moral sense, in a sense that 
does not have a directly personal motive, whereas the former do not. 
This thinking about how one ought to act, and the further step of acting 
upon it, is precisely what is involved in having conscience. 
Believing, Acting and Moral Conscience 
At NE 1098b33-1099a2 Aristotle says: 
... presumably 
it makes no little difference whether we 
think of the supreme good as consisting in the possession 
or in the exercise of virtue: in a state of mind or in an 
activity. For it is possible for the state to be present in a 
person without effecting any good result (e. g. If he is 
asleep or quiescent in some other way), but not for the 
activity. he will necessarily act, and act well. 
In PR #141 Hegel discusses what the transition from morality to ethical 
life involves, a distinction that for the individual involves the difference 
between thinking and acting. In conscience is expressed the moral, 
beliefs about what ought to be the case. The good involved here, what 
I believe to be good, is abstract in that it is only thought - it is only 
what I think ought to be the case. But in thinking something ought to 
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be the case, it is implied that it is not the case, and my proposition or 
belief is that the good that it involves should be actual. Until I act, I 
remain at the level of the 'ought-to-be', and it is not until I act that what 
I think becomes ethical. In other words, it is one thing to have beliefs 
about what ought to be the case, and another to act on them. 
In this difference between thinking and acting, Hegel is saying much 
the same as Aristotle in the point he makes about the possession of 
virtue and the exercise of virtue. In acting on a belief a person is 
fulfilling the conviction involved in believing 'X ought to be the case', 
and it is this showing the conviction of one's belief that is much more a 
sign of character than the mere holding of a belief. The importance of 
this point is something that many commentators on Aristotle overlook 
or underestimate, mainly due to the modern tendency to try to work out 
which are the 'right' beliefs to hold. But ethics is much more than the 
holding of a set of beliefs, for as a practical study it is concerned with 
Action (NE 1095a5). In concentrating on beliefs and moral codes, what 
is often overlooked is the important point that acting involves 
commitment, committing oneself, and that, without acting, the holding 
of beliefs means very little in reality. 20 
It is from such a context that problems of weakness of will and bad 
conscience arise. Such problems would not exist if it were the case 
that the holding of beliefs causes us to act in a way appropriate to 
20 Here I speak of committing oneself to what is done, and not the commitment to 
abstract principles discussed in the Introduction. 
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them, but the importing of logical and causal inferences into our 
accounts of Action21 misses the point that acting involves committing 
oneself. In our everyday activities, in our eating, travelling, work, 
leisure, we commit ourselves in what we do. But because most of what 
we do is common practice, habitual, and part of the ethical community 
in which we live, we do not feel that we are making commitments. It is 
only when such activities are questioned that the commitment that we 
are making comes out. Should we: endorse and continue to support 
the current treatment of animals in our eating habits? Contribute to the 
detrimental effects on the environment in our preferred methods of 
travelling? Assist our bosses in the exploitation of the third world by 
the work we do? Cheer on two people whose main aim is to punch 
each other to the ground? Much of our daily lives we take for granted, 
but that does not mean that what we do does not involve committing 
ourselves in some way. 
To have beliefs, however, is very different from acting on them. It is 
one thing to be persuaded by an argument that the farming of animals 
for human consumption is unjustified, but it is quite another thing to 
become a vegetarian. In ignoring the transition from having a belief 
and acting on it, we miss out a crucial factor in human conduct which 
cannot be explained away by a rigorous conception of reasoning which 
does not make a show in the logic of human conduct. The decisions 
that we make in acting are much more than the logical or causal 
21 Logical and causal inference will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six. 
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entailment of the holding of certain beliefs. More often than not our 
beliefs are not chosen as such, but are something that we are 
persuaded of. But to act on them is a choice, a decision that we have 
to make. This is precisely what is indicated by weakness of will: we 
believe something to be good, and believe that to act contrary to it is 
wrong, but acting according to what we believe to be good is often a 
choice or decision that is difficult to make. 
When both good and evil are placed before me, I have a 
choice between the two; I can decide between them and 
endow my subjective character with either. Thus the 
nature of evil is that man may will it but need not (PR 
#1 39[A]). 
To attempt to account for Action as a logical or causal entailment from 
beliefs is, in effect, to do away with the element of choosing and 
deciding involved in acting. But it is in this choosing and deciding that 
good and evil have their origin and genesis, and doing away with this 
element, by importing the logical or causal entailment of abstract 
reasoning, is not so much to solve the problem of morality, how we 
might lead the right path through life, but to do away with morality 
altogether. However, that someone can do good is, eo ipso, to say that 
he can do bad, and vice-versa; a set of logically coherent principles, a 
particular moral theory, may banish evil from our beliefs, but that will 
not banish the possibility of doing evil in the choosing and deciding 
that Action involves. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have illustrated the role that reason, desire, 
knowledge, belief and related phenomena have in various aspects of 
moral and ethical life, in contrast with the tendency towards 
rationalisation and abstraction that these concepts attract in much 
philosophical debate. In doing this, my reading of Aristotle has 
emphasised his concern with moral character, rather than reading him 
as attempting to establish a theory of Action which will yield formal 
principles to determine what it is good to do and bad to do. By the 
latter aim, reason and desire become contrasting, abstract concepts, 
with the reason of human conduct being purged of the desire element. 
Consequently, this logically rigorous, purified conception of reason is 
raised as the arbiter of the good and the evil. 
In emphasising moral character as primary, however, we can see that 
desires, feelings, appetite, etc. are central to moral conduct, and not 
so easily distinguished in nature as a purified conception of reason 
often suggests. Indeed, it is very much the case that the reasoning 
about how, when, where, etc. we are to fulfil our desires that 
establishes those desires as either good or bad. Theoretically, it may 
well be the case that acting according to desire, and acting according 
to reason, are easily distinguishable in analysis, but this gives a 
misleading picture of the desire and reason involved in human 
conduct. We might say that, as a fact of nature, we are creatures with 
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needs, desires, impulses, etc., and these are the stimuli for what we 
do. Those needs, etc., are, in the sense of being facts of nature, given. 
But our awareness of them, that they may be fulfilled in various ways 
and by different means, itself gives rise to our knowledge of what is 
good and bad: to have them as the object of our Actions, rather than 
impulsive stimuli that cause us to act, is that which gives us good and 
bad reasons for acting this way or that way. That is to say, the 
analytical distinction between reason and desire, affected by a logically 
purified conception of reason, is not so easily reconcilable with the 
logic of human conduct. 
This, however, will not be acceptable to many modern moral 
philosophers, for analytical reason demands that the moral is 
something over and above the practical. We have seen in Chapter 
One that this is the case for Kant, in that morality is something that is 
unattainable to human beings, due precisely to the distinction between 
reason and desire and its expression in the duty/inclination dichotomy. 
Those who, in one form or another, have continued the Kantian 
project, demand that reason - the arbiter of morals - is something 
over and above the personal nature of individual agents' reasons, 
motives, relationships, etc. that constitute practical life. But that is due 
to treating individuals as abstract beings, rather than as individuals 
whose outlook on life is of a moral nature. Taking individuals as 
abstract beings, the question is raised as to what makes some good, 
and some not. But such a distinction between good and bad can only 
be made given that there are moral beings, within which context it 
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makes sense to say that someone is bad. Good and bad are, that is to 
say, features of, arise out of, human conduct, rather than abstract 
concepts by which we determine what is to be good and what bad. 
The distinguishing between good and bad reasons for doing this or 
that involved in human conduct, I suggest in agreement with Hegel, is 
precisely the concrete phenomenon that we refer to by the concept of 
conscience. The conflict of conscience arising out of knowing one 
thing to be the right thing to do, but wanting to do otherwise, does not 
arise for Aristotle's person of excellent character. This is not because 
he acts solely by reason alone: he acts by right desire. Such a conflict 
is a problem for those who do not have such a developed character: 
for them, believing what is right, but desiring something else, gives rise 
to weakness of will. These are issues that I shall explore further in the 
following chapter. 
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5. JUDGEMENT, CONSCIENCE AND WEAKNESS OF WILL IN 
ACTION 
Introduction 
In Chapter Four, I claimed that often the danger in philosophical 
analysis is that, if we lose sight of what we are doing in analysing a 
subject, we allow the results, the concepts distinguished and defined 
by the analysis, to take primacy and dominate our perspective on the 
subject. In this way, the subject does not determine our perspective; 
rather, the concepts, and the way in which they have been defined, 
determine our perspective. However, in ethics especially, the concepts 
become specialised to such a degree that they no longer operate in 
the practical context out of which they have been analysed. Thus, we 
are left with a cluster of concepts - such as good, evil, desire, reason, 
knowledge, judgement - that are so highly defined in relation to, and in 
differentiation from, one another that they become irreconcilable with 
certain ways in which people think and act. Consequently, what results 
is a highly specialised language that, at most, bears only a vague 
relationship to that which it purports to be discussing. 
In this chapter I shall look at the connection Hegel observes between 
logic and Action, which has implications on judgement and the notion 
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of practical truth in human conduct. Following on from this, it will be 
argued that talk of good without reference to situations in which it is 
instanced results in an abstraction that ultimately has little bearing on 
how people do think and conduct themselves. This reflects on the 
notion of right desire, the wanting to do right, which involves an 
attitude and disposition which defies the analytical distinction between 
reason and desire. As we shall see in the final section of the chapter, 
some of the problems related to the phenomenon of akrasia can be 
seen as arising out of a demand for epistemological exactitude in our 
conceptions of knowledge and reason. 
Logic, Judgement and Practical Truth in Action 
Here I will develop a point that was made in the previous chapter. 
There I claimed that purposive Action implies a judgement, in that the 
reasoning of the agent implies that this (the thing done) ought to be 
done. This will perhaps be met with much suspicion by many modem 
philosophers, for there is a strong tendency to think that judgement is 
effected in thought, and that consequently the proper discipline for the 
analysis of judgement is that of formal logic. In this section I will 
suggest that logic is in fact a refined and abstract formalisation of 
purposive human conduct, the way in which we engage with the world. 
A development of this will show that the notion of practical truth is not 
as peculiar as it might at first appear. 
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The Judgement of Logic and the Logic of Judgement 
The seeming peculiarity of the claim that Action involves judgement 
rests on an assumption prevalent in philosophy about the nature of 
reason and, in particular, logic. The assumption is that the province of 
thought is fundamentally distinct from the material world, the world of 
physical objects and physical events, Action being one particular type 
of physical event. Thus, judgement being an act of reason, a form of 
thought, and the proper discipline for the analysis of the 'forms of 
thought' being logic, it is a fundamental conceptual error to claim that 
an Action is a judgement. 
This is an assumption that Hegel recognised, and anticipated, in his 
own day. Much the same assumption is often made in modern 
philosophy on the relation between language, and consequently logic, 
and the content of what is said in statements, propositions, 
judgements, etc. In the Logic that forms part of EPS, Hegel says: "The 
judgement is usually taken in a subjective sense as an operation and a 
form, which is found merely in self-conscious thought". But, he 
continues: 
All things are a judgement: that is to say, they are 
individuals, which are a universality or inner nature in 
themselves. They are a universal which is individualised. 
(EPS #167). 
This claim of Hegel's is a direct attack on the prevailing psychologism 
in philosophy, and in particular formal logic. The point he is making 
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here is that, in language, we form distinct terms such as 'subject', 
'predicate', 'copula', 'proposition', `judgement'; 'individual', 'particular', 
'universal', etc. However, these terms are not founded on some 
special operation of the human mind, but rather have their basis in the 
world in which we live. When I say 'This (i. e. individual) is a rose 
(universal)', the subject and predicate are in, e. g., my garden. The 
truth expressed by the copula is not made so by my expression, but by 
the flower that I refer to itself. This flower is a universal, a type of 
flower, which is individualised in being this flower: 
... the germ of a plant contains 
its details or particular, 
such as root, branches, leaves, & c.: but these details are 
at first present only potentially, and are not realised till the 
germ uncloses. This unclosing is, as it were, the 
judgement of the plant. The illustration may also serve to 
show how neither the concept nor the judgement are 
merely found in our head, or merely framed by us. The 
concept is what dwells in the very heart of things, and 
makes them what they are. To form a concept of an 
object means therefore to become aware of its concept: 
and when we proceed to a criticism or review of the 
object, we are not performing a subjective act, and merely 
ascribing this or that predicate to an object. We are, on 
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the contrary, observing the object in the character 
imposed by its concept (EPS #166). ' 
Of course, there are many good reasons why we should formalise the 
various features of language, setting these out in terms of subjects, 
predicates, different types of judgements, etc. One such reason, for 
example, is the use of logic textbooks for teaching various techniques 
in formal argumentation. Syllogism is a prime example, particularly 
useful in showing how the inference in an argument can be valid 
without its premises necessarily being true. The interest in such 
analysis is not what a particular argument says, what it says about its 
content, but the form of the argument. Indeed, in many of the 
propositions that make up standard syllogisms knowledge of the 
content is presupposed: 
All men are mortal, therefore Caius is mortal: All metals 
conduct electricity, therefore e. g. copper does so. In order 
to predicate these major premisses, which when they say 
'all' express the immediate individuals and are properly 
intended to be empirical propositions, it is requisite that 
the propositions about the individual Caius, or the 
individual copper, should previously have been known to 
be correct on grounds of their own. Everybody feels not 
merely the pedantry, but the unmeaning formality of such 
1 Wallace translates begriff as 'notion' but, for the sake of continuity with translations of 
other works of Hegel, and to avoid confusion, I have substituted 'concept'. 
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syllogisms as: All men are mortal, Caius is man, therefore 
Caius is mortal (EPS #190). 
Hegel is not dismissive of the value of syllogism altogether. For 
example, it has value in the empirical sciences through induction. 
Induction is certainly not perfect: in universal premisses the 'all' only 
indicates, e. g. all the metals that have been subject to experimentation 
and observation. But the significance of this is that it leads to what 
Hegel calls the 'syllogism of Analogy': 
In the syllogism of Analogy we conclude from the fact that 
some things of a certain kind possess a certain quality, 
that the same quality is possessed by other things of the 
same kind. It would be a syllogism of Analogy, for 
example, if we said: In all planets hitherto discovered this 
law of motion has been found, consequently a newly 
discovered planet will probably move according to the 
same law. In the experiential sciences Analogy 
deservedly occupies a high place, and has led to results 
of the highest importance. Analogy is the instinct of 
reason, creating an anticipation that this or that 
characteristic, which experience has discovered, has its 
root in the inner nature or kind of object, and arguing on 
the faith of that anticipation (Ibid. ). 
The reason that Hegel refers to here is not the 'faculty' that is 
supposed to be in the sole possession of mankind, the sort of 
subjectivism that he is attacking. Rather, it is the reason that comes 
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about in our engagement with the objects in the world, through 
experimentation and observation. The general point that Hegel is 
making is that syllogism does not consist of the 'categories of the 
understanding' or 'laws of thought' that are exclusively human and as 
such distinguishes humanity from the world, but the formal rendering 
of the way in which we engage in and with the world. 
This formality comes out in that, once we come to terms with 
elementary logic, working out how we can draw correct conclusions in 
the different figures becomes a mechanical process, 
... which 
its purely mechanical nature and its want of inner 
meaning have very properly consigned to oblivion. And 
Aristotle is the last person to give any countenance to 
those who wish to attach importance to such enquiries or 
to the syllogism of understanding in general. It is true that 
he described these, as well as numerous other forms of 
mind and nature, and that he has examined and 
expounded their specialities. But in his metaphysical 
concepts, as well as in his concepts of nature and mind, 
he was very far from seeking a basis, or a criterion, in the 
syllogistic forms of the understanding. ... that syllogistic of 
the understanding to which he first gave such a definite 
expression is never allowed to intrude in the higher 
domain of philosophy (EPS #187). 
Hegel's reference here to the syllogism of 'the understanding' is 
precisely that understanding of reason in its abstract formality, the 
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abstract formality that takes syllogism as a criterion of validity or proof 
for reasoning. What this thinking falls short of is that the formal 
syllogism is derived from the way in which we engage in the world, i. e. 
it is derived from purposive Action. As such, it is not a criterion for how 
we must think, but the formal, abstract rendering of the way in which 
we do engage purposefully, thoughtfully, in the world in which we live. 
Hegel's complaint is that logic had become so abstract and specialised 
that it had been divorced from the very contexts that supplied its 
meaning. Consequently, logic itself had become meaningless: 
At present-the different forms of the syllogism are met 
nowhere save in the compendia of Logic; and to make an 
acquaintance with them would be termed an act of stupid 
pedantry, of no further use in practical life or in science. It 
would indeed be both useless and pedantic to parade the 
whole details of the formal syllogism on every occasion. 
And yet the several forms of syllogism still make 
themselves constantly felt in our cognition. If any one, 
when awaking on a winter morning, hears the creaking of 
the carriages on the street, and is thus led to conclude 
that it has been a strong frost during the night, he has 
gone through a syllogistic process: -a process which is 
everyday repeated under the greatest variety of 
conditions. The interest, therefore, ought at least not to be 
less in becoming expressly conscious of this daily action 
of our thinking selves, than is admitted to accompany the 
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study of the functions of organic life, such as the 
processes of digestion, assimilation, respiration, or even 
the processes and structures of the world around us. We 
do not, however, for a moment deny that a knowledge of 
Logic is no more necessary to teach us how to draw 
correct conclusions, than a previous study of anatomy 
and physiology is required in order to digest or breathe 
(EPS #183). 
To generalise Hegel's point, abstract thinking can often involve an 
inversion: syllogism, propositions, judgements, etc., are seen as 
issuing from logic, which becomes the criterion for rationalising the 
world and our Actions, rather than logic - syllogism, propositions, 
judgements, etc. - issuing from the reason in the world and our 
Actions. 
Action, Judgement and Thought 
Aristotle's concentration on character, his distinction between the 
voluntary and the chosen, choice involving deliberation, and his 
discussion of the practical syllogism (especially in chapter iii of Book 
VII, NE), clearly suggests that judgement plays some sort of role in 
purposive Action. Character is determined by our choosing what is 
good or evil (e. g., 1112a3), choice implying rational principle, the name 
'choice' (prohairesis) itself indicating "something that is chosen before 
other things" (1112a17, pro = 'before'). Indeed, the practical syllogism 
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involves three propositions involving the joining of subjects and 
predicates, the concluding one being an Action (1147a30). Thus the 
conclusion, an Action, this would suggest, is a judgement of the form 
'This is good', every Action aiming at some good (1094a1; leaving 
aside for the moment whether it is an apparent or actual good, or 
whether it is successful). 
What I am suggesting here is that this is very similar to Hegel's claim 
that Actions are judgements. For Hegel, a judgement involves bringing 
a particular under a universal. Thus, an Action is a judgement in that it 
says that 'This (particular Action) is good (universal)'. In purposive 
Action there is both a positive content and a negative content: positive 
in that in doing something I produce, posit, a state of affairs; negative 
in that I change, negate, the state of affairs before me. Consequently, 
there is no such thing as natural innocence in purposive Action, for 
what I do I choose to do, and that involves judgement. Natural 
innocence is a feature of the voluntary, but not chosen, conduct of 
children. Judgement is something that is developed: 
... we unhesitatingly ascribe only a very 
inadequate power 
of judgement to someone who habitually frames such 
judgements as "The wall is green", "This oven is hot", and 
so on. In contrast, we say that someone genuinely 
understands how to judge when his judgements deal with 
whether a certain work of art is beautiful, whether an 
action is good, and so on. In the case of judgements of 
the first kind, the content is only an abstract quality, the 
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presence of which can be adequately decided by 
immediate perception; whereas to say of a work of art that 
it is beautiful, or of an action that it is good, the objects in 
question must be compared with what they ought to be, 
i. e. with their concept. 2 
Such development is something that is indicated in the education of 
children, in the acquisition of language, the cognition (as opposed to 
mere perception) and understanding of their environment. 3 In 
philosophical analysis it is perfectly reasonable to distinguish between 
thought and Action, just as it is perfectly reasonable to say that to think 
can be a different thing than to act. But to say that they can be distinct 
is quite different from saying that (as in the Cartesian tradition) they 
are - that is, ontologically - distinct. For what we are discussing here 
is purposive Action, which involves choice, and what is chosen 
involves thought. It has been a particular feature of modern 
philosophical debate - especially, in the area of ethics, in arguments 
between Kantians and utilitarians - to draw distinctions between what 
goes on before an Action and the deed itself, but 
It is subjective reflection, ignorant of the logical nature of 
the single and the universal, which indulges ad libitum in 
the subdivision of single parts and consequences; and yet 
2 The Encyclopaedic Logic tr. Gereats, Suchting and Harris (Cambridge, 1991), 
#171 [A]. 
3 On Hegel's discussion of cognition and understanding in PS, see D. Lamb, Language 
and Perception in Hegel and Wittgenstein (Avebury, 1977). 
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it is the nature of the finite deed itself to contain such 
separable contingencies (PR #119). 
The concept that ethics is concerned with is Action. In analysis we can 
make the distinction between the single elements of 'intention' and the 
'consequences' of intention. Some say that it is the intention that 
matters (e. g. a will that is good), others that it is the consequences that 
matter. But it is absurd to say that there are intentions and there are 
consequences, as if these are separate phenomena: there are no 
intentions without consequences, for what is intended are the 
consequences; there are no consequences without intentions, for 
consequences are what was intended. These are not distinct 
phenomena that can exist on their own account, but are particular 
logical distinctions derived from Action. They are distinctions that can 
only be drawn given that something has been done. 
That such logical distinctions are founded on Action, that they are 
grounded on purposive Action rather than themselves being the 
grounds of Action (an inversion effected by abstract thinking, see p. 
230 above), is something we would do well to keep in mind when 
reading NE. When Aristotle says that choice implies something that 
comes before, there is nothing to suggest that he is saying that choice 
can exist without something being done, as if it were some distinct 
mental phenomenon or event that need not necessarily lead to an 
Action. It is in this sense that I have been claiming that Aristotle is not 
concerned in NE with a theory of Action, metaphysical pre-conditions 
for the possibility of Action. In this lies the importance, say, that he 
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places on how a person feels after he has acted in his analysis of 
character (see Chapter Four, pp. 183ff): in ethical judgement we are 
concerned with someone who has character, and not with a theoretical 
and abstract account of pre-conditions of Action and character. This is 
also supported by the many references throughout NE to the 
judgements that are made in common practice (see, in particular, 
Book VI, chapter xi). 
In claiming that Actions themselves are judgements I am no doubt 
taking my reading of Aristotle a step further than what he explicitly 
says in NE, and certainly further than many modern commentators 
would accept. However, there is material in NE which strongly 
suggests that Aristotle had some sort of conception of practical truth. 
Practical Truth: creating good and bad 
At NE 1179a19 Aristotle says: 
in the matter of conduct truth is assessed in the light of 
the facts and of actual life; because it is in these that the 
decisive factor lies. 
And at 1107a30-b1 he says: 
When we are discussing actions, although general 
statements have a wider application, particular 
statements are closer to the truth. This is because 
actions are concerned with particular facts... 
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These two statements make Aristotle's general point that in ethics, the 
more we take into account the particular circumstances of Actions, the 
closer to the truth we shall get in what we say about them. However, at 
1139a21 he says something that provides a wider context for the idea 
of practical truth: 
Pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of appetition 
correspond exactly to affirmation and negation in the 
sphere of intellect; so that, since moral virtue is a state 
involving choice, and choice is deliberative appetition, it 
follows that if the choice is to be a good one, both the 
reasoning must be true and the desire right; and the 
desire must pursue the same things that the reasoning 
asserts. We are here speaking of intellect and truth in a 
practical sense: in the case of contemplative (as distinct 
from practical and productive) intellect, right and wrong 
are truth and falsehood. To arrive at the truth is indeed 
the function of intellect in any aspect, but the function of 
practical intellect is to arrive at the truth that corresponds 
to right appetition. 
Aristotle's point about the particular facts and of actual life in assessing 
the truth of conduct can be taken as a warning, explicitly made at 
various places in NE, not to expect too much from the study of ethics. 
To ask for a definition of 'right', i. e. to establish it in writing or in formal 
terms by way of, say, ethical principles, is indicative of a misfocused 
approach. The most that ethics can do for us is to give us a 'broad 
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outline of the truth', i. e. we must be content to draw conclusions that 
are for the most part true (NE 1094b20-1). The peculiarity, for many 
modern readers of Aristotle, is the idea of truth in the matter of 
conduct: it is one thing to speak of right and wrong in the matter of 
conduct, but truth and falsehood in relation to Actions is quite another 
thing. 
In her `Thought and Action in Aristotle' Anscombe picks up on the idea 
of practical truth, and cites a possible objection: 
The concept of truth and falsehood in action would quite 
generally be countered by the objection that "true" and 
"false" are senseless predicates as applied to what is 
done. 
But, referring to Aristotle's concept of Action, she concludes that: 
... these predicates apply 
to actions (praxeis) strictly and 
properly, and not merely by an extension and in such a 
way that ought to be explained away. 4 
Clearly there are ways in which 'the concept of truth and falsehood' in 
relation to Action is relatively unproblematic; 'He did X may well be a 
fact and thus a true statement. For modern philosophy the problem 
arises when we use the concept of truth not so much in describing who 
did what, where and when, in describing that he did X, but in relation to 
saying that what he did was true or false. The question is: can we talk 
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about truth and falsehood in ethical judgements in relation to what is 
done? 
Anscombe goes some way in supporting such an idea: 
... practical truth 
[is] when the judgements involved in the 
formation of the "choice" leading to the action are all true; 
but the practical truth is not the truth of those 
judgements. For it is clearly that "truth in agreement with 
right desire" (1139a30), which is spoken of as the good 
working, or the work, of practical intelligence. That is 
brought about - i. e. made true - by action (since the 
description of what he does is made true by his doing it), 
provided that a man forms and executes a good "choice". 
The man who forms and executes an evil "choice" will 
also make true some description of what he does. He will 
secure, say, if he is competent, that such and such a 
man has his eyes put out or his hands cut off, that being 
his judgement of what it is just to do. But his description 
"justice performed" of what he has done will be a lie. He, 
then, will have produced a practical falsehood. 5 
So we might say that a description of a man who forms and executes a 
good choice will involve an ethical truth, not merely in that the 
41n New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. R. Bamborough (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1965) pp. 157-8. 
51bid., p. 157. 
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description 'He did X' will be true but also in that the description 'His 
doing X was right or good' expresses a truth. Thus if we were to accept 
such an idea, we need to accept that a right or good Action is a true 
Action and a wrong or bad Action is a false Action. 
Perhaps the most common way that moral philosophers would 
approach the issue of whether a particular ethical judgement - e. g. `X 
was justice performed' - is true would be to come up with a definition 
or theory of justice, and then measure the Action under consideration 
against that. But this moves us away from justice as a feature of 
Action, the truth or falsehood of the first-person description of the 
Action as 'Justice performed'. For in terms of Action, although what is 
just (dikaios) is what is aimed at, what this will be (and whether it is 
just) will turn on the sense of justice (dikaisosune) with which the 
Action is performed. It may well be the case that someone who claims 
justice has been done by his Action defends himself by way of a theory 
of justice, or by reference to some other supposed authority (popular 
opinion, religion, etc. ). But again, this misses the point: the supposed 
authorities that he cites will stand or fall according to whether or not 
particular features of his deed can be seen to be motivated by a sense 
of justice; and that what he calls a sense of justice can be seen to be a 
sense of justice - rather than, say, revenge, misplaced loyalty, envy, 
etc., or an outright lie. Even in a court of law, it is not enough that it is 
an official judge who applies the law and passes sentence; what is 
wanted is that the law is applied, and sentence is passed, with a sense 
of justice. 
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A further temptation here for moral philosophers would to be to ask 
exactly what this `sense of justice' is - as if it were, say, some special 
faculty that exists in us distinct from individual instances in which 
justice or injustice is perceived or sensed. But this is an abstract 
philosophical move, a move peculiar to philosophers (or, at least, 
certain sorts of philosophers): moral agents, i. e. individuals acting in 
the world, are concerned with what is just and good in particular 
situations; whereas moral theoreticians seem bent on asking what 
justice or the good is other than in the Actions in which they are 
instanced. For the former, there is a great deal of agreement on what 
is just and good: agreement not in what justice or the good is, but 
agreement in this particular deed being just and good, in that being just 
and good. Certainly there is disagreement also, but again this is 
usually about individual instances, disagreements about, say, rewards 
and punishments. The abstract philosophical move demands a 
meaning to justice and goodness distinct from individual instances of 
them, but it is precisely individual instances of Actions that give 
meaning to the terms 'justice' and 'goodness'. 6 If we do not take this 
into account in our philosophical thinking, then it might seem that good 
and justice in some way lie in wait for particular Actions to fulfil their 
demands, rather than good (and evil) and justice (and injustice) being 
created by particular Actions. 
6 Here again we can see how the abstract question takes on the mantle of the old 
subject-predicate logic: 'just' and 'good' are abstract predicates which we attach to the 
subject (Action), rather than a central aspect of the subject. 
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It is in the sense that good and evil, justice and injustice, are created 
by Actions that I speak here of practical truth. When someone refers to 
a particular Action and says 'That is good' or `That is unjust' the 
primary purpose is to say something about the Action, and not to give a 
clue as to their general conception of good and justice. The concern is 
the Action itself, the Action as a fact in the world. This is reflected in 
what we intend in our Actions: faced with a situation that is causing 
distress, pain, injustice, etc. we manipulate the various factual 
circumstances of the situation in order to make good; conversely, given 
the opportunity by way of the various factual circumstances of our 
situation, we manipulate them to create an injustice (e. g. theft). Such 
Actions are the basis of moral and ethical life, the truth of what is good 
and just, evil and unjust, rather than a super-sensible world that results 
from abstract philosophical thinking. 
Good and Conscience in Thought and Action 
In claiming that Actions, and the states of affairs created by them, are 
the basis of moral and ethical life, I am claiming that the meanings of 
'good' and 'evil', 'just' and 'unjust', are tied up in the particular details of 
the Actions and states of affairs to which they are attributed. Another 
way of stating this - in terms of Hegel's criticism of traditional subject- 
predicate logic - is that 'good' and 'just' are not abstract predicates 
(referring to abstract notions, conceptions, ideas, etc. ) that have 
meaning in isolation to the subjects (Actions, states of affairs) to which 
they are attributed. That is to say, the meanings of 'good' and 'just are 
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implied in the specific details of those Actions and states of affairs that 
are, in character, good and just. Those specific details are the referents 
that provide the sense and meaning to the application of the terms 
'good' and 'just'. It is in this sense that descriptions employing 'good', 
'just, etc. express practical truths (and falsehoods). 
There is a tendency in much moral thinking to suppose that, on the 
contrary, it is our notions, conceptions, ideas, etc. of good and justice 
that characterise those Actions and states of affairs as 'good' and 'just'. 
Such a tendency is one particular aspect of Hegel's criticism of what he 
considered to be the abstract philosophical thinking of his day. As we 
have seen throughout the first part of this thesis, Kant's idea of the will 
that is good in itself, Hegel claims, is the result of such thinking. Hegel 
reserves his severest condemnation for those (e. g. F. Von Schlegel, 
Fichte, Solger - writers, associated with the Romantics, who claimed to 
follow and improve upon Kant) who developed this into the "... view that 
the goodness of the will consists in its willing the good", a view in which 
"... this willing of the abstract good is supposed to suffice, in fact to be 
the sole requisite, to make its action good" (PR # 140). Thus, according 
to this view, what is good is what the individual moral agent conceives 
to be good. Hegel spends much time berating what he sees as the 
shallowness of such thinking, but I want to concentrate on the positive 
side to his point. 
The positive point is that, if it were to be the case that good is 
determined by the individual agent, a central aspect of the moral life of 
the agent is rendered false and illusory. Thus, when I want to do the 
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good or the right thing, but it is not absolutely clear to me that what I am 
thinking of doing is the good or the right thing, I am mistaken because I 
am failing to realise that it is good precisely because I want to do the 
good or right thing. What that might be is not important, for as long as I 
am doing it with a good will, then it is the good or right thing. Such a 
view is refuted by the logic of reasoning in thought and Action in the 
moral life of individuals, highlighted by the phenomenon of conscience. 
Conscience: the desire to do right 
At PR #140 Hegel says: 
The subjective right of self-consciousness to know 
whether an action is truly good or evil in character must 
not be thought as so colliding with the absolute right of 
the objectivity of this character that the two rights are 
represented as separable, indifferent to one another, and 
related only accidentally. 
As members of an established ethical community, the greater part of 
our lives involves engaging in the habits, customs, practices and 
activities that constitute the ways in which our needs, desires, wants, 
etc. are pursued and fulfilled. It is a practical knowledge and 
understanding of this community that serves us in getting on in life. On 
the whole, this is quite straightforward, even though it may take up 
much effort in areas such as education, training, work, leisure, family 
life, etc. Often, however, situations arise whereby the straightforward 
business of everyday life is interrupted. No more immersed in that 
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community, we ask questions of ourselves and of certain situations with 
which we are confronted. We are not sure about the rightness of a 
particular practice, or we are not clear about the right way to go on, or 
we are not sure that what we think is the right thing to do is in fact the 
right thing to do. In such situations, we become aware of our 
individuality by the demand on ourselves to get things right, and the 
demand that this be recognised by the community. Not only do we want 
to do what we think is the right thing, but we also want it to be 
recognised that it is the right thing. 
Wanting to do what one thinks is right and wanting that to be, 
objectively, the right thing, are not two separate, accidental and 
indifferent attitudes. It is, rather, the very heart of the ethical community: 
Hegel stresses throughout PR that mere conformity to customs and 
laws is not adequate, both to ourselves and the ethical community as a 
whole. A state that demands mere conformity and obedience from its 
citizens is one that is prone to corruption and internal disruption, for a 
community that flourishes is one which is organised to meet the needs, 
desires, wants, and concerns of its individual members. 
Conscientiousness is thus a central aspect of moral and ethical life. 
Conflicts of conscience, that is to say, are themselves a necessary 
aspect of ethical life. Not content to accept things merely because they 
are customary, traditional, established in law, etc., we question 
practices and activities that we might previously have engaged in 
without question. But in questioning thus, it is not necessarily the case 
that we are clear about what is right and wrong. If we do think that we 
245 
know what is right, we are often concerned as to how to establish that 
what we think to be right is indeed the right thing. The personal 
dilemma of conflicts of conscience is captured for us in the logical 
difficulties in determining what, exactly, is to be the criterion of truth as 
to what is right. But what philosophers have tended to ignore in 
attempting to solve this problem, is precisely that desire to do the right 
thing, not only for our own personal satisfaction but also that it is (i. e. 
objectively) the right thing to do. 
Consider what Aquinas has to say about the erring conscience: 
Et ideo diendum est quod omnis conscientia, sive recta, 
sive erronea, sive in per se malls, sive in indifferentibus, 
est obligatoria; ita quod qui contra conscientiam facit, 
peccet. 7 
In Summa Theologiae, 1a 2ae, Question 19 article 6 Aquinas explains 
that since conscience, whether right or wrong in what it believes to be 
in accord with God's law, is binding, this can leave a person in 
somewhat of a fix. 8 In other words, suppose my conscience tells me 
that I ought to do so and so - and it is wrong/in error (according to 
God's law). Then I'm doomed, because if I follow my conscience I do 
wrong (ex hypothesr), but if I act contrary to it I do wrong because it is 
7 Quaestiones Quodlibetalis 3, Articulus xxvii. F. C. Copleston, in Aquinas (Pelican, 
1955) p. 28, translates this passage as: "Every conscience, whether it is right or wrong, 
whether it concerns things evil in themselves or things morally indifferent, obliges us to 
act in such a way that he who acts against his conscience sins". 
8 Blackfriars edition. 
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wrong of me to do what I believe to be wrong. 9 Here we have a 
practical dilemma as issuing from conscience. 
The conflict arises in that a person wants to do only that which he 
thinks is right, but wants that which he thinks is right to be actually, 
objectively right - for Aquinas, in accordance with God's law. 
Conscience is a natural principle derived from God, according to 
Aquinas, and aims at His laws (even if it is sometimes amiss). The 
religious framework, however, is not a necessary requirement, as John 
Stuart Mill illustrates: 
The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of 
duty may be, is one and the same -a feeling in our own 
mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation 
of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in 
the more serious cases into shrinking from it as an 
impossibility. This feeling... is the essence of 
conscience... 1° 
However we wish to characterise it, whether it be given to us by a deity 
or a cultivated feeling for duty, conscience would seem to be something 
within us that aims at what is right and good. 
But there is something not quite right with this, something that Mill 
provides a clue to. Conscience is an internal sanction, which has an 
external counterpart - viz. "... the hope and favour and the fear of 
displeasure, from our fellow human beings or from the ruler of the 
9I owe this rendering to Rosalind Hursthouse in discussion. 
10J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, (Everyman, 1964), p. 26. 
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universe". " What is paramount here is the wanting to be right, in both 
the internal, subjective, and external, objective aspects. That is to say, 
the distinction between right and wanting it, the external, objective, and 
the internal, subjective aspects is something that arises from a 
problematic situation, whereas ordinarily there is no distinction. The 
reactions of fellow human beings and the ruler of the universe may 
deter someone from committing evil deeds or failing in a duty; and the 
prospect of guilt, if 'internal sanction' is meant in the sense of coercion 
as Mill would appear to suggest (as opposed to authority or approval 
for a course of Action), may also act as a deterrent. But deterrent, 
whether internal or external, is not something that is going to come into 
play for someone who wants to do right. 
Right Desire and Acting Truly 
One of the major features of philosophy throughout its history has been 
the characterisation of the needs, desires and wants of human beings 
as 'internal' strivings, stirrings, or propensities to act, as distinct from 
reason, which works out how these needs and wants are to be fulfilled 
within the 'external' environment in which they live. This has certainly 
been the case since Hume, reflecting his infamous 'Reason is, and 
ought only to be, the slave of the passions'. Wanting and desiring are 
the ultimate springs of Action, reason being at a loss to explain the 
11 Ibid. P. 25. 
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ultimate ends of human beings. Ask a man why he exercises, and he 
will only reply that he desires health and hates pain. 
Perhaps to your second question, why he desires health, 
he may also reply, that it is necessary for the exercise of 
his calling. If you ask, why he is anxious on that head, he 
will answer, because he desires to get money. If you 
demand why? It is the instrument of pleasure, he says. 
And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason. 12 
In moral philosophy, this distinction between reason and desire (or, in 
Hume's terms, between reason and sentiment or taste) leads to 
disputes as to whether morals are justifiable by way of reason, 
objectively, or whether moral judgements and statements are merely 
the utterances of personal, subjective, preferences. 
The notion of 'wanting to do right, if there is any sense to it, would 
appear to bridge this distinction. On the one hand, it is clearly (if it is to 
be a spring of Action) something that an individual wants or desires, i. e. 
it has a personal or subjective element. On the other hand, that it 
should be right, suggests an objective element, i. e. that what is done is 
valuable or worthy independently of my wanting or desiring it. However, 
the 'subjectivist' might reply that this is a piece of sophistry: whether 
valuable or worthy independently of your wanting it, it still comes down 
to your wanting it thus. 
12 Enquiries loc. Cit App. 1 sec. 244. 
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There is a confusion here, and I think Hume, or at least the 
interpretation Hume has received, bears some of the responsibility for 
this. The passage reducing a person's activity to his desires is used by 
Hume to draw the conclusion that "Thus the distinct boundaries and 
offices of reason and of taste are easily ascertained". 13 But this does 
not unequivocally bear the mark of a conclusion, as the passage also 
bears the mark of an example that is drawn specifically to yield such a 
conclusion, in which case what is said to be the conclusion is in fact the 
presupposition of the example. That is to say, if one wanted to forward 
the view that reason and taste are distinct offices, then that is the 
character that one would give the example. 
It would be perfectly reasonable to fill in the reasons for a person's 
wanting good health with other reasons, and give further reasons that 
do not ultimately rest on his wanting or desiring in Hume's sense. He 
wants his family to fare well. He enjoys his work. He is also good at his 
work, and he gets pleasure from seeing the benefits it has for others. 
'Wanting', 'enjoying', 'pleasure' - but, it will be argued, these are terms 
that refer specifically to the agent, and anything that is said to be a 
reason for acting can be seen itself to rest, depend on some desire, 
taste or sentiment in the agent. However, just as what someone wants 
or desires is dependent on the wanting and desiring, that wanting and 
desiring is equally dependent on what is wanted and desired. 
13 Ibid. 246. 
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It is the failure to see this that leads to confusion. People do not just 
'want' and 'desire' - they want and desire something. Talk of 'wants' 
and 'desires' is the language of philosophical abstraction, which is one 
thing. But it amounts to becoming blinkered by such talk to then 
attribute such bare 'wants' and 'desires' to people. Indeed, it is what we 
want that very much goes to defining and characterising our 'wants' 
and 'desires', and we would be hard put to give an account of 'wants' 
and 'desires' without a what element, without resorting to talk of 
'strivings' and 'stirrings'. 
The distinction between the reason for acting and the desire that acting 
involves is not as clear-cut as is often made out. Indeed, wanting and 
desiring are very much rational attitudes: just as there must be a desire 
for some reason for acting, so there must be a reason for having some 
desire. Certainly the distinction between reason and desire can be 
validly drawn. For instance, calculation can involve the employment of 
reason, dispassionately aiming at the correct result. Similarly, a good 
philosophical argument will arrive at a conclusion without the 
intervention of the particular preferences of the philosopher. The 
mathematician and the philosopher in such cases do not calculate and 
argue in order to arrive at a result and conclusion which they particularly 
want or desire. 
However, they do want, desire, to come to a correct result and a valid 
conclusion. They want this for the right reason, i. e. that that is where 
the calculation or argument leads. But with this the distinction begins to 
blur, or rather we begin to look at the situation in such a way that the 
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original reason for making the hard and fast distinction no longer does 
the job we originally set out to do. That is to say, the distinction between 
reason and desire is drawn for specific purposes, purposes that are tied 
up with the tasks we set out to accomplish. We can certainly make a 
hard and fast distinction conceptually, but it is quite another thing to see 
this as grounds for claiming that they are distinct phenomena in realiter. 
Such a move involves another example of the way in which we think, 
logically and conceptually, determining our subject matter, rather than 
the subject matter determining our thinking. 
However, in saying this I am not claiming that the distinction between 
reason and desire is drawn exclusively in logical and conceptual 
analysis. It is also a distinction that is drawn in our attitudes and 
concerns about our beliefs and the way in which we conduct ourselves. 
This is something we do for particular reasons, reasons that need not 
be particularly good ones. The making of such a distinction, and the 
fact that it is done for some reason, results in conduct that philosophers 
find difficult to assimilate, which in turn leads to confusions about what 
is and what is not to count as reasons for acting. 
Weakness of Will, Bad conscience and Self-Deception 
One aspect of human conduct that has puzzled many philosophers in 
the current century is the phenomenon of weakness of will or akrasia. 
The problem for the Ancient philosophers is that akrasia would seem 
to involve erring voluntarily, which is somewhat paradoxical when we 
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consider that to err is not something that we do voluntarily. This is 
particularly puzzling when we consider moral weakness: knowing the 
right thing to do in a particular situation, a person then acts in a 
contrary way. The question that consequently forces itself on 
philosophers is thus 'How is akrasia possible? ' The phenomena of 
akrasia and self-deception throw up questions that are extremely 
difficult to provide coherent philosophical answers to. 
Aristotle on Akrasia 
In discussing akrasia I do not here propose to offer a solution to the 
problems that it presents, for in a sense the idea of attempting to 
provide a philosophical solution to this sort of phenomenon is 
misconceived. This misconception, I shall argue, is itself based on 
certain misconceptions about those features of conduct that constitute 
the phenomenon of akrasia. It is these features that I shall concentrate 
on here. 
Let us first look briefly at what Aristotle says about akrasia. He begins 
Book VII with: 
The question may be raised: What sort of right conception 
can a man have, and yet be incontinent? Some say it is 
impossible for a man who knows, because it is a shocking 
idea, as Socrates thought, that when a man actually has 
knowledge in him something else should overmaster it 
and "Drag it about like a slave". (NE 1145b21-24) 
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Amelie Oksenberg Rorty sets out clearly the Socratic problem for us. 
The Socratic position has three separable theses: 
(1) no person voluntarily does (what he takes to be) bad; 
(2) acting virtuously requires - indeed, is identical with - 
(acting from) knowledge; so acting badly is acting from or 
in ignorance; (3) there is fundamentally one object of 
moral knowledge, the Good. It follows that all forms of 
wrongdoing are essentially the same and that they all 
involve involuntary ignorance of the Good. 14 
Socrates rejects the concept of akrasia, but Aristotle himself retains it. 
The argument which he produces for its retention is centred around 
the question of what sort of knowledge we are talking about here, i. e. 
in what sense is the akratic acting against knowledge that he 
possesses? 
First of all, let us consider the question regarding the sort of knowledge 
the akratic has. Aristotle raises the point about the having of 
knowledge without the person putting it to use, some of which cases 
we can put down to acting in (rather than through) ignorance. This has 
already been dealt with at length in Book III and, although it helps to 
clear some of the ground, it doesn't really do the job of providing a 
consistent account of akrasia. This is because we need to deal with 
14 'Akrasia and Pleasure: Nicomachean Ethics Book 7' in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics 
ed. A. 0. Rorty (University of California Press, 1980), p. 267. 
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cases where knowledge is present when the emotion upon which 
someone acts occurs (NE 1147b11). 
This latter point of Aristotle's, however, contains an important 
consideration. With the akratic we are dealing with someone who is 
knowledgeable of the universal aspects of Action, i. e. is capable of 
forming judgements or universal premises under which he considers 
Actions to be good or bad. Indeed, it is the knowledge that he has of 
the universal nature of his conduct - the major premise in the practical 
syllogism - that throws up the peculiarity of the case: it was Socrates' 
concern that it was precisely this that was 'dragged about like a slave' 
should the concept of akrasia be accepted. Similarly, we are dealing 
with someone who knows the particularity of the case - that the desire 
can be fulfilled in this way. Clearly, then, ignorance in whatever form 
will not explain away akrasia, for it is precisely the lack of ignorance 
that throws up the problem. 
The important point however is this: the universal premise - implying 
'the right principle' - is not contradicted by the Action, although the 
person does not act in accordance with it. This is because the person 
still upholds the universal premise, it still forms part of his beliefs about 
what is good; his reasons for acting were not due to, say, any long- 
term benefit to be gained out of acting badly, but merely to fulfil a 
particular desire. That is to say, it is not "Knowledge in the strict sense" 
- i. e. knowledge of the right principle - which is "'dragged about' by the 
emotion, but only sensory knowledge"(NE 1147b18), knowledge 
pertaining to desires. 
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Consider this from another perspective. A person in this sort of 
position, it is often said, has been overpowered by his desires, he is 
acting in accordance with the particular circumstances of the situation. 
In doing so he is disregarding the universal aspect of Action, the 
aspect under which it can be considered good or bad. But that does 
not mean that the Akratic does not hold beliefs in the form of what is 
good and what is bad, although occasionally he fails to conduct 
himself in accordance with them. For the licentious person, for 
example, the conflict between what he does on particular occasions in 
fulfilling his desires and his general beliefs does not arise, for he "is 
carried away at his own choice, thinking that he ought always to 
pursue the pleasure of the moment" (1146b23). The point is that the 
licentious person is acting consistently with his general beliefs, that his 
Actions are conducive to fulfilling the sort of life he has chosen to 
pursue, whereas the akratic is not acting in accordance with 
consideration about the universal aspects of his conduct, general 
beliefs which, if he followed, would constitute his chosen way of life. 
He is acting only in the sphere of the particular - i. e. desires of the 
moment. 
The peculiarity of the concept of akrasia is that the reasons that would 
count for my not acting in the way I did are my reasons, they are 
reasons for not acting in the way that I did that I hold, the point which 
encourages Socrates to reject the concept. The attempt to explain 
away akrasia goes something like: 'He knew there were reasons for 
not acting in the way that he did; that is, he believed that this sort of 
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thing is wrong, but he didn't really hold these views himself because, 
e. g., he didn't have a true understanding of the right principles 
involved' (as those, say, who "have just started learning a subject reel 
off a string of propositions which they do not understand", NE 
1147a22). This returns us to the Socratic position that ignorance (i. e. 
not really holding those views himself, not really seeing the truth) 
causes us to go astray in such situations. But, as we shall see, this 
does not succeed in explaining it away. 
In `Thought and Action in Aristotle' Anscombe suggests that one of 
the reasons for the lack of a clear-cut conclusion in Aristotle's 
discussion is due to his still being under the influence of this Socratic 
view that evil is based on ignorance. 15 This is something that I would 
not outrightly dispute, although there are passages in NE which 
suggest that Aristotle was uncomfortable with Socrates' position, 
especially in the difference in their accounts of knowledge (Aristotle's 
account of exactly what is 'dragged about like a slave' being one 
particular example of this difference). The problem comes, however, 
in the stark cases of clear-cut situations wherein a person, fully 
capable of making choices, forming judgements with a view to what is 
good and what is bad, consciously conducts himself in a way that 
would be condemned according to the sorts of judgements he himself 
I 
has formed. Of course, I may be mistaken in the sorts of things that i 
hold to be good, but this does not have any bearing on the case, "for 
15 In New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, loc. cit. 
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there are some people who have no less confidence in their opinions 
than others have in what they know" (NE 1146b29). That is, whether 
true or not, I hold them to be true and I act contrary to what I hold to be 
true. We are dealing with someone who has moral character, but who 
on occasions acts against the sort of attitudes that make up that 
character. 
Reason and Desire in Conflict 
The standard analysis of akrasia very much rests on the distinction 
between reason and desire, and there is plenty of material in NE to 
suggest that this is the case with Aristotle. Practical reason tells me 
the best way of going on, that this is the best thing to do in these 
circumstances, but on occasions I have desires which compete with 
what reason tells me. Reason is over-powered by the desire of the 
moment. That reason and desire are distinct for Aristotle would appear 
to be confirmed at NE 1102a25 - b28, where he tells us that, as well 
as a rational element, "... there seems to be another element [phusis] 
which, while irrational, is in a sense receptive of reason" (bl3). This he 
illustrates with the difference and similarity between the enkratic and 
the akratic, i. e. the rational and the irrational urge them on in different 
directions. However, towards the end of this passage Aristotle tells us 
that the distinction is unimportant - "... in what sense it is a separate 
element does not matter" (b25). 
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My claim here is stronger than Aristotle's: not only does it not matter, 
but if we take it to mean that there are within human beings two 
sharply distinguished faculties'6 then we can easily lead ourselves into 
conceptual confusion. Certainly on occasions it can sensibly be said 
that a distinction does arise in our attitudes and conduct. But it is 
significant that it is in cases of enkrateia, overcoming the desire to do 
what one thinks one ought not to do, and akrasia, succumbing to that 
desire. That is to say, ordinarily there is no distinction, for in the case 
of the akratic we are talking about someone who on occasions is 
troubled by a desire to do other than what he thinks he ought to do. 
We may, following Aristotle, talk about them being in harmony, but it 
would be a confusion to read into this and into Aristotle that we actively 
harmonise these two elements or faculties within us. 
If this were the case, then I suggest that life would be considerably 
more difficult than it is. Thankfully for a great number of people, it is 
only occasionally that we can speak of being 'over-powered by 
desire', 17 and the use of such a phrase is perfectly reasonable. 
However, if we take this phrase too seriously in our philosophical 
considerations we are apt to lead ourselves into confusion. For 
instance, it conjures up images of human beings as vessels of some 
sort within which the stirrings and strivings of the rational part and the 
16 it is interesting to note here that Aristotle uses phusis, tendency or state, rather than 
dunamis, faculty or some sort of thing we are equipped with. 
17 Of course, in many parts of the world there are a great number of people who are 
constantly plagued by the desire for, e. g. food, but this is need caused by poverty and 
disaster. 
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emotional part compete with one another. But we are not just 
overpowered by desire - we are overpowered by the desire to do, or 
for, something. That is, we are overpowered by the object of desire, 
what the object has to offer us, and this is why we speak (as Aristotle 
does) of the desire of the moment. Talk of being overpowered by 
desire per se is abstract talk, with associated images of desires within 
us lying in wait for objects to attach to. But the objects of our desires 
have a primary and fundamental role in the particular desires that we 
have - it is these that characterise the specific desires that we have. 
In philosophical analysis it is one thing to talk about human conduct in 
terms of clear distinctions, but attributing these distinctions to the 
constitution of human beings is quite another thing. Again I would refer 
to Wittgenstein's observation that language is a sort of refinement (see 
Chapter Two, note 1 above), but to take this refinement as referring to 
how things actually are is a failure to adhere to a fundamental rule of 
philosophy, viz. to be vigilantly conscious of what one is doing and 
saying. The result of such a failure is to get so engrossed in our own 
way of thinking that what we think becomes more and more only a 
vague reflection of how things actually are. 
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Akrasia: the philosopher's problem 
In "How is Weakness of Will Possible? "18 Donald Davidson, rightly I 
think, generalises the concept of incontinence to consider it in relation 
to the attitude or belief of the agent, in doing so not restricting 
incontinence to knowledge. 19 Davidson makes some interesting points 
in his paper, but I also think he makes some confusing remarks. I shall 
restrict myself to the latter, for I think that it is these that shed light on 
the philosophical problems of akrasfa. 
The first signs of confusion come with reference to three other 
authors. 20 The first is to Anscombe and a comment she makes in 
Intention. "The primitive sign of wanting is trying to get", says 
Anscombe. 21 But, he continues, "Hampshire comes closer to exactly 
what I need when he writes, in Freedom of the Individual, that 'A wants 
to do X is equivalent to 'other things being equal, he would do X, if he 
could'". 22 Now it not clear why Davidson makes this comparison, but 
presumably he must see some similarity in the points being made by 
Anscombe and Hampshire. However, Anscombe's point is about 
wanting and its role in acting - i. e. the doing or trying to do something, 
and not in establishing a principle which, e. g., plays a role in a 
18 In Joel Feinberg (ed. ) Moral Concepts (Oxford, 1969). 
19 Ibid. p. 93. 
20 Ibid. p. 94. 
21 Intention (Oxford, 1957), p. 67. 
22 Davidson, op. cit. pp. 94 - 5; S. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual (New York, 
1965), p. 36. 
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conceptual or theoretical framework for Action. For "The wanting that 
interests us here... is neither wishing nor hoping nor feeling the desire, 
and cannot be said to exist in a man who does nothing towards getting 
what he wants... the wanting that concerns us here is a person's doing 
something about it°. 23 That is to say, Anscombe is making a point 
about the phenomenon of Action and not establishing a building block 
for a theoretical account of Action. 24 
The confusion here is that it very much seems that Davidson fails to 
see that Anscombe is making a different sort of philosophical point, 
based on observation and exploration, rather than one that goes 
towards a rationalistic definition of Action. The 'wanting' that is 
expressed in a person's trying to get is of a different nature to the 
'wanting' that does not find expression in acting, such as the akratic's 
wanting to do the right thing but doing something else. Davidson does 
not appear to recognise this, and in going on to use Hampshire he 
adheres to a theoretic view of 'wanting'. 
That Davidson fails to see the sort of philosophical point being made is 
reflected in his reference to E. J. Lemmon's 'Moral Dilemmas'. 
Lemmon says: "Perhaps akrasia is one of the examples of a pseudo- 
problem in philosophical literature: in view of its existence, if you find it 
23 Anscombe op. cit pp. 67-8. 
24 Anscombe is certainly concerned about the concept of Action, but my understanding 
is that it is an exploration rather than an attempt at a formal definition of Action. 
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a problem you have already made a philosophical mistake". 25 
Davidson replies to this: "If your assumptions lead to a contradiction, 
no doubt you have made a mistake, but since you can know you have 
made a mistake without knowing what the mistake is, your problem 
may be real". 26 
The point I take Lemmon to be making here is that, in view of the 
existence of akrasia as a phenomenon, any problems that arise for 
philosophy are going to arise by way of the philosophical method 
employed in discussing it. There is a problem with giving a clear, 
rational explanation of akrasia, but the problem for the akratic is not 
philosophical. The possibility of akrasia is not grounded by a clear 
philosophical account, just as acting is not grounded on philosophical 
accounts of such concepts as 'wanting'. 
Davidson believes that the confusions we get into are based on a 
mistake about the nature of practical reasoning, 27 and there follows a 
discussion on this. But what we get is a discussion based on the 
concept of an ideally rational person, i. e. a rational person who 
satisfies an abstract and formal account of practical reason. The paper 
concludes with: 
25 E. J. Lemmon, 'Moral Dilemmas' in Philosophical Review, LXXI (1962), pp. 144-5.1 
do not wholeheartedly go along with it being a pseudo-problem, for philosophical 
problems are often illuminating as to what can and cannot be done in philosophy, and 
thus can be a spur for us to reflect on what we are doing and how we are doing it. 
26 Op. cit p. 95. 
27 Ibid. p. 96. 
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... if the question 
is read, what is the agent's reason for 
doing a when he believes it would be better, all things 
considered, to do another thing, then the answer must be: 
for this, the agent has no reason. We perceive a creature 
as rational in so far as we are able to view his movements 
as part of a rational pattern comprising also thoughts, 
desires, emotions, and volitions. 28 
When such a creature is the result of a rigid philosophical account of 
thoughts, etc. then it will necessarily be the case that in the case of 
incontinence the attempt to read reason into behaviour will be 
"... subject to a degree of frustration"29, especially when the reason that 
we try to read into it is based on an abstract and formal sort of reason, 
which only exists by virtue of a certain sort of philosophical approach. 
The error with many discussions of practical reasoning lies in the quest 
for a systematic and closed 'theory', and attributing this as the sort of 
thinking that is going on in particular cases of Action. In "Deliberation 
and Practical Reason"30 David Wiggins sums up this point in general 
terms: 
No theory, if it is to recapitulate or reconstruct practical 
reasoning even as well as mathematical logic 
recapitulates or reconstructs the actual experience of 
28 Ibid. p. 112. 
29 Ibid. 
30 In David Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth (Blackwell, 1987). 
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conducting or exploring deductive argument, can treat the 
concerns an agent brings to any situation as forming a 
closed, complete, consistent system. For it is the essence 
of these concerns to make competing, inconsistent 
claims. (This is a mark not of our irrationality but of 
rationality in the face of the plurality of human goods). 31 
When a person does a when he believes it would be better to do 
another thing, then it may well be the case that he has no reason in 
the sense of 'reason' that issues from a closed, consistent, complete 
system of 'practical' reasoning, but that is no justification for drawing 
the conclusion that the agent has no reason. Only against the 
background of such theoretical thinking can assumed wisdom 
adjudicate so clearly as to what is to count as rational and what as 
irrational; what is to count, and what is not to count as a reason for 
acting. 
Akrasia: the akratic's problem 
In Chapter Four I claimed that Hegel's discussion of conscience is an 
attempt to show, bring out and expose, the practical nature of good 
31 Ibid. p. 232. Wiggins' footnote to this is also pertinent "Jonathan Glover speaks of 
'the aesthetic preference most of us have for economy of principles, the preference for 
ethical systems in the style of the Bauhaus rather than Baroque' (The Aristotelian 
Society, supp. Vol. 49,1975, p. 183). Against this I say that only a confusion between 
the practical and the theoretical could even purport to provide reasoned grounds for 
such a preference". Ibid. pp. 232-3. 
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and evil, for it is in conscience that "... both morality and evil have their 
common root" (see p. 192 above). This is in line with his general 
approach to philosophy, viz. that its task is to set out and expose the 
logic of Action, and not necessarily to provide solutions to the 
problems that individuals experience in their lives. Given that as 
rational creatures human beings do not merely conform to, and accept 
without questioning, the laws, customs and habits of their social 
situation (a point related to `the spirit of reflection' discussed in 
Chapter Two above), that "... on the contrary, everyone demands that 
[they] shall comply with his private criterion" (PR p. 4 [A]), then 
problems relating to how things are and how they ought to be will be a 
necessary feature of life. 
Of course, not all philosophers who have covered such ground have 
entertained the confused belief that they could provide solutions to the 
problems that individuals experience in their lives (though only a brief 
survey of the literature will show that there are many who do appear to 
entertain such a belief in moral philosophy in general). Most writers 
concern themselves with attempting to provide solutions to the 
philosophical problems that the phenomenon of akrasia throws up. But 
even here the overall problem is of how a person can voluntarily err. 
Consider what Hegel says about conscience and its positive side, 
good and morality. This refers to the desire that individuals have to do 
the right thing. By the right thing' here I do not mean that in any given 
situation there is a particular right thing to do, that faced with a 
troublesome situation there is one course of Action awaiting 
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enactment, so to speak. It is simply the desire to get it right, to right the 
situation. This does not have a philosophical justification to it; we must 
not think that we must, do or ought to appeal to some universalizable 
maxim that will justify by way of reason what would be the right thing to 
do. Reason in this formal sense has not been distinguished in this 
context. At bottom, wanting to get it right - the concept of right32 - has 
as its basis human activity and conduct, and that involves rational 
desire, practical reason. Similarly, there is no distinction between the 
subjective and the objective - it is not that 1, in particular, want to get it 
right, and right according to what I think is right. What is wanted is that 
the situation is righted. What is wanted is, in Aristotle's terms, practical 
truth in agreement with right desire (e. g. NE 1139a30). 
With the negative side of conscience, however, something further is 
going on. In doing wrong there is an intrinsic falsity in the deed. Thus, 
for example, in fraud I present something as true and right to my 
victim, but that which I present to him is not what it appears to be: I sell 
him something that has the semblance of gold, but which in fact is not 
gold. Wrong, in this sense, is a mere show [Shein], it is something 
masquerading as true and right (PR #82). But it is dependent on truth 
and rightness, that the item is genuine and that this is the true and the 
right basis on which to strike a deal, and this is explicitly recognised by 
me in that they are the basis of my deception. 
32 It is worth pointing out here that Hegel uses the term Recht with its full etymological 
significance, i. e. meaning correct, lawful, just (gerecht), ethically good. 
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This fraudulence is then a practical falsehood based on a person's 
knowledge of what is true and right, carried out with the conscience 
(Gewissen = self-certainty) of the perpetrator knowing what he does to 
be wrong. This is what is involved in acting with a bad conscience, and 
it is this knowledge of what is true and right that is the basis upon 
which I can act truly or falsely - i. e. conscience is the common root of 
both good and evil. 
Now consider the matter from the following perspective. Ordinarily, 
am the sort of person who acts truly and rightly, doing and wanting to 
do what is the right thing. I am not ignorant of certain possibilities: I 
know that / can take advantage of certain situations, act in ways that 
might be considered to be to my own advantage, but it never enters 
my mind to do so. What might be considered to be to my own 
advantage, i. e. more than what I consider is truly and rightly due to 
me, is not something I ordinarily want. However, on a particular 
occasion, I am tempted by an opportunity to defraud someone, and I 
succumb to this. Here I act with a bad conscience, not only in that I act 
falsely and wrongly, but with the added factor that I feel bad about it. 
Such conduct is uncharacteristic of me, character not only being the 
sum of what I do, the way I act ordinarily, but also how I feel about 
what I do and about myself. 
The question that concerns me here about akrasia is not so much how 
it is possible - given the nature of conscience, that is relatively clear - 
but rather how I can put myself into a position in which I know I will 
suffer from my own condemnation. This takes akrasia a step further 
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than Aristotle, who concentrates on the knowledge involved, which 
Socrates emphasises. In this way, as Anscombe says (p. 256 above), 
Aristotle may well have still been under the Socratic `ignorance view' of 
evil. 
However, if we are to take Aristotle's claim that man is a creature of 
rational appetition, and his remarks on character and feeling seriously 
(discussed in Chapter Four above), then this further point is implicit in 
the phenomenon of akrasia. That is to say, desire and feeling are a 
fundamental feature of the actual, empirical phenomenon of akrasia, 
and the distinction between reason and desire is something that arises 
out of this sort of situation and experience. On the other hand, if you 
begin by analysing the phenomenon of akrasia with an abstract 
conception of knowledge and reason - 'abstract' in relation to the 
context of the phenomenon which you are analysing - then the 
likelihood is that there are going to be anomalies and problems, 
precisely because that conception of knowledge or reason bears little 
or no resemblance to that which is expressed in the phenomenon. 
This is the philosophical mistake that I take Lemmon to be speaking of 
(see p. 261-262 above). 
There is, however, something that can be said about the empirical 
problem of akrasia, without resorting to speculative psychology. The 
feeling bad about it (which is more than likely, since the akratic is 
someone who would not ordinarily act in this sort of way) is due to the 
fact that what I think I ought to do is not expressed in what I actually 
do, and the latter is a judgement that is contrary to the beliefs held by 
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the agent. As such, it is a false judgement according to the beliefs held 
by him. Ordinarily, being a person of good character, the agent wants 
to act truly. 
This recalls a point I raised in Chapter Four concerning Aristotle's 
distinction between the possession of virtue, as in a state of mind, and 
the exercise of virtue in an activity, and Hegel's distinction between the 
moral attitude and the ethical (see pp. 216 -217 above). The akratic 
has the right moral attitude, he is in possession of right principle, but 
on this occasion he finds he cannot act in accordance with it. For 
Hegel the moral attitude is when a person is still in the 'ought to be' of 
thinking, but the moral does not find expression in the ethical, i. e. 
Action and the actual. Here we have a situation where there is no 
conjunction between right desire (for in a sense the akratic has it - it 
just does not win over) and practical truth. But when they do need to 
be conjoined then we are on the verge of akrasia, i. e. ordinarily the two 
are not distinct - the person just acts. It is in this sort of situation, this 
sort of experience, that the distinction between reason and desire 
arises. 
When philosophy assumes this distinction between reason and desire 
then it is apt to run ahead of itself. In the beginning is the deed. 
Closing the preface to PR, Hegel comments on those who would give 
instruction to how the world ought to be, but it is also pertinent here. 
Philosophy comes late on the scene, and "The owl of Minerva spreads 
its wings only with the falling of dusk" (pp. 12 -13). That is to say, 
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philosophy does not ground morality, ethics and human life; it 
assimilates and reflects what is. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have developed two points that were raised in Chapter 
Four. The first of those was that purposive Action, conduct that issues 
from established characteristics of a person, can be seen as a 
judgement, which through further consideration lends plausibility to the 
notion of practical truth. This in turn furnishes an argument that 
suggests the analytical distinction between reason and desire is not as 
clear-cut in Action as it is often supposed. This is supported by a 
discussion of right desire, wanting to the do right thing as a central 
aspect of conscience. 
In saying this I am arguing that distinctions between reason and desire 
arise in certain empirical situations, reflected in examples such as 
akrasia and bad conscience. The discussion of these develops the 
second point carried over from Chapter Four, viz. the important 
distinctions that Aristotle and Hegel draw between virtue as a state of 
mind and virtue as activity, and between the moral and the ethical. It is 
often this that accounts for the actual, empirical problems of akrasia. 
On the other hand, philosophical problems arise from the demand of 
epistemological and logical exactitude in accounts of knowledge and 
reason. Aristotle's claim that virtue implies a principle, rather than the 
Socratic view that knowledge involves knowledge of a principle, opens 
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up the discussion of akrasia to allow us to see that character and 
feeling are fundamental features in reasoning, something that is left 
out of accounts of formal, abstract practical reasoning. 
In the following chapter I will continue the main theme of the thesis 
that attributing the abstract concepts and categories of philosophical 
analysis to the subject matter of our considerations can often give a 
jaundiced perspective. In particular, I will consider the use of causal 
analysis and formal accounts of practical reason in discussions of 
Action. 
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6. AGENCY, CHOICE AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
Introduction 
In Chapters Four and Five I discussed various aspects of human conduct 
that reflect the nature of both Aristotle's and Hegel's conceptions of 
purposive Action. I say here reflect rather than define, for the aim was not 
to set down psychologically or logically necessary pre-conditions by which 
Action might be explained. To attempt to establish psychological pre- 
conditions would be to formulate a theory of mind that would hopefully go 
towards explaining how `the mental' then finds expression in the physical 
world in which Action takes place. Such an exercise rests on the Cartesian 
and empiricist assumptions that mind and the physical world are essentially 
distinct, as discussed in Chapters One to Three. On the other hand, to 
attempt to set down logical pre-conditions for Action would be to make an 
assumption, the subject of criticism in Chapter Five, about the nature of 
formal logic. 
In the present chapter I shall discuss these further. In particular, causal 
analysis and the use of logical inference will be considered as ways of 
accounting for Action. It will be argued that such approaches are confused 
in a common way, i. e. that they both unnecessarily seek some sort of 
mechanism that operates between the internal, 'mental' and the external, 
physical expression of the latter. This is unnecessary, I suggest, precisely 
because those aspects of purposive Action discussed in Chapters Four 
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and Five - reason, desire, character, conscience, knowledge, self- 
awareness - show that no such mechanism is needed, and that the 
distinction between 'the mental' and the physical in relation to human 
conduct is misleading. Those aspects of Action that I refer to will be looked 
at in the context of voluntary conduct, choice, character and practical 
reasoning. I will suggest towards the end of the chapter that such 
considerations, alongside considerations of habituation and education, are 
reflective of self-conscious Action, and that in this light such questions as 
what moves us to Action are in fact peculiar and misconceived questions. 
Voluntariness, Choice and Agency 
Aristotle's account of Action has deservedly attracted much attention in the 
20th Century. In his voluntary/involuntary distinction, and his discussion of 
choice and practical reasoning there has been a slow but significant move 
away from discussing abstract moral theories to looking to the specific 
details of Action and the implications on ethics. However, in accounts of 
Action there remains a tendency to find explanations by reference to 
abstract ideas - quite legitimate in their own place - that Aristotle's account 
shows to be unnecessary, and which ultimately only lead to confusion. This 
is the case with causal analysis, and the use of logical inference in 
discussions of practical reasoning. 
Aristotle on The Voluntary and The Chosen 
At NE 1111 b5 Aristotle says that choice is a "better test of character than 
Actions are", and that a chosen Action is a voluntary Action, although it 
involves something further than this, "for both children and animals have a 
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share in voluntary Action, but not in choice". This something further is that 
"choice implies a rational principle, and thought" (NE 1112a16). 
Aristotle's point seems to be something like this. The sorts of ways a 
person chooses to conduct himself will tell us something about the sort of 
person he is. An Action only tells us that the agent did this, and although 
we may want to call it, e. g. evil, it does not tell us the reasons for his doing 
what he did. A person's reasons for conducting himself in the way that he 
does are part of our understanding of that person's character. If we enquire 
why he chose to act as he did, we gain information about his character, 
and this will be, to some degree, illustrative of how he thinks he ought to go 
on in life. This might be extended slightly to saying that the sorts of things a 
person chooses to do will constitute what he thinks well-being consists in, 
for choices are about means and not ends (NE 1112b34ff. ), i. e. we do not 
deliberate about and choose ultimate ends, e. g. well-being, ' i. e. all rational 
Action aims at some good (as discussed in Chapter Four above). How we 
choose to go about attaining well-being is illustrative of the sorts of persons 
we are, it says something about our characters. 
Aristotle's discussion of prohairesis involves a particular account of agency, 
different from that captured by the term 'voluntary', in that choice implies 
character. This in turn involves deliberation, constituting Action in a broad 
sense - i. e. not just the pursuit of a particular desire, but the pursuit of 
desire in terms of a practical understanding of the social context of Action, 
the activities, practices, customs, habits of the community in which the 
individual lives. Character thus involves an understanding of Action in 
1 use 'well-being' as the translation of eudaimonia rather than 'happiness'. There is little in 
Aristotle's work that suggests he was talking about what the latter term is used to indicate 
today. This will come into play in Chapter Seven. 
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relation to getting on in life, and it is this which is the mark of the chosen 
Action rather than a merely voluntary one. 
We need to keep in mind that in discussing choice we are usually referring 
to extraordinary situations, in that much of our daily lives involve activities 
where no apparent conscious choices are made, although we may want to 
say that those activities were chosen. 'Thus the field of deliberation [which 
is an aspect of choosing] is that which happens for the most part, where 
the result is obscure and the right course not clearly defined" (NE 
1112b10). For the most part, our daily lives involve activities where the 
result is not obscure, and the right course of conduct is a question that 
rarely raises itself, e. g. "writing, for we do not hesitate over the way in 
which a word should be written" (NE 1112b1). In such activities questions 
of choice, in the normal course of events, do not arise. 
However, when it comes to more complicated Action, that which involves 
thought and deliberation, Aristotle appears to have burdened modern 
philosophy with something of a problem. Practical reasoning, involving 
thought and reasoning, expressed - when laid out - in premises, results, 
not merely in a proposition about how I should go on, but in Action itself. 
Hegel says much the same: 
... practical reason not only posits 
the universal determination, 
i. e. the good, within itself, on the contrary, it is only 'practical' 
in the more proper sense, when it requires that the good 
should be there in the world, that it should have external 
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objectivity; in other words, that thought should not be merely 
subjective, but altogether objective. 2 
What goes on then between my thoughts and reasoning (involving desires, 
beliefs, the practical assessment of particular situations) and my Action? 
G. H. Von Wright puts the question in the following way: 
What sort of connexion would this signify between want and 
thought on the one hand, and Action on the other? Can I say 
that wanting and opining make me act? If so, would this be a 
form of causal efficacy? Or would it be more like a logical 
compulsion? 3 
Von Wright gives us two possible explanations of what is going on between 
thought and Action, causal analysis and some sort of logical compulsion 
involved in the inference of practical reasoning. However, as we shall see, 
such attempts to explain Action represent ways of thinking and do more to 
explain that way of thinking than they explain Action itself. That is, Action is 
made to fit the particular mode of explanation - causal or logical analysis - 
rather than the other way around, such attempts failing to take heed of 
Aristotle's demand (made at various places throughout NE) that theories 
and the truths they purport to put forward must fit the facts and actuality, 
rather than the latter accommodating the former. 
2 The Encyclopaedic Logic, op. cit., #54. Later on in the present chapter 1 will make a few 
points regarding Hegel's mention of 'the good' in practical reason, and I shall discuss it at 
greater length in the following chapter. 
3'On So-called Practical Inference' in J. Raz (ed. ) Practical Reason (Oxford, 1978), p. 47. 
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Agency and Causal Analysis 
Causal analysis exemplifies such explanations of Action in terms of a way 
of thinking, trying to think of ways in which thought and reasoning can 
result in Action, rather than with the logic of Action itself. In his 'Actions, 
Reasons, and Causes' Donald Davidson confirms this in the opening 
paragraphs of the paper, saying: 
What is the relation between a reason and an action when 
the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason 
for doing what he did? We may call such explanations 
rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the 
action. 
In this paper I want to defend the ancient - and common- 
sense - position that rationalization is a species of causal 
explanation. 4 
That is to say, Davidson's subject is not Actions, i. e. things done, but the 
philosophical explanation of Action, and further, a particular way of thinking 
about Action, namely causal explanation. This can be seen by noting that 
Action is rational per se, and therefore does not need rationalising. Or 
rather, Action needs rationalising only to those who find a particular 
instance puzzling, in need of justification, etc., or those who want to put 
forward a particular way of thinking about Action. The general nature of 
Davidson's approach is illustrated by his broad categorisation of human 
conduct. In a footnote he says: 
4 Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, 1980), p. 3. 
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Actions, performances, and events not involving intentions 
are alike in that they are often referred to or defined partly in 
terms of some terminal stage, outcome or consequence. 5 
Here Davidson throws in Action together with unintentional behaviour. But, 
as Aristotle points out for us, the prohairesis involved in Action proper 
distinguishes it from unintentional behaviour. Davidson, continuing the 
footnote, then goes on to distinguish Action as what an agent does 
intentionally, but then goes on to lump it together again with voluntary but 
unintentional and involuntary and unintentional behaviour: 
... suppose 
'A' is a description of an action, 'B' is a description 
of something done voluntarily, though not intentionally, and 
'C' is a description of something done involuntarily and 
unintentionally; finally suppose A=B=C (my emphasis). 
But we need to ask why suppose A=B=C when the descriptions provided 
for A and B and C suggest the conclusion AýB*C? Or rather, A=B=C when 
we consider them in terms of formal categories which provide a framework 
wherein A and B and C are representative of the category 'event, 
'happening', etc. rather than actual phenomena. What we are left with is a 
discussion of philosophical categories rather than of the actual features 
Action itself. 
Anscombe gives a hint as to what is going wrong with Davidson's 
approach. Given the options of either causal efficacy or logical compulsion, 
he goes for the former 
51bid., footnote 2, p. 4. 
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... on the ground that there is a difference between my having 
a reason and its actually being my reason. I act 
because.. . We need an account of this 'because'. The 
psychological 'because', he supposes, is an ordinary because 
where the because clause gives a psychological state. The 
solution lacks acumen. True, not only must I have a reason, it 
must also 'operate as my reason': that is, what I do must be 
done in pursuit of the end and on grounds of the belief. But 
not just any act of mine which is caused by my having a 
certain desire is done in pursuit of the object of desire; not 
just any act caused by my having a belief is done on grounds 
of the belief. 6 
Whereas the description of something done in the form 'He did X 
because... (of such-and-such a desire) and... (such-and-such belief)' is 
perfectly sensible, there is nothing in the description to say that the agent 
did X in pursuit of the desired end or on the grounds of the beliefs that he 
held at the time. Such a description fits impulsive behaviour pretty well. 
Indeed, such behaviour represents the mainstay of Davidson's position, 
behaviour which is instanced by the onslaught of a state or disposition: 
A desire to hurt your feelings may spring up at the moment 
you anger me; I may start wanting to eat a melon just when I 
see one; and beliefs may begin at the moment we notice, 
perceive, learn, or remember something.? 
6'Von Wright on Practical Inference' in P. Schlipp (ed. ) The Philosophical of Georg Heinrik 
Von Wright (Open Court Pub. Co., 1982) 
7 Op. cit., p. 12. 
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The problem with such an approach is that, although Davidson gives us the 
grounds for distinguishing between certain types of behaviour, he does not 
recognise these grounds as reason enough for making such a distinction - 
and thus all forms of behaviour are lumped together with Action proper. 
The cause of the problem is that Action proper, to borrow from Anscombe 
again, is 
... not 
just any old thing which we do, such as making an 
involuntary gesture. Such a gesture might be caused, for 
example, by realising something (the 'onset of a belief) when 
we are in a state of desire. Something I do is not made into 
an intentional action by being caused by a belief or desire, 
even if the descriptions fit. 8 
The confusion arises from the failure to allow the different forms of 
behaviour to be self-defining in terms captured by Aristotle's observations 
on the difference between the voluntary and the chosen. Instead, Action is 
not only placed in the same category as unintentional, voluntary but not 
intentional, and involuntary behaviour, but also in the broader category of 
'events' and 'happenings' where clearly causal analysis is provided with an 
opening. In other words, we allow the way in which we think to determine 
how we define Action, rather than allowing Action's distinguishing 
characteristics to do the job. 
8 Op. cit., p. 378. 
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The Voluntary and The Chosen: unreflective and reflective conduct 
In his paper'Hegel and The Philosophy of Action' Charles Taylor points out 
the historical origins of the type of approach that Davidson adopts. 
... the 
basic conception goes back, I believe, at least to the 
17th century. A conception of this kind was, in a sense, even 
more at home in the basically dualist outlook common to the 
Cartesian and empiricist philosophies. 
Qua bodily movement actions resembled all other events. 
What distinguished them was their inner, "mental" 
background. Within the bounds of this outlook, there was a 
clear ontological separation between outer event and inner 
background. 9 
Taylor contrasts this with a 'qualitative view'- 
... actions are what we might call 
intrinsically directed. Actions 
are in a sense inhabited by the purposes which direct them, 
so that action. and purpose are ontologically inseparable. 10 
Here Taylor reflects the importance of the distinction between the 
voluntary and the chosen as put forward by Aristotle, albeit he approaches 
it from a slightly different angle. This becomes clear later in the paper, in a 
passage that deserves to be quoted at length. 
On the qualitative view, action may be totally unreflective; it 
may be something we carry out without awareness. We may 
91n Hegel's Philosophy of Action (Humanities Press, 1983), ed. Lawrence S. Stepelevich 
and David Lamb, p. 2. 
10Ibid. 
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then become aware of what we are doing, formulate our 
ends. So following a conscious desire or intention is not an 
inescapable feature of action. On the contrary, this degree of 
awareness in our action is something we come to achieve. 
In achieving this, we also transform our activity. The quality of 
consciously directed activity is different from that of our 
unreflected, semi-conscious performance. This flows 
naturally from the second view on action: if action is 
qualitatively different from nonaction, and this difference 
consists in the fact that action is directed; the action is also 
different when this direction takes on a crucially different 
character. And this it does when we move from unreflecting 
response, where we act in the same manner as animals do, 
to conscious formulations of our purposes. Our action 
becomes directed in a different and stronger sense. To 
become conscious is to be able to act in a new way. " 
Conduct that is voluntary but not chosen is 'unreflective' in that it is not 
chosen, whereas Action that is the result of choice involves deliberation 
and is thus 'reflective' (although, as we shall see in relation to habit, this is 
a very basic drawing of the distinction). The latter consists of more than 
reacting to impulses and desires, the mode of behaviour of animals and 
often that of children. Reflective behaviour is something that we develop 
through experiencing and learning about the world we live in, and it is by 
way of such experience and learning, and the Action that is characteristic 
of it, that we develop the capacity to get on in the world. 
11 Ibid., p. 7. 
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To become conscious, in Taylor's words, is precisely the development 
involved in gaining a practical understanding of the world (activities, 
practices, customs, habits, et al. ) in which we live, making judgements in 
relation to that world (discussed in Chapter Five, pp. 232ff. above), 
providing the background to the deliberation and choosing of Actions 
proper. That is not to say that these processes of understanding, 
judgement, deliberation and choice are going on on each and every 
occasion of a conscious act. Much of the time our Actions are 
straightforward, that 'straightforwardness' reflective of character based on 
the understanding, judgement and deliberation that we have developed 
over time. Given such developed character, there is no distinction between 
thought and Action - we just act. That is to say, there is no need for some 
sort of causal mechanism to be' imported into our accounts of purposive 
Action, a move that is reminiscent of the Cartesian attempts to explain the 
relation between mind and body. 
Agency and Practical Reasoning 
However, looking at Action from within the context of philosophical 
presuppositions rather than the contexts within which Action takes place is 
not restricted to causal analysis. It is also illustrated by the approach which 
starts from the idea that practical reasoning, being a type of inference, 
involves some form of logical necessity. Indeed, a comment by A. J. Kenny 
can be taken to suggest that practical inference itself presupposes logic, in 
that 
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It is beyond doubt that in addition to theoretical reasoning 
there is practical reasoning. We work out, with the aid of 
logic, not only what is the case but also what we are to do. 12 
That is, Action is dependent on the 'aid of logic' in order for us to work out 
what is the case and what we are to do. Clearly there might be a sense in 
which the philosopher employs certain logical tools in order to, e. g. 
formulate practical reasoning, but it is equally clear that this is not what 
goes on in Action itself. I say Kenny's comment can be taken to suggest 
such dependence on logic, that not being the only possible interpretation of 
what he says. But what is worrying about this is the suggestion that the 'aid 
of logic' is sought, suggestive of the absurdity that "... a previous study of 
anatomy and physiology is required in order to digest or breathe" (see 
Chapter Five, p. 231 above). 
Nevertheless, there is undoubtedly a prevalent tendency to view practical 
reasoning, and thus Action, through formal logical categories, the use of 
'inference' in the formulation being an obvious example of the 'aid of logic'. 
Consider a point made by Mary Mothersill: 
Now if we suppose that Aristotle meant the practical syllogism 
to remind us that in prohairesis a person must have an end in 
view (expressed in the universal premise) and must also have 
some beliefs about the particular facts of his own situation 
(expressed in the minor premise) then the syllogism is not 
any kind of argument but rather a schema of logically 
12 'Practical Inference', Analysis 26.3 (Jan 1966), p. 65. 
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necessary conditions for deliberate (intentional) action... (my 
emphasis). 13 
Again the aid of logic is brought in the form of logical necessity in order to 
capture the nature of Action. This is expressed even in Von Wright's 
suggestion, mentioned earlier, that the relation between thought and Action 
might be one of logical compulsion. Von Wright's problem, Anscombe 
suggests, 14 is the way in which he phrases the inference, viz. 'Unless I do 
A, then I shall not achieve F. Thus for 'E' to be achieved I am logically 
compelled - if I really want 'E' - to do 'A'. But surely the idea of being 
logically compelled to Action is an absurdity? 
The difficulty felt is to grasp why this should be called 
'inference'. Inference is a logical matter; if there is inference, 
there must be validity; if there is inference, the conclusion 
must in some way follow from the premises. How can an 
action logically follow from premises? 15 
Practical reasoning concludes in an Action, rather than merely a 
proposition concerning what must be done if a certain end is to be realised. 
However, using 'unless' in a schematical rendering gives a false impression 
in that 'A' is a necessary Action in 'Unless A, I shall not achieve E'. 
Whereas in reality 'A' may not be the only means by which 'E' can be 
realised. For sure, 
13 'Anscombe's Account of the Practical Syllogism' in Philosophical Review 71, Oct. 1962, 
p. 461. A point, incidentally, that Mothersill attributes to Donald Davidson. 
14 Op. cit 
15 Ibid., pp. 384-5. 
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Practical grounds may 'require' an action, when they shew 
that only by its means can the end be obtained, but they are 
just as much grounds when they merely shew that the end 
will be obtained by certain means. 16 
In schematicizing practical reasoning into syllogistic form, something 
'borrowed' from logic, the logical necessity of the inference between 
premises and conclusion is taken along as part of the package. But such 
necessity does not always have a place in Action - i. e. situations where 
there may be various means by which to achieve the desired end. 
Desiring, Wanting and Action 
'Wanting' is indeed a necessary condition for Action - but wanting does not 
appear in the practical syllogism. In discussing practical reasoning, 
Aristotle, I would suggest, is taking it for granted that it is wanting and 
desiring for some end that is under consideration, and wanting for some 
end is involved in an Action. Thus he is not talking about desiring and 
wanting as some sort of 'psychological states' which are pre-conditions to 
Action - which in the Humean tradition are usually parcelled-off as 
'stirrings 
in the soul'. Desiring and wanting are the desiring- and the wanting- of- the- 
object, something that cannot be captured in exclusively psychological 
terms (see Chapter Five, pp. 247ff. above). Furthermore, he is not talking 
about wishing - "... e. g. we wish to be healthy, but choose things that will 
make us healthy... " (NE 1111 b29). The wants and desires that are related 
to Action and its end or object involve a rational cognition of it as in our 
power, of the possibilities that a state of affairs has to offer, rather than 
16 Ibid., p. 384. 
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brutish desires that cause us to act. The necessity comes in here: if we are 
talking about Action - rational and deliberate Action - rather than a 
theoretical framework or blueprint of the pre-conditions of human conduct, 
then wanting and desiring are themselves necessary elements in what has 
been achieved. 'If that which he did was rational and successful (what was 
done was not only deliberated about but also deliberate) he must have 
wanted it?. His reasons will appear in the formulation of a practical 
syllogism - wanting doesn't, it is redundant and would be pleonastic. 
However, this necessity of the wanting does not necessitate that certain 
reasons are to be put into the premises, only that there are some reasons 
to put in. The necessity is thus not that of logical necessity that prevails 
between certain premises and a particular conclusion, but the necessity of 
the features of rational, deliberate Action, features necessary to achieve a 
desired end. 17 
What, then, does move us to Action? But this is a curious question. From 
the start the presence of 'move' begs the question of some force - causal 
or logical - which is suggestive of involuntariness. The 'wanting' that 
Aristotle is interested in is the 'move' to Action, but a 'wanting' that is tied 
up with the world we have learned to get on in, i. e. a practical 'wanting' and 
not a 'wanting' of an exclusively psychological nature. Taylor provides us 
with a clue as to the curious nature of the question: 
17 In Von Wright on Practical Inference' Anscombe provides a detailed discussion on how 
we can get fooled by the idea of 'logical necessity', even in theoretical reasoning. 'As well as 
the truth connection of p, p implies q, and q we also want to say that there is logical 
necessity: "But the logical necessity is the justification of assertive inference from p to q and 
its apprehension compels belief. That is a confusion. The justification is simply the truth of p 
and p implies q: Where there is such a justification, we call the connection one of "logical 
necessity"'. p. 391. 
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One theory explains Action in terms of the supposedly more 
basic datum of the mental; the other accounts for the mental 
as a development out of our primitive capacity for Action. 18 
In an important sense, man is his activity - activity is a 'natural principle' 
(NE 1168a8 -a point I shall discuss at greater length in Chapter Seven), 
and, further, desires and wants - 'the mental' - are the desires and wants 
they are in virtue of the context of the sphere of activity, in which exist the 
objects of those desires and wants, i. e. the world in which we live (= are 
active). To repeat something I said in Chapter Five (see p. 249 above), just 
as what someone wants or desires is dependent for its being wanted on 
the wanting and desiring of the agent, so the wanting or desiring of the 
agent is dependent on the object. With such a background it just does not 
make sense to ask what it is that 'moves' us to Action. 
This is true of the general question. But of course in particular instances of 
Action we often ask 'Why did you do that? ' But this is a different sort of 
question altogether in that it questions the rationale or justification of a 
particular deed. Here the question is often of the form 'What's the good of 
that? ' The 'good' comes in here because we assume that Action is for 
some good, and we are right to do so: Action and activity are concerned 
with getting on, with some 'good' in view. Whether it is the actual good or 
apparent good (NE Book III 4) - i. e. whether it is good absolutely or good 
for an individual (NE Book VII 12), or whether it is good as a means or as 
an end (NE Book 14) - is irrelevant here (again, this is something I shall 
look more closely at in Chapter Seven). To ask the question in a situation 
where the 'good' or the point of the Action is clear will (rightly) bring 
18 Op. cit., p. 13. 
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astonishment from he who is questioned, and the general question 'What 
moves us to Action? ' only makes sense in the context of a particular 
philosophical conception of Action. But I have argued that it is a 
philosophical conception of Action - i. e. a theory or definition of Action 
organised around philosophical categories and concepts - that produces 
questions that are quite peculiar when asked of Action and activity proper. 
Action and Activities: choice, habit, rules and self-awareness 
The confusions that arise in this area are often due to conceiving activities 
as in some way mechanistic, carried out 'habitually', rather than looking at 
them in their wider context of Action. Action involves deliberation and 
choice, which themselves involve a practical consideration of the way in 
which those activities are carried out and what might be attained by way of 
them. The first thing to note here is that many of the activities which we get 
up to require habituation in the ways those activities are carried out and in 
the objects we employ in doing so. In looking at human activities we need 
to note that habituation involves learning how to get on in the world that is 
populated by innumerable objects, artefacts, tools, etc. the very existence 
of which is dependent on the potential purposes they fulfil for us. In 
learning to use, manipulate, employ such things for our purposes we learn 
those activities that 'getting on in the world' involves. This itself involves a 
reflective awareness of our own agency and a degree of self-sufficiency, 
two factors which are reflected in the process and practical organisation of 
education. 
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Activity, Choice and Habituation 
Clearly there are situations where agency figures but in which choice is not 
immediately apparent. And yet in considering these activities we are not 
dealing merely with the sort of voluntariness that, according to both 
Aristotle and Hegel, animals and children display; we are considering 
activities which fall within that sub-set of voluntary conduct, i. e. rational, 
purposive, Actions, the cause of which, says Aristotle, is prohairesis. But 
here in discussing activities it would seem that the closer we focus on the 
activity concerned the more the role of choice in its execution appears to 
diminish. However, a closer look at what these activities involve shows the 
relevance of Aristotle's point that the field of deliberation, the 
considerations involved in the making of choices, is that which happens for 
the most part, where the result is obscure and the right course is not clearly 
defined. 
Now, the foregoing considerations are not intended to establish that choice 
has no role to play in such activities, or that a person engaged in a 
particular activity cannot make choices, but that when we consider the 
nature of such activities and the sorts of situations which arise in the 
execution of them, situations in which choice comes into play, then we are 
talking about situations which have an effect on the ordinary, 
straightforward execution of those activities. This in turn throws up the 
question of where choice is to figure in our account of Action. 
Consider the latter point from the following perspective. When a situation 
arises where choice is involved, it is a situation where the sort of question 
'What shall I do (here, next, for the best... etc. )? ' arises. An important point 
to emphasise here, a point that tends to be overlooked, is that the question 
is 'What shall I do? ' That is to say, the situations in which this sort of 
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question arises involve the person being directly conscious of their agency. 
But there are many day-to-day activities in which we participate where 
situations throwing up such questions, such a direct awareness of one's 
agency, are a hindrance to the execution of those activities. Furthermore, 
such situations arise, for the most part, when the activity is not following its 
ordinary, straightforward course of events. More often than not the 
situation throws up such questions as 'What shall I do? ' and involves an 
awareness of one's agency precisely because the 'right course of Action is 
not clearly defined', and this is so because the situation in question 
represents an element within the activity which hinders its ordinary, 
straightforward execution. 
The point being made here regarding choice can be illustrated by 
considering a modern, everyday activity: take, for example, driving a car. 
The learner-driver faces many questions such as 'What shall I do (here, 
next, for the best ... etc. )? 
' because the results of certain operations are 
obscure to him, and the right course is not clear. I may know, as a learner- 
driver, that, for example, the accelerator makes the car go forward and that 
the brakes bring the car to a halt. But until I feel the result of depressing 
the accelerator or brakes - i. e. the pressure required to cause certain 
speeds of movement and degrees of slowing down - the result may well be 
obscure and the right pressure to, e. g., move off slowly and smoothly, 
unclear. 
Further, the anxieties of the learner-driver arise due to the fact that the 
question raised is 'What shall I do? ', a question that directly confronts the 
driver with his own agency. Indeed, the learning process is itself geared to 
minimise the occurrence of such questions, i. e. to accustom the driver to 
the various operations of the vehicle, the sorts of bodily movements and 
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the force required for certain manoeuvres, and the rules of the road, which 
is to say, minimise the occasions where the result of certain operations are 
obscure and the right way to go unclear. 
Clearly in such activities situations requiring someone to make a choice are 
a hindrance to their successful execution, and it is when such questions of 
choice do not arise, or come up rarely, that I would, e. g., graduate from 
being a learner-driver to a qualified driver. I am aware of the bodily 
movements required for different operations, what those operations effect; 
I have a practical knowledge of the rules of the road (i. e. I can drive in 
accord with them), etc. Given that other road-users drive in accordance 
with the rules of the road, situations should not arise wherein the question 
'What should I do? ' confronts me. It is only in unusual, extraordinary, 
situations that this question will arise for the qualified driver. 
If we consider this further, we shall see that even when we are talking 
about the skilful execution of an activity the role of choice is not 
immediately clear; indeed, it is in situations where our skill comes into 
question, or is put to the test, that it comes out more clearly. What is 
interesting in a situation in which the question 'What shall I do? ' is raised is 
that it is not a situation of our choosing (even though it may have been due 
to a voluntary manoeuvre), i. e. it arises when something has gone wrong, 
when something has gone amiss, where there is something hindering the 
successful execution of the activity, etc. - i. e. when there are external 
factors at play, factors which are not caused by my choosing but which 
may (truly) cause me to be in difficulty. 
When driving, for instance, I may make a mistake, or even intentionally 
break the rules of the road, and thus I may well be in a situation which is 
accountable in terms of my agency. But agency does not necessarily 
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involve choosing: in the case of a mistake, it is clear that the resulting 
situation is not of my choosing, although I acted voluntarily; however, even 
in the second case it may be said that I chose to break the rules of the 
road, but it would be absurd to say that I chose the situation wherein the 
question 'What should I do? ' arises, even though I knew it was possible 
that I might find myself in such a situation. In breaking the rule that I did 
(e. g. driving too fast) I wanted to get away with it, i. e. not end up in a 
dangerous situation, and my bodily movements and my handling of the car 
are directed by this purpose. That the situation got out of control was not of 
my choosing, although I am blameable. 
Activity, Rules and Reason 
That choice is not apparent in the skilful execution of certain activities can 
be seen if we look at the point from the perspective of the nature of such 
activities. Many such activities are what we would call 'rule-governed' in 
that they involve the mechanical use of our bodies and tools, etc., i. e. if this 
is done then that will happen, and that will be a contributory factor in the 
successful execution of the activity as a whole. Some activities are not only 
rule-governed, but law-governed also, and these laws reflect the basis for 
the successful execution of the activity concerned. Driving comes 
immediately to mind here, i. e. its successful execution involves following 
certain rules or laws. 
Problems arise in using 'rule-governed' and technical activities in explaining 
human behaviour. This is precisely where causal analysis, for instance, 
misses the mark, choice consequently falling out of account, for, as 
Anscombe tells us of NE: 
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Book VI teaches us, as I think we might not have realised 
from Book III, that there is no such thing as a 'choice' which is 
only technical.... There is always, on Aristotle's view, another 
'choice' behind a technical or purely executive one (1139b1- 
3). That is why he denies the name of 'prohairesis', 'choice', 
to the technical or executive decision, even though this is the 
fruit of deliberation, if that particular thing for the sake of 
which the decision being made is not itself decided upon by 
deliberation-19 
That is to say, by focusing exclusively on the technical aspect of executing 
an activity, the element of choice and deliberation 'behind' the activity - the 
background or context of Action - falls out of account, thus allowing causal 
analysis a place in the picture. 
The role that choice does play in the execution of an activity can be seen in 
the fact that activities are the sorts of things that are chosen, i. e. a 
particular activity itself represents a choice. As a factor in purposive Action, 
activity represents a means to some end. I want to go somewhere, and I 
choose a particular means which will get me there - e. g. I drive, cycle, walk, 
etc. Considering the rationality of activities i. e. that they involve some form 
of practical reasoning - there would seem to be some sort of pre-condition 
which forms the basis of the possibility of executing such an activity with 
purpose; something which is captured in the idea of following a rule. 
In speaking of rules here it needs to be acknowledged that rules vary in 
their rigidity and application, i. e. it might be just a matter of common sense 
whether they should be followed, or it may be a matter for the law, but this 
19 Anscombe in Bamborough op. cit, p. 68. 
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will depend on a whole range of considerations centred on the details of 
particular activities. For present purposes however it is enough to note that 
such considerations of how rigidly a rule ought to be applied, and whether 
it should be enforced, only come on the scene when it is already 
established that acting against a rule is foolhardy, wrong, evil, etc. And the 
idea of acting against a rule needs to be emphasised here, for notice that 
in charging someone with being 'foolhardy' or'criminal' we are talking about 
persons who have not merely failed to follow the rule, but who have 
consciously flouted the rule. With regard to the further question as to what 
it is that establishes any particular rule - i. e. what sort of considerations or 
principles give it its validity - we would do well to reflect that considering the 
sort of creatures that we are - according to Aristotle, creatures who function 
on the principle of rational desire -a rule can be seen as reflective of a 
quite rational way of going about things. That is, purposive Action implies 
a rule that signals, so to speak, the way to a desired end. 
Clearly, rule-following can be seen to be teleological in that a rule is 
followed for the sake of some end, but care is also needed in considering 
what sort of 'end' we are talking about here. For instance, I may follow the 
rules of the road in order to get from A to B, but this is not to say that the 
rules are designed specifically for my own personal ends. The 'ends' of the 
rules of the road are of a different nature, for their aim or purpose, the 
reason for their being designed in the way that they are, is to enable me to 
attain my personal ends smoothly, safely, efficiently, etc., and the best way 
to achieve this is to drive in accordance with those rules. 
Here the rules are not only conducive to my personal ends, but also to 
those of other road users. In this sense the rules of the road are reflective 
of a rational way of attaining the ends of such an activity as driving, i. e. 
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rational not only in that they enable me to drive well, but more importantly 
they enable me to drive well in virtue of the fact that they enable all road 
users to do well in their pursuits. Consider a point by Hegel: 
By educated men, we may prima facie understand those who 
without the obtrusion of personal idiosyncrasy can do what 
others can do. It is precisely this idiosyncrasy, however, 
which uneducated men display, since this behaviour is not 
governed by the universal characteristics of the situation (PR 
#187[A]). 
Thus 'driving' has universal characteristics (captured in the rules of the 
road) in that its very possibility by all users is dependent on each doing 
what others do. Hence the universal and social character of such activities, 
which is central to both Aristotle's and Hegel's account of Action, i. e. 
reflecting the claim that man is by nature a social creature. 
Self-awareness and Acting Well 
However, it needs to be kept in mind that the sorts of rules which are under 
discussion require for their execution the capacity to make choices and an 
awareness of one's own agency, for these rules pertain to the sort of 
activity that is chosen, i. e. a rational activity by which I can attain my 
personal ends (e. g. getting from A to B). This awareness of one's own 
agency is something that Aristotle is clearly getting at when he says: 
What we deliberate about is practical measures that lie in our 
power..... The effects about which we deliberate are those 
which are produced by our own agency but not always in the 
same way, [i. e. by different means].... (NE 1112a31-b3). 
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Deliberation and choosing involve self-awareness of some sort, something 
that comes out in considering rule-following when it is noted that the 
capacity to follow a rule involves the concomitant capacity not to follow a 
rule, that the capacity to act well involves the capacity to act badly, and 
thus how I conduct myself, which rules I follow and which I break, depends 
upon what it is that I want to achieve. It may well be the case that a person 
spends very little time in life making such choices, but this will depend on 
that person's character. This is to say, acting through rational choice may 
not involve self-awareness at any given time, or the sort of self-reflection 
involved when considering e. g. whether I should break this law or not, but 
clearly deliberation and choice cannot be accounted for without some 
reference to an awareness of one's own agency. 
The importance of self-awareness in an account of Action can be seen if 
we look closely at the distinction that Aristotle and Hegel make, at several 
places, between the conduct of children and that of rational adults. 
Children, for Aristotle, do not act through choice, for their ends are set by 
desires, and not conceived in such universal terms as are captured in the 
sense of 'acting well'. Children act out of impulse and desire, something 
that comes out when we consider that, more often than not, the child's 
statement 'Candyfloss is good' can be understood in terms of 'I like 
candyfloss' and not as a statement about the benefits of the properties of 
candyfloss, i. e. 'good' here is being used in a particularly narrow way. This 
point is brought out by Hegel when he says "... children have no moral will 
but leave their parents to decide things for them" (PR #170[A]). 
Using the term 'good' to refer to Actions, and not just to say something 
about my personal tastes, requires an ability to understand the rationality of 
an Action, i. e. its 'universal' aspect, the extent to which it might be an 
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instance of acting well, eupraxia. It is on the basis of this character of 
Action that rational adults are able to make decisions, for it is the rationality 
of the Action which is the subject of deliberation - i. e. is this a good - 
efficient, justifiable, legal, honest, sufficiently far-sighted, etc. - way of 
attaining this good that I want to attain. It is the child's inability to deliberate 
about such aspects of conduct in terms of 'acting well' that excludes him 
from acting through choice. 
However, to suggest a hard and fast distinction between children and 
adults, apart from setting the misleading task of determining exactly when 
children receive reason and become adults, misses the point that this 
ability to grasp the rationality of Action, based on a practical understanding 
of the social context, is something that, like judgement, is developed. Both 
Aristotle and Hegel acknowledge this as the primary function of education, 
and in doing so give important pointers to the social context of purposive 
Action. 
This is something that calls for close scrutiny. In turning to it I want to 
develop (with the help of Hegel) Aristotle's concept of autarkeia in order to 
further the historical argument of the present chapter, that Aristotle 
represents a turning point in philosophy which looks ahead to modern 
philosophical considerations, considerations which are traditionally thought 
to be distinguishing features of modern thinking in relation to antiquity. 
Self-sufficiency, Education and Action 
Throughout Hegel's works he makes numerous comments about the 
difference between the modern world and the world of the ancients. Hegel 
sees the defining aspect of the modern in the rise of Christianity, giving 
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recognition to individual conscience through the crucifixion of Christ. 
However, Hegel discussion of the Jansenist - Jesuit debates of the 17th 
Century concerning conscience and the philosophical development of the 
notion of `the good will' is highly critical, and it is to the ancients that he 
turns to illustrate what he regards as the 'superficiality' of such a 
development. In particular, he returns to Aristotle's account of Action as 
involving knowing and willing as bringing out the nature of individual 
intentions, motives and purposes. 
Hegel and The Ancients 
PR #124 says: 
The right of the subject's particularity, his right to be satisfied, 
or in other words the right of subjective freedom, is the pivot 
and centre of the difference between antiquity and modern 
times. This right in its infinity is given expression in 
Christianity and it has become the universal effective 
principle of a new form of civilization. 
Commenting on this, Knox tells us that Hegel 
... held that subjective 
freedom never came within the Greek 
purview at all, since the principle of conscience, of self- 
certainty, on which 'subjective freedom' in all its forms 
depends, came into the world with the Christian revelation 
(translator's note 18 to #124). 
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But here Knox is conflating two very different points when he claims that, 
for Hegel, subjective freedom did not come within the Greek purview at all. 
Hegel's point at #124 is that subjective freedom was not explicitly 
recognised, expressed, in the ancient penal codes. This is something he 
says explicitly at #117 [A]: 
Oedipus, who killed his father without knowing it, cannot be 
accused of parricide. The ancient penal codes, however, 
attached little weight to the subjective side of Action, to 
imputability, than we do nowadays ( PR #1 17[A]). 
The point that Hegel makes here is a social and political one, about the 
actual social and political arrangements of the day. It is quite another point, 
however, to claim that he is talking about the 'Greek purview' as a whole. 
This would be to ignore the importance that Hegel sees in the fact that 
Greek drama also did include reference to the 'subjective' aspects of 
Action - i. e. the knowledge, motives, intentions etc. of the individual agent 
(for Hegel's analysis of Antigone, see Chapter Two above). For example, 
Oedipus, in accordance with established law, custom and practice, 
considered that he had committed the crimes of parricide and incest, 
hence his self-inflicted punishment. Nonetheless, Sophocles also refers in 
his plays to the subjective motives, intentions and purposes with which 
Oedipus acts, references which Hegel considers significant in 
themselves. 20 Knox's comment also fails to take into account various 
20 Sophocles, The Three Theban Plays tr. Robert Fagles (Penguin Classics, 1984). 
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comments of Hegel's on ancient philosophy and philosophers. For 
instance, he tells us that 
The philosophy of modern times proceeds from the principle 
which ancient philosophy had reached, the standpoint of 
actual self-consciousness.... (LHP vol. III, pp. 159). 
Self-consciousness, for Hegel, represents the possibility of 'subjective 
freedom', i. e. someone's being aware of their ability to make decisions, 
choices, to conduct themselves rationally (as opposed to, say, merely 
following the orders of others). Certainly, Hegel sees philosophy as 
developmental, in any given period moving from the abstract to the 
concrete, something he comments on with regard to Plato and Aristotle: 
Plato with his ideas or universals laid the foundations of the 
independent world of intellect, and established absolute 
existence as an existence which is manifestly present in the 
mode of thought; Aristotle developed, completed and peopled 
the realm of thought... (Ibid., pp. 29. My emphasis). 
Thus, in claiming that subjective freedom did not, for Hegel, come within 
the Greek purview at all, Knox is conflating what Hegel says about the 
actual customs, laws and codes, with his consideration of the Greek 
dramatists and philosophers. 
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Motives, Intentions and Deeds 
As we have seen in Chapter Two above, ethical life for Hegel must 
necessarily shape itself in a way that accounts for the needs, wants, 
ambitions etc. - the features of 'subjective freedom' - of its individual 
constituents, otherwise it loses its authority and is prone to internal strife 
and corruption. This is what he refers to as the necessity of 'subjective 
freedom' to find expression in the institutions of a society. Aristotle 
`peopled' Plato's world of the intellect by taking into account, in NE, the 
particular aspects and features of individual agency, especially in his 
discussions of knowledge and ignorance, the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction, and choice. Indeed, Hegel considers this to be a fundamental 
philosophical concern that Aristotle raises, even in relation to more recent 
philosophical considerations. Further to his description of bad conscience 
(see Chapter Five, pp. 266-267 above), Hegel adds (PR #140): 
At one time great importance was attached to the question 
whether an action was evil only in so far as it was done with a 
bad conscience.... The inference from an affirmative answer is 
admirably drawn by Pascal: lls seront tous damnds ces demi- 
pecheurs, qui ont quelque amour pour la vertu. Mais pour ces 
franc-pecheurs, pecheurs endurcis, pecheurs sans melange, 
pleins et achev6s, 1'enfer ne les tient pas; ils ont trampe le 
diable ä force de s'y abandonner. [Let us have none of these 
half-sinners, with some love of virtue; they will all be damned. 
But as for these avowed sinners, hardened sinners, 
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unadulterated, complete and absolute sinners, hell cannot 
hold them; they have cheated the devil by surrendering to 
him]. 21 
In a footnote to this, Hegel takes Pascal to task for not following his point 
through: 
In the same context, Pascal also quotes Christ's intercession 
on the Cross for his enemies: 'Father, forgive them, for they 
know not what they do' -a superfluous prayer if the fact that 
they did not know what they did made their action innocent 
and so took away the need for forgiveness. Pascal quotes 
there too Aristotle's distinction (Nic. Eth. 1110 b24) between 
the man who acts O OK EL&bg and the one who acts cryvowv 
in the former type of ignorance, his action is not freely willed 
(here the ignorance depends on external circumstances... ) 
and his action is not imputable to him. But of the latter 
Aristotle says: 'Every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought 
to do and what he ought to refrain from doing; and it is this 
kind of failure (äNapria) which makes men unjust and in 
general bad.... An ignorant choice' between good and evil is 
the cause not of the action's being involuntary' (of being non- 
imputable) 'but only of its being wicked'. Aristotle evidently 
had a deeper insight into the connexion between knowing and 
willing than has become common in a superficial philosophy 
21 Pascal, The Provincial Letters tr. A. J. Krailsheimer (Penguin, 1967), letter iv. 
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which teaches that the opposite of knowledge, the heart and 
enthusiasm, are the true principles of ethical action. 22 
Ethical Action, for Hegel, involves the conscious knowing of the agent, 
practical knowledge in relation to the circumstances in which a person acts, 
and not merely willing the good. In difficult and problematic circumstances, 
resorting to a reliance on the good will alone is, for Hegel, an easy 
philosophical way out of the problem, just as in a particular Action a person 
can find "... good reasons, a justification in his own eyes for the evil he 
does, because he can use these reasons to pervert its apparent character 
from evil into good" (PR #140). That is, knowing my deed to be wrong, I 
can plead that nevertheless my intentions were good. This, after all, is one 
of the possibilties of conscience. 
With Aristotle's detailed analysis of the details of purposive Action, what we 
in fact see, I suggest, is very much what Hegel is saying about self- 
conscious Action. It is easy enough, in analysis, to draw a distinction 
between the motives, intentions, etc. - the 'subjective' elements - of a 
deed, and the deed itself, but it is precisely the lack of this distinction that is 
the mark of an ethical Action: in the person who acts with true and full 
virtue (arete), not only are desires and rational principle in complete 
harmony, but also the motives and intentions are in complete harmony with 
what motivates and what is intended, i. e. the deed. With the merely 
continent (enkratic), a distinction arises in that he desires other than what 
he considers ought to motivate him, the Action that he ought to bring 
about, but in the fully virtuous such distinctions do not arise: because of the 
22 Hegel sees this reference to the heart and enthusiasm' as only a slightly different form of 
the view that willing the good is adequate for an Action to be good. See Chapter Five p. 
243 above. 
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character that he is, he just acts. In a sense, his character is a second 
nature, developed by habit, something captured for us admirably by 
Bradley: 
The character shows itself in every trifling detail of life; we can 
not go in and amuse ourselves while we leave it outside the 
door with our dog; it is ourself, and our moral self, being not 
mere temper or inborn disposition, but the outcome of a 
series of acts of will. Natural it is indeed well to be; but that is 
because by this time morality should be our nature, and good 
behaviour its unreflecting issue; and to be natural in any 
sense which excludes moral habituation is never, so far as I 
know the world, thought desirable. 23 
To the 'perversion' that 'What is natural does not reflect, and without 
reflection there is no morality.... where we are natural because we do not 
reflect, there we can not be moral', Bradley replies: 
But here it is forgotten that we have reflected; that acts which 
issue from moral reflection have qualified our will; that our 
character thus, not only in its content, but also in the form of 
its acquisition, is within the moral sphere; and that a 
character, good or bad, is a second nature. 24 
-'-ý13 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies pp. 217 - 18. Julia Annas, in The Morality of Happiness 
(Oxford, 1993) p. 126, uses this passage to a similar purpose. Rightly protesting the 
neglect of Bradley's work on ethics in Anglo-American philosophy, Annas comments: 
'Bradley's own brilliant account of ethics owes much to the leading ideas of ancient 
ethics... ' (footnote 5, p. 4. ). 





did not have a name corresponding to what we refer to by these terms, but 
I am arguing that his discussion of the details of purposive Action very 
much constitutes what self-conscious activity amounts to. But this much 
needs to be kept in mind here: in discussing self-consciousness, I am not 
aiming to define the concept, but rather I am looking to the logic of the 
particular details of human conduct which constitute the concept. Self- 
consciousness, that is to say, is not something that is distinct from the way 
in which it is manifested, and thus self-conscious, purposive Action cannot 
be defined without reference to the particular details which acting involves. 
In this sense, self-conscious activity, knowing what one is doing, is 
something that we develop as individuals through developing a practical 
understanding of the social environment in which we act. 
For Aristotle education aims at freeing individuals from being governed 
solely by their feelings and desires, and to be receptive to argument, 
... because the man who 
lives in accordance with his feelings 
would not listen to an argument to dissuade him, or 
understand it if he did. And when a man is in that state how is 
it possible to persuade him out of it? In general, feelings 
seem to yield not to argument but only to force (NE 1179b26- 
29). 
Similarly for Hegel education is a liberation of sorts, and 
... this 
liberation is the hard struggle against pure subjectivity 
of demeanour, against the immediacy of desire, against the 
subjectivity of feeling and the caprice of desire (PR #187). 
Education is the art of making men ethical. It begins with 
pupils whose life is at the instinctive level and shows them 
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the way to a second, intellectual nature, and makes this 
intellectual level habitual to them (PR #151[Al). 
The distinction that Aristotle makes between argument and force is central 
to rational agency. The person who understands an argument is one who 
understands what is being said in terms other than merely debarring him 
from fulfilling certain desires at any given moment in time. The argument 
will show him that, e. g. to do this at this point in time, would not be good, 
wise, prudent, etc. and, depending on the strengths of the argument, an 
educated person will agree with that argument, and act accordingly 
(excluding the phenomena of akrasia). 
There are two important points here. Firstly, the argument refers to the 
universal character of the Action, i. e. to those factors (relating to goodness, 
wisdom, prudence, etc., i. e. acting well) which do not refer to the fulfilling of 
this desire, here and now (i. e. it may not be bad, unwise imprudent, etc. to 
fulfil the desire at another time). That is, when someone says that it would 
not be wise, prudent etc. to do this, he is referring to the wider scope of the 
deed, his point being to show me the practical aspects involved in the light 
of the circumstances of the proposed deed. Secondly, in acting in 
accordance with the argument, the person has himself decided to do so (or 
to refrain from doing something), in virtue of he himself agreeing with the 
argument (i. e. seeing its validity in terms of acting well). The person who 
does not understand the argument, and who lives in accordance with his 
feelings, may be forced not to do such and such, i. e. in this sort of situation 
he does not make a decision - the decision that he should not act is made 
for him. This is reflected in the way in which we bring up children. 
The importance of the example of the person who is receptive of the 
argument is that it takes us on to a much neglected notion of Aristotle's, 
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which is reflected in the aims of education and training: autarkeia, self- 
sufficiency or independence. In discussing flourishing or well-being 
(eudaimonia) Aristotle says this of self-sufficiency: 
It is a generally accepted view that the perfect good is self- 
sufficient. By self-sufficient we mean not what is sufficient for 
oneself alone living a solitary life, but something that includes 
parents, wife and children, friends and fellow-citizens in 
general; for man is by nature a social being .... A self-sufficient 
thing, then, we take to be one which by itself makes life 
desirable [hairetos, choosable] and in no way deficient; and 
we believe that happiness [eudaimonia] is such a thing (NE 
1097b8-16). 
When it comes to questions of well-being or welfare, the child, governed by 
feelings and desires, does not yet have the ability to recognise that which 
is desirable on its own account (rather than being desirable on account of, 
say, the liking of sweet things), i. e. that which is conducive to well-being, 
and such decisions are often made for him by his parents. In this sense the 
child is not yet eudaimon due to his conduct not having the character of 
autarkeia. 
Aristotle's main concern in this passage is to tell us what eudaimonia 
involves, and his interest in autarkeia is to show that eudaimonia has such 
a character as this. In this sense, the passage is about eudaimonia, 
autarkes being secondary. Aristotle doesn't directly draw out a relationship 
between the two with regard to the individual person. It is in the philosophy 
of the Stoics and Cynics - which involve both positive and negative 
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reactions to the outlook of Plato and Aristotle26 that self-sufficiency is 
attributed to individuals directly. However, there are direct references 
scattered throughout Aristotle's ethical writings. 27 By looking closely at what 
Aristotle says about prohairesis in relation to education, the roles that self- 
sufficiency and independence play in self-conscious, purposive Action can 
be elucidated. 
Choice, Well-being and Acting Well 
Choice involves deciding, through deliberation, to do something on a 
particular occasion, which is one way of saying that choice involves 
determining oneself in one way or another. Further, all of this is descriptive 
of an independent Action of, on this occasion, a self-sufficient individual. 
We may take advice, listen to the suggestions of others, but ultimately the 
decision rests with us whether to accept or reject that advice or those 
suggestions. We are self-sufficient and independent in that we take advice 
and suggestions, and do not regard them as demands that we act 
accordingly. Self-sufficiency is not only a characteristic of eudaimonia, it is 
also characteristic of the person who deliberates and chooses which, for 
Aristotle and Hegel, are features of purposive, self-conscious Action, i. e. 
activity upon which eudaimonia or well-being is dependent. 28 
260n Stoicism see J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1969) and A. A. Long Hellenistic 
Philosophy (Duckworth, 1974). 
27See e. g. Magna Moralia 1212b24-1213b2 and Eudemian Ethics 1244b1-20. 
28That eudaimonia or well-being is dependent on deliberative and chosen Action comes out 
of Hegel's observation, discussed in the previous chapter, that good "has in the subjective 
will its only means of stepping into actuality" PR #131. Here Hegel makes a connection 
which Aristotle does not explicitly follow through with regard to eupraxia and eudaimonia in 
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Even though Aristotle doesn't explicitly connect prohairesis, eudaimonia 
and autarkeia in such a way, it is clear that he had something like the 
above in mind. This comes over more clearly in his consideration of what 
individuality consists in. At NE 1168b34 he says: 
... a person is called continent or incontinent according as his 
reason is or is not in control, which implies this is the 
individual. Also it is our reasoned acts that are held to be in 
the fullest sense voluntary and our own doing. Thus there is 
no doubt that this part is, or most nearly is, the individual 
man. 
New-born infants have what we might call basic needs and desires, basic 
in that the child is hungry, thirsty, etc. but has not developed the capacity to 
distinguish what food, what drink, etc. As they develop and begin to 
understand the varieties of foods and drinks available in the world (i. e. the 
world of family and friends) that they inhabit, so they develop the capacity 
to distinguish what they want to eat, drink, etc. Later on in life, children 
consider food and drink in terms wider than, e. g. the pleasure of sweet 
things. Consideration of what is good for them also comes into play, and 
we hope that as they develop this becomes more and more the case. One 
particular aspect of parents' hopes for their offspring is that they will be 
able to make their own choices, that their health will be something that they 
will take care of themselves. This sort of self-sufficiency and independence 
is established by the development of reason, learning about and 
understanding the world in which they live, and how to get on well in that 
world. This, at least, is the aim of social training, education, etc. - it might 
NE although as we shall see in the next chapter there are some interesting considerations in 
Politics. 
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not succeed, but on the whole, parents aim to bring their children up to do 
well in their independent lives. Ideally, the more the voluntary conduct of 
children can become reasoned, chosen conduct in later years, so much the 
better. 
There are numerous areas of life in which we make reasoned choices in 
and about our own lives, and many of these will be our identifying 
characteristics as individuals. In this way we self-determine ourselves, i. e. 
the reasons upon which we act and the choices we make constitute the 
`self we come to be. It is the reasoning, thinking, deliberation about the 
world in which we live and the choices that we make that contributes to our 
social and moral identity. For Aristotle, although, as mortal, we are not 
going to attain the self-sufficiency and independence of the divine, activity 
in accord with practical reason is that which establish us as this person, 
and it is this sort of activity that establishes us as (as far as is possible) 
self-determining, self-sufficient individuals. 
The importance that Aristotle places on education can be seen against this 
background, for the process of education has the eudaimonia of the adult 
the child will become as its ultimate aim, and eudaimonia involves acting 
well. The latter involves reason and choice, which are characteristic of self- 
sufficiency and independence. Education, then, aims to develop in the 
child the ability to make decisions concerning his own welfare, to consider 
the rationality of his Actions and not merely to act according to his desires. 
For the self-sufficient or the independent person, things which are 
conducive to well-being are desirable in and for themselves, and it is his 
ability to recognise this character of Action which is the basis of his own 
decision-making. Similarly, just as the aim of education is to bring about 
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independence in the child, so for instance the driving instructor is looking to 
the pupil being capable of driving self-sufficiently and independently. 
Self-sufficiency, Practical Reason and Social Life 
But that such independence is not equatable with solitariness is something 
that both Aristotle and Hegel are insistent upon. In acknowledging the 
validity of an argument that to do such-and-such would not be a good 
thing, I am acknowledging at the same time that my own well-being is not 
something that I have exclusive insight into, and this is captured in the 
reasons why doing such-and-such would not be a good thing. 29 Such an 
ability to grasp the wider aspects of Action involves establishing what 
Hegel calls a 'second intellectual nature', something that becomes 
'habitual' through the process of education. A similar point is made by 
Aristotle, for contemplation is the high point in self-sufficient activity, 
although contemplation does not hold exclusive rights over it. That is to 
say, although "... happiness (eudaimonia) is a form of contemplation" 
... 
its possessor, being only human [as opposed to being a 
god, who is completely self-sufficient], will also need external 
felicity, because human nature is not self-sufficient for the 
purpose of contemplation; the body too must be healthy, and 
food and other amenities must be available (NE 1178b30-5). 
Self-sufficiency pertains not only to thought, but also to purposive Action 
and practical reason, i. e. the assessment and organisation of how we are 
29This is why both Aristotle and Hegel recommend that education should be taken on by the 
state, c. f. NE 1179b30ff. and PR #153[A], where Hegel dismisses the solitary education 
recommended by Rousseau in Emile. 
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to fulfil the desires and needs that we have in virtue of our being human. 
Putting such practical reason to use involves activities by which such 
needs and desires can be fulfilled, activities which are organised with such 
an end in mind. But it is only through my ability to use practical reason, to 
participate in such activities, that I become an independent, self-sufficient 
person; and I am able to participate in such activities only in that I 
understand the rationality, the universal character of such activities. That is 
to say, it is only in virtue of my knowing that such activities are not 
designed specifically for the fulfilment of my desires and needs, my 
knowing that such activities are designed for others also, that I can 
participate in them. It is only through acting alongside or in conjunction with 
other people that I become independent and self-sufficient, and thus only 
with an awareness of the agency of others, and by doing things as others 
do them, do I become aware of the scope of my own agency. 
Independence or self-sufficiency does not involve being solitary but social. 
The individuality that I have as this person, with such-and-such 
characteristics, indicated by and in the reasoning and choices that I have 
made and do make, arises out of my development and engagement in the 
social context in which I am born and in which I live (see Chapter Two 
passim). 
In Part One of this thesis I illustrated how, for Hegel, such concepts as will 
and freedom defy definition without reference to the way in which they are 
expressed and manifested, in the same way as wants and desires do (as 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five). The same is true of the concept of 
self-consciousness: attempting to define it without reference to the 
315 
particular ways in which it is expressed is an abstract exercise that can 
only result in an abstract conclusion. 
In PR we are dealing with self-consciousness in the sphere of Action and 
ethics, the self-consciousness expressed and manifested in social, moral 
and ethical life. Self-conscious Action, that is to say, is the actuality of 
ethical life - "... self-consciousness has in the ethical realm its absolute 
foundation and the end which actuates its efforts" (PR #142), an allusion 
(also made at #152 and #258) to Aristotle's concept of the unmoved 
mover, moving in a similar fashion as objects of desire: 
There is a mover which moves without being moved, being 
eternal, substance and actuality. And the object of desire and 
the object of thought move in this way; they move without 
being moved. 30 
Self-consciousness takes on different forms, i. e. it 'moves' in various 
particular ways according to its object: seeing and hearing involve the 
awareness of seeing and hearing, perceiving and thinking an awareness of 
perceiving and thinking (NE 1170a29 - 30). The ultimate form of self- 
consciousness is this 'thinking of thinking' that, for Aristotle, is the divine 
element in us (NE 1177b29 - 30), and which for Hegel is philosophy, "... or 
Spirit that knows itself as Spirit, [which] has for its path the recollection of 
the Spirits as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the 
organization of their realm" (PG #808), i. e. the thinking that is involved in 
the various ways in which self-consciousness expresses and manifests 
30 Metaphysics 1072a25. 
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itself. In the study of ethics, philosophy is concerned with self- 
consciousness in the needs, desires and reasoning that express 
themselves in the social, historical, cultural and political environment in 
which we live. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have developed several themes in Aristotle and Hegel to 
argue that Aristotle's analysis of Action - in terms of the 
voluntary/involuntary distinction, choice, character and habituation through 
the education and training that forms part of social life - can be accounted 
for in terms of self-conscious Action. The aim has not been to establish a 
definition of Action and self-consciousness in order to show the relations 
between thought and particular instances of Action. This would suggest 
that thought and Action are distinct phenomena, raising questions about 
the nature of the relations that hold between them. Consequently, 
philosophers have sought to find relations which might account for the 
move from thought to Action, in the form of causality, compulsion based on 
logical inference and, in moral considerations, principles or theories that 
come between thinking and doing. However, considering the nature of self- 
conscious, purposive Action, the question as to what moves us is in fact a 
peculiar one. 
Certainly, self-conscious Action can and does show, express, manifest a 
distinction between thought and Action, i. e. as self-consciousness, but this 
is in situations where problems arise and the question 'What shall I do? ' 
arises. This sort of self-consciousness also arises in cases where we don't 
know what the right thing to do is, in cases of akrasia, and in cases of 
continence. But self-consciousness is for the most part expressed and 
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manifested in the `moral self that Bradley speaks of, i. e. habituated 
character that is developed out of education, training, observation, 
reflection and deliberation - the process and development of a practical 
understanding of the social circumstances in which we live and act. In right 
desire and ethical Action there is no relation between thought and Action, 
what I want and what I want to do, for there is no distinction that requires 
explanation in terms of relations. 
The distinctions that we make in analysis, that is to say, often complicate 
matters when we allow ourselves to attribute those distinctions too readily 
to the actual subject matter under analysis. In Chapter Two above I 
discussed the distinction that is drawn between individual and society as a 
whole in terms of Hegel's account of ethical life. A similar distinction has 
marked many commentaries on Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia. This, 
I shall argue in the next chapter, is based on the confusion resulting from 
the way in which we can be mislead by our own thinking. 
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7. EUDAIMONIA AND ACTION 
Introduction 
In this chapter I shall take a closer look at the concept of eudaimonia 
and some of the treatments it is afforded by modern commentators. 
This, along with akrasia, is perhaps one of the areas where Aristotle's 
thought finds most problems in being accepted into modern thinking. 
However, as we shall see, it is not at all clear that the problems are 
Aristotle's, but rather due to perspectives with metaphysical and 
epistemological baggage inherited - consciously or not - from 
Descartes, Hume and Kant. This comes over not only in claims made 
about the nature of Aristotle's arguments and the philosophy of mind 
that we get in NE, but also in modern considerations of the raison 
d'etre of the state and its relation to individual agents. If care is not 
taken in respect of these last two points we can find ourselves not only 
misled, but also failing to benefit from insights of Aristotle's which are 
highly pertinent to modern ethical life. These insights can be 
illuminated by considering the relationship between eudaimonia and 
eupraxia which I shall explore in the later part of the present chapter. 
The problem with modern interpretations of Aristotle's concept of 
eudaimonia is something like this: Actions are the acts of individual 
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agents, and if eudaimonia is the end of Action then it must be related 
to the will - motives, desires, intentions - of those individual agents. 
Thus eudaimonia is a feature of the individual will. The problem for 
Aristotle, according to this reasoning, is moving from an individualistic 
conception of eudaimonia to a wider-ranging, objective, universal, 
meaning for the term, and yet the argument for eudaimonia insists that 
we retain the direct relationship between eudaimonia and the will of the 
individual. ' 
This is only a bare outline of the problem: what Aristotle says here has 
implications for a whole range of other ethical concepts. Aristotle 
spends much time showing us what is required for virtuous Action, but 
all those requirements ultimately rest on the character of individual 
agents. Again, autarkeia -a concept central to eudaimonia - lends itself 
easily to individualistic interpretation: how can such a concept relate to 
anything but to the individual who is autarkeia? Many of the most 
important (and interesting) of Aristotle's arguments and points rely on 
his invoking the 'right' or 'rational' principle - e. g. his discussions of 
1 In his 'Two Conceptions of Happiness', The Philosophical Review 88 (1988) R. Kraut 
says of Aristotle that "Roughly, he insists on an objective and stringent standard, 
whereas our test is more subjective and flexible". p. 167. However, I shall argue here, as 
I have in Chapter Two in relation to Hegel, that this apparent dichotomy is 
misconceived, a misconception based on an unquestioned, pre-supposed hard and fast 
distinction between individual wants and desires, and the public, objective, ethical realm 
in which those wants and desires are expressed in Action. Further, if 'stringent 
standard' is understood to be the adherence to stringent rules, then this runs counter to 
Aristotle's thought: ethics and Action, for Aristotle, is not about following rules and laws, 
in that this does not capture the nature of human conduct, and further that ethical 
studies cannot produce, or'discover', stringent rules and laws. 
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akrasia, the voluntary/involuntary distinction, prohairesis, right desire, 
etc. - but he fails, it is said, to give us a clear picture of what he means 
by this. Certainly Aristotle wants us to take on a broad meaning for 
eudaimonia but, for modern critics, it is difficult to see how we can get 
away from the narrow, individualistic level. 
Activity and Social Life 
Although it is a well-established principle amongst commentators on 
ancient thinkers that a shift of focus is required to grasp what is going 
on in Aristotle and others, that the theoretical frameworks of modern 
thinking and those of the ancients differ greatly, in the course of 
discussing eudaimonia I want to illustrate how this principle is not taken 
as seriously as it ought to be taken, and that it ultimately fails to find a 
place in much of the debate. Further, this will throw into question the 
assumption that this need to adjust our thinking somehow bears 
witness to the falsity of the ancients' vantage point. Rather I shall 
suggest that identifying this difference between those outlooks is itself 
an important contribution to current debate. 
Activity: a natural principle 
In particular, there are two specific claims that Aristotle makes which 
illustrate this. The first concerns his claim that there is an intrinsic 
relation between human existence and human activity, a relation he 
refers to as a 'natural principle'. By this he means that it is an aspect of 
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the nature of humankind, and this leads to the second claim that tends 
to be ignored in many analyses: that man is by nature a social and 
political creature. 
With regard to Aristotle's starting point, the first thing we need to note 
is the relation between activity and human life in general. He says 
... existence 
is to everyone an object of choice and love, 
and we exist through activity (because we exist by living 
and acting); and the maker of the work [that results from 
activity] exists, in a sense, through his activity. Therefore 
the maker loves his work, because he loves existence. 
This is a natural principle; for the work reveals in actuality 
what is only potentially (NE 1168a5-10). 
Taken on its own, 'existence' is an abstract category, a category which, 
applied on its own, carries little meaning. In this sense 'existence' is an 
abstract noun form of 'to exist', but even here particular, actual 
instances of 'to exist' are needed if 'to exist' is to convey any meaning. 
By 'particular, actual instances of "to exist" ' is meant the way in which 
the subject exists, . e. g. the activities that make up its existence if it is a 
living thing. For animals to exist is to do just that - they exist in actually 
eating, drinking, etc. For human beings existence becomes a potential, 
i. e. it is a question of eating and drinking what, where and when. Even 
with the senses, there is choice in what, e. g., we see and hear (art and 
music). Thus existence is an object for us in that it is a matter of 
choosing how to fulfil that existence, i. e. the activities which we 
participate in in our living. For human beings existence does not mean 
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merely breathing, eating, drinking, sleeping, etc. (although there are 
philosophers and scientists who think this to be the case), but also the 
possible activities through which we might exist. Activity, to paraphrase 
Aristotle, reveals in actuality what is only potentially. 
Consider desires. We might say humans and other non-human 
animals share certain needs and desires in common - eating, drinking, 
sleeping, procreating, etc. And this is certainly the case. But as we look 
closer at the particular ways in which those needs and desires are 
fulfilled, and at what is required to fulfil them, differences appear 
between species. Thus, on an abstract level, all animals have basic 
needs and desires in common, but as we get down to a more concrete 
and practical level, differences appear which are significant to the 
activity, survival and well-being of the particular species. This is the 
case even within species: as a human being I have the 'same' needs 
and desires as other human beings, but differences appear when 
accounting for my constitution, health, environment, etc. The more we 
move from the abstract to the concrete, the less value the truism of the 
proposition that animals (including humans) share basic needs and 
desires holds. 
One way of stating the difference, as has been done in various 
previous chapters, would be to refer to the will, choice, intention, 
present in the fulfilling of a human being's desires. But this does not 
directly capture Aristotle's point about potentiality and activity. 
However, another way of stating the difference is that, in general, there 
is a more direct relationship between an animal's activity and the 
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fulfilling of its desires, whereas human desires more often than not 
involve often quite complex means by which they are fulfilled. Indeed, 
this is often a necessity for man, as in the example Hegel gives of 
"... the necessity [for man] of cooking his food to make it fit to eat" (PR 
#190[A]). The reasoning involved in thinking and acting in terms of 
means and ends represent potential and actual ways in which desires 
can be and are fulfilled. Thus, although species share common needs 
and desires, the activities involved in fulfilling them indicate important 
differences when we apply ourselves - whether in our analyses or in 
our treatment of theme - to particular species. 
The point that I make here is a logical one, relating to needs and 
desires, the ends or objects by which they are directed, and the means 
employed in their fulfilment. We might again, as in Chapter Five above 
(pp. 247ff. ), be tempted here to invoke Hume's 'Reason is ... the slave 
of the passions', but note that these passions/desires are often had 
only because they are attainable by way of reasoned activity, and that 
these means - rational activities - are often desired for their own sake, 
e. g. cooking, and not merely for a further end, e. g. eating. Thus the 
activity itself becomes the cause of the desire, rather than the desire 
2 And in the purpose of our analyses in relation to our treatment of them, e. g. it might 
be argued, in a Cartesian fashion, that humans and animals are fundamentally distinct 
in that the latter have no soul, and thus cannot feel pain, so the way in which we treat 
them is morally insignificant. This is not the place to go into such a debate, apart from 
to point out that to use differences for the purpose of such views is both logically and 
ethically suspect. This is a point that Mary Midgely makes in her discussion of the 
notion of 'speciesism' in Animals and Why They Matter (Penguin, 1983). See esp. 
Chapter 9. 
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being some sort of non-rational phenomena that causes us to act, 
although I will be the cause of my fulfilling that desire. 3 
The modern tendency to regard desires as arising exclusively from 
some sort of internal stirrings of individual human beings fails to note 
this last point, and consequently Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia as 
the end of Action becomes difficult to assimilate. A not too dissimilar 
point is made by Sarah Broadie in her Ethics with Aristotle: 
We should notice that the argument [for eudaimonia] 
itself does not operate with the notion of a human self 
whose interests might conflict with the interests of 
another, or of the citizens at large. The dramatis 
personae of this argument are not you, I, we or they, but 
roles or functions. The aiming which is the central notion 
of the argument is not intending, seeking, or purposing in 
a psychological sense. Only human individuals 'aim' in 
that sense, and the aim may vary depending on the 
motive. But Aristotle's argument attaches aims and ends 
to those abstract entities crafts, activities, practices, 
projects. They cannot have motives, and the 'aim of each 
is defined by the end whose achievement is the mark of 
success for that kind of craft, activity, etc. 4 
3 For a discussion of the over-simplification involved in causal analyses of Action, see 
Chapter Six above. 
4 S. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford, 1991) p. 16. 
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The point that Broadie makes here is that the argument for eudaimonia 
does not operate on the assumption that human beings are first and 
foremost isolated (by conflicting and competing interests) individuals, 
but rather on the basis of the active and social nature of their 
existence. The view that humans are fundamentally individual, as I 
have argued throughout Part One of this thesis, is a modern prejudice 
based on the epistemological and metaphysical framework of the 
rationalist/ empiricist debate. It is specifically the notion of a human self 
based on this prejudice that Aristotle does not operate on for (as we 
shall see shortly) it is not the case that he does not have any notion of 
the human self. 
Modem Preconceptions 
There is a clear tendency in modern interpreters to retain 17th and 18t' 
Century metaphysical and epistemological precepts in their reading of 
Aristotle. 5 This comes over particularly forcefully in discussions on the 
relationships between desires, perception and rationality. These tend 
to involve, in one way or another, viewing reason as something we 
have over and above, 'added on to', our animal desires and faculties, 
rather than something that pervades all aspects of our lives. Consider 
a question raised by Nagel in his 'Aristotle on Eudaimonia': 
5 For a similar theme, see Hursthouse's review of Engberg-Pedersen's Aristotle's 
Theory of Moral Insight in 'Moral Habituation', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy vol. 
vi (1988) pp. 201-19. 
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If digesting, for instance, is something a clam does, why 
is it not something a human does as well - and something 
to do which is part of being human, even though it does 
not require effort? 6 
The answer to Nagel is that we cannot accept this picture, because it is 
a picture of human-being-as-clam. That is to say, we do not merely 
digest, for there are a host of factors present before we consider 
putting something into our mouths - digestible or not - which are not 
present in the nutritional processes of a clam. Certainly a physician 
may be able to point out a digestion process that might be conceptually 
compared with that of a clam. But the physician is interested in the 
digestion system of his patients in terms of what is digested, how much 
is digested and how it is digested - i. e. those factors that pre-figure 
consumption. Failure to take this point from Aristotle leads to 
comments such as: 
Food, for example, is an external good, and the only thing 
that could count as the proper use of food is eating it. 7 
For us, the proper use of food is not merely the eating of it, but eating it 
appropriately, eating well (appropriate and well according to our own 
health, constitution, social and economic circumstances, etc. ). 
6 In Phronesis, vol. xvii (1972), p. 254. 
7 R. Heinaman, 'Eudaimonia and Self-sufficiency in the Nicomachean Ethics', 
Phronesis vol. xxx iii/i (1988), p. 49. 
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When we consider desires (e. g. to eat) and their object (food) in 
Aristotelian terms, we see that they cannot be considered in isolation 
from one another, precisely because for us our desires and their 
objects are not isolated from one another. The tendency to consider 
such distinctions as ontologically separable can lead to quite surprising 
results, as we shall come to see shortly. In 'Two Conceptions of 
Happiness' Kraut says, with specious plausibility, 
... a major 
human good is the second-order good which 
consists in the perception that our first-order desires are 
being satisfied. 8 
which leads him to the apparently quite straightforward conclusion that: 
A theory of eudaimonia, in other words, ought to 
harmonize, at least partly, with the way people feel about 
their lives; that is the upshot of our argument linking 
eudaimonia with the perception that one's major desires 
are being fulfilled. 9 
Again, as we shall see, such simplistic treatments of the nature of 
human needs, desires and perceptions are the result of philosophical 
abstraction rather than being based on the way things actually are; 
missing the complexities of those needs, desires, perceptions, in 
comparison with those of non-human animals; regarding needs, etc. in 
the abstract. The observation that 'Human and non-human creatures 
8 Op. cit., p. 173. 
9 Ibid., p. 175. 
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have needs etc. in common' is clearly true, but this is uninformative 
about the nature of those needs so long as we fail to state whether we 
are talking about the needs of clams or sheep or human beings, etc. In 
failing to refer to the latter, needs etc. become philosophical 
abstractions, unrelated to the way things actually are for clams, sheep, 
human beings. (Leaving aside the merits/demerits of adopting such a 
perspective, any claim that Aristotle's views are being discussed is 
invalidated immediately, for Aristotle's concern for needs, etc. is in 
relation to the proper functioning of that whose needs are under 
consideration. ) In such analyses, reason is set aside as some sort of 
extra appendage, distinct from needs and desires, rather than 
pervading those needs and desires. That human needs are pervaded 
by reason is a point which Hegel makes well: 
An animal is restricted to particularity. It has its instincts 
and means of satisfying them, means which are limited 
and which it cannot overstep. Some insects are parasitic 
on a certain kind of plant; some animals have a wider 
range and can live in different climates, but there is 
always a restriction preventing them from having the 
range open to man. [Man has] The need of shelter and 
clothing, the necessities of cooking his food to make it fit 
to eat and overcome its natural rawness... Intelligence, 
with its grasp of distinctions, multiplies these human 
needs, and since taste and utility become criteria of 
judgement, even the needs themselves are affected 
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thereby. Finally, it is no longer need but opinion which 
has to be satisfied-The very multiplication of needs 
involves a check on desire, because when many things 
are in use, the urge to obtain any one thing which might 
be needed is less strong, and this is a sign that want 
altogether is not so imperious (PR #190[A]). 'ß 
Human needs are not some sort of non-rational phenomena, reason 
coming along in order to secure fulfilment. Rather, we have rational 
needs and desires, rational in that we develop different ways of 
sheltering and clothing ourselves, different foods and various ways in 
which to procure and prepare them, according to the purposes 
determined by tastes, usefulness, opinions, etc. These purposes, and 
the means of procurement, involve further needs and means, such that 
there is a whole complex of needs. However, within all of this, the 
concept of need being employed has been transformed, in that the 
needs that we are talking about no longer have the sense of necessity 
(as that which attaches to, e. g. the need to eat), but rather derives its 
sense from the ways in which we have chosen, e. g. to eat when, what, 
and how much. 
10 In the Cambridge edition Wood ends this passage with "... this is a sign that 
necessity [Die Not] in general is less powerful". 'Necessity' expresses the development 
of Hegel's argument (though of course 'want is more specific). According to Ilting's 
edition, Hegel entitles the pertinent section 'Sphare der Notwendigkeit und 
Ungleichkeit', Sphere of Necessity and Difference, and then goes on to discuss the 
'System Des Bedurfnisses', System of Needs. Karl-Heinz Ilting (ed. ) Die Philosophie 
Des Rechts Klett-Cotta (1983), #89-93. #93 compares the needs of man and animals 
(Tier und Mensch). 
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Needs, Desires, Reasoning and Perception 
The same point that Hegel makes about the transformation of needs is 
made by Aristotle in his consideration of 'external' goods throughout 
NE, goods that are not needs in the sense of necessary (e. g. to stay 
alive), although some amount is necessary for eudaimonia. The 
subject of ethics is concerned with living well, and not merely staying 
alive, and it is precisely in relation to living well that needs and desires 
are relevant. The needs and desires pertaining to eudaimonia are not 
related to mere survival, but to the sorts of ways in which we go about 
being eudaimon. Indeed it is surprising how many commentators on 
Aristotle miss this point: the desire that Aristotle is concerned with is 
right desire; the desire to, e. g. eat, is neither right nor wrong, good nor 
bad. " Both Aristotle and Hegel say that reason distinguishes man from 
animal, but again this is stated at too abstract a level and needs more 
concrete expression. Thus, we might say: one of the ways in which 
humans and animals differ, is in the reasoning involved in the fulfilment 
of the desires that we have in common, as well as those desires that 
are different. 
Again, Kraut's idea that a 'major human good' involves perceiving that 
we are satisfying or fulfilling our desires ('first order or any other 
'order') is an oddity, its oddness resulting from the misleading use of 
'perception' and desire-satisfaction. The satisfying of a desire is itself a 
II 'Right desire' is discussed in Chapters Four and Five above 
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rational process, involving a particular way, amongst other ways, of 
doing so; there is not, in general a single phenomenon 'satisfying a 
desire'. In that our fulfilling of our desires is pervaded by particular 
intentions, choices, preferences, calculations (e. g. how beneficial 
something is), in the execution, we do not need to 'perceive' ourselves 
(whatever this may mean) doing so. What we perceive are the 
particular details that this way of doing so involves, not some abstract 
and removed perception of our doing so. Perception itself is pervaded 
by reason in the experience of perceiving, i. e. the whys and wherefores 
of the perceptual experience. The crucial passage here comes at NE 
Book IX. 9: 
A man who sees is aware that he is seeing, a man who 
hears that he is hearing, and a man who walks that he is 
walking; and similarly in all our other activities there is 
something that is aware of them, so that if we perceive, 
we perceive that we are perceiving, and if we think, that 
we are thinking. 
To be conscious that we are perceiving or thinking is to 
be conscious of our existence(NE 1170a29-32) 
Aristotle's contextual point here is that this consciousness contributes 
to the good (and, presumably, bad) of our experiences, which is to say 
that our experiences are good (or bad) in virtue of the nature of our 
experiences, and such consciousness is a feature of the rationality of 
those experiences. Clearly any grey area is located in how we are to 
understand Aristotle's aisthanesthai, generally translated as 'to 
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perceive' but above universally translated in terms of consciousness or 
awareness. But the idea that Aristotle uses aisthanesthai here in terms 
of the simplistic sense of perceiving ourselves as we perceive objects 
at a distance is implausible. For Aristotle, perception is not a non- 
rational process whereby objects impress upon the retina, reason 
coming along to assimilate what is seen. Perceiving is itself a rational 
experience, rather than an experience which is rationalised. Aristotle 
makes this clear in De Anima at 424a17 - "... concerning all perception 
it must be understood that the perception is the reception of form 
without matter". 12 
The important point in all of this is that Aristotle is talking about the 
goodness of life itself in virtue of the nature of our experiences, rather 
than the perception of certain experiences (fulfilling desires) being a 
good amongst others. Reason is not something that is ontologically 
separate from desires, but rather runs through our experiences in the 
fulfilling of our desires and needs. This is captured nicely for us by 
Broadie in her discussion of theoria (a particular way of employing 
reason) in relation to eudaimonia: 
... 
far from recommending a retreat from life on the 
ordinary, practical level, Aristotle asks that it be lived with 
12 De Anima Tr. H. Lawson-Tancred (Penguin, 1986). This point - i. e. 'the reception of 
form without matter - taken together with his claim that man's better part, the 
intellectual, is the divine in us, suggests grounds for thinking that Aristotle has more 
dualist sympathies than current mainstream interpretation allows, in that nous is not 
reducible to the material and to individual desire satisfaction. The latter point will be 
raised later in the current chapter. 
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a different emphasis. So continuities between theoria and 
everyday existence tell in favour of his enterprise; as, for 
example, the fact that theoria is already a natural human 
activity, and we engage in it almost all the time without 
decision and probably without being able to help it. As he 
says at the beginning of the Metaphysics, 
All men by nature reach out for knowledge [or: understanding]. An 
indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart 
from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all 
others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even 
when we are not going to do anything, we prefer sight to almost 
everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes 
us know and brings to light many differences between things 
(980a21-7) 
This more-than-practical interest in our surroundings and 
in each other is already theoria. 13 
Not only is it the case that desire and reason are inseparable, but the 
point runs through to Aristotle's conception of practical life and reason. 
To miss out on this, is to miss out on the basis upon which Aristotle's 
discussion of eudaimonia takes place. 
130p. cit., p. 424. 
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The Character of Selfhood 
The idea that good and evil refer specifically and foremostly to 
individual agents and their desires - i. e. that good and evil are 'in' us 
rather than in what we do as rational agents - runs alongside the 
tendency in much modern philosophical debate (particularly in 
rationalistic conceptions of ethics and neo-Humean theories of 
motivation) to view individual agents, and their reasonings and desires, 
as - somehow or other - entities or phenomena distinct from the world 
in which they engage. Questioning such an assumption is not to deny 
that the sphere of feelings and thought and the sphere of Action can 
be distinct (as opposed to are distinct, a point I make with regard to 
reason and desire in Chapter Five above) from one another - having 
feelings and thoughts is different from acting - but feelings and 
thought, rational desires, involve reference to the world in which we 
live in the fulfilling of desires, i. e. acting, and the possibilities that the 
world holds are more often than not motivating factors in the feelings, 
thoughts and desires that we have. 
That is to say, a rational desire is one that is possible to fulfil in Action, 
and this involves engaging in the world. Feelings and thought are, 
generally, about the way we live our lives, the things that surround us 
and how they affect us, and what it is that the people we live amongst 
get up to. Herein lie the objects of many of our desires: those objects 
of desires have a place within the sphere of Action, and it is precisely 
because of this that we have the feelings and desires and thoughts 
that we do. Rational desires are about the possibilities that the 
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customs, habits, ethos of the social environment in which we engage in 
our Actions offer-14 
Here we need to look more closely at the claim of Broadie's that 
Aristotle's argument for eudaimonia does not operate with the notion of 
a human self. The argument certainly doesn't operate with a notion of 
the self with the emphasis placed on the agent as an isolated 
individual, a prejudice of modern philosophy which clearly has its roots 
in the Cartesian Cogito and in Humean psychologism. Such a 
conception is fraught with difficulties, particularly in establishing 
whether, and in what way, such a thing exists. 15 
Aristotle's conception of selfhood differs very much from this. 
Throughout Part Two I have argued that many of the conceptions that 
much modern philosophy attributes to its subject matter are, in fact, the 
results of abstract reasoning, rather than being attributes of the actual, 
particular phenomena of the subject matter. In this sense, the 
language of reasoning has taken leave of the subject matter which it 
purports to refer to. Thus, conceptions of reason, needs and desires 
14 Notice that the objects of desires of children and those with learning and mental 
health difficulties are sometimes not possible to attain, and this is why we do not 
consider such desires to be rational. Now this is not to say that those desires are 
therefore irrational; we might say that it is that the environment does not cater for the 
fulfilling of such desires. 
15 Much has been written on this topic. Some of the more interesting discussions are: 
J-P Sartre Being and Nothingness Tr. H. Barnes (Methuen 1969), G. E. M. Anscombe 
'The First Person' in S. Guttenplan ed., Mind and Language (Oxford, 1972), and A. R. 
Manser'Problems With the Self, Presidential address, Proc. Arist. Soc. 1983-4. For an 
interesting and more positive discussion see G. Evans 'Self-Identification' in Varieties of 
Reference (Oxford 1982). 
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are developed by way of abstract thinking, i. e. outside of the social 
contexts in which they are, in actuality, empirically developed. 
Consequently, the language of such thinking becomes specialised to 
the extent that it no longer describes how things are. 
By way of contrast, I have argued that in Aristotle's and Hegel's 
conceptions, reason, desire, choice, agency and character are derived 
from the social, moral and ethical contexts in which, as empirical 
phenomena, they develop. In this analysis, character has played a 
fundamental role throughout, and in Chapter Six we have seen how 
the cluster of concepts that constitute purposive Action is characteristic 
of self-conscious Action. It is the development of self-conscious 
activity, in terms of a practical understanding of our social and ethical 
environment, habituation in activities, practices and customs, and 
reflection that at the same time constitutes the selfhood of character - 
the habituated `moral self that Bradley speaks of (see pp. 305ff. 
above). That is to say, Aristotle and Hegel do not have a conception of 
the self that begins with an abstract definition, but rather arrive at a 
conception through considering the development of the empirical 
phenomena which gives rise to (actual) character and selfhood. 
Eudaimonia, Activity and Eupraxia 
Given the historical roots of modern philosophy in Descartes, Hume, 
and the synthesis in Kant, it is not surprising that an individualistic 
interpretation is thought to be needed if eudaimonia is to have a place 
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in current debate. But this runs counter to a claim that pre-dates the 
Cartesian 'revolution' and which still enjoys much support, i. e. the idea 
that man is by nature social and political. 16 This claim of Aristotle's is 
indeed almost universally acknowledged, but again it fails to gain 
expression in the execution of ethical analysis, which tends to obscure 
the teleological nature of Aristotle's point. Consequently, the majority of 
discussions attempt to reconcile eudaimonia with a personal, 
subjective account of the good and best life, or repudiate Aristotle as 
an egoist or hedonist. 
Eudaimonia and the Individual 
A point that W. F. R. Hardie makes in his paper 'The Final Good in 
Aristotle's Ethics' illustrates this well. Hardie considers a passage from 
NE, which describes eudaimonia in terms of human good in a general 
sense, i. e. in relation to domestic and political science, and a 
statement in Eudemian Ethics which relates to the individual's own 
well-being. "But", he says, 
16 In my discussions of this 1 have concentrated on the social rather than the political 
aspect of this claim of Aristotle's and Hegel's. This relates to my point in footnote 2 to 
Chapter Three, i. e. that to go into a detailed discussion of Hegel's view of the 
structure of the state would be to go beyond the parameters of the thesis. This 
strategy does, however, have the unfortunate consequence of the missed opportunity 
of discussing the similarities - similarities that perhaps even Hegel does not 
acknowledge - between Aristotle's and Hegel's distinction between civil society and 
the state. This must be left for another occasion. 
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... something should be said at this point about the 
relation between the end of the individual and the greater 
and more complete end of the state. "While it is worth 
while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and 
more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states" (NE 
1094b6-7). This does not mean more than it says: if it is 
good that Smith should be happy, it is even better that 
Brown and Robinson be happy too. 17 
What is worrying about Hardie's rendering of this point is that he 
seems to be emphasising individual end-seeking and desire- 
satisfaction. Immediately after the passage just quoted he states that 
"Individual end-seeking is primary", 18 something that seems to be re- 
affirmed in his later Aristotle's Ethical Theory, stating that political 
institutions exist to "promote the ends and enjoyments of individuals". 19 
Now clearly Aristotle is saying that the state has the task of promoting 
the eudaimonia of individuals, but to read this in terms of individual 
end-seeking and enjoyments can be quite misleading. The 'ends' with 
which the state is concerned are those of the activities and practices 
which are promotional of certain (and not al! ) ends of individual 
members, i. e. those ends which are conducive to myself and others 
being eudaimon. I may have 'ends' which are not conducive to 
eudaimonia, as well as ends which the state is neither positively or 
17 Philosophy vol. xl (1965), p. 281. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Oxford (1980; 2nd ed. ), p. 19. 
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negatively concerned with at all. This emphasis on individual end- 
seeking thus affects what Hardie wants to make of Aristotle's 
statement at 1094b6-7. 
Hardie wants to restrict the meaning to 'it would be better that Brown 
and Robinson should be happy as well as Smith'. But why should it be 
'better'? The most obvious answer to this would seem to be that the 
greater the number of happy people the better the situation altogether, 
a view that Broadie seems also to hold, saying "the difference is one of 
quantity°. 20 There is no doubt that there is some truth to the greatest 
number principle, but it altogether misses the subtlety of how Aristotle 
sees eudaimonia. The point might be put in terms of it being not a 
question of quantity, but of quality. That it is 'finer and more god-like' is 
indicative of a quality that cannot be reduced to the empirical 
quantification of individual desire-satisfaction, precisely because what 
is of concern to the ends of the state are right desires, and right 
desires relate to living well and not to how many desires can be 
fulfilled. If Smith, living in (i. e. acting in) community with Brown and 
Robinson, is eudaimon, then it is more than likely - as a matter of fact, 
all being social creatures - that Brown and Robinson should be 
eudaimon. Smith may live, through his activity, by stealing the goods of 
Brown and Robinson, but Smith would not be eudaimon in Aristotle's 
sense because he is unjust and, as we are told in Politics 1253a7, it is 
a common view in our perception of what is just and unjust which 
makes for community. Such perception is qualitative, whereas the 
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stealing by Smith, and any pleasure he may get out of it, is a 
quantitative result from desire-satisfaction (e. g. one may be rich in a 
quantitative sense, but not necessarily in a qualitative sense). 21 
As I have already suggested, the 'more is better' characterisation 
results from failing to take seriously the teleological nature of Aristotle's 
claim about the nature of man and his activity, resulting in the idea that 
the state's purpose is to secure (in true utilitarian fashion) the 
maximisation of desire-satisfaction of individual members of the 
community. One of the upshots of Aristotle's teleology is that the state 
is a necessary feature of human life, rather than being merely one way 
(amongst other ways) of ordering needs and wants. For instance, if it 
were desire-satisfaction that we were after, we might well do better if 
we were all assigned 'pleasure machines' which could be programmed 
to fulfil the desires we have at any given time. 22 Whatever such a 
fanciful idea might entail, we would not be talking about human life, for 
it involves ignoring central features of the latter. Aristotle's point that 
man is by nature social is illustrated for us in his analogy of the 
severed or sculptured hand: 
20 Op. cit. p. 16. 
21 A point that leads Aristotle to castigate those who warn us that 'man should think the 
thoughts of man', or'mortal thoughts fit for mortal minds', NE 1177b31-33. Here there 
is a similarity with Hegel (see footnote 16 of the current chapter) on the nature and 
end of the state, i. e. "The march of God [the divine or the rational in us] in the world, 
that is what the state is" (PR #258[A]). 
22 R. Nozick discusses such ideas in Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, 1975), 
chapter 24. 
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Separate hand or foot from the whole body, and they will 
no longer be hand or foot except in name, as one might 
speak of 'hand' or 'foot' sculptured in stone. 23 
A human being who is not, in some way, living a social life is a human 
being in name only, precisely because it is only within a social 
community that a person can act, activity being for us what it is to live 
(which is another way of expressing Aristotle's 'natural principle' at NE 
1168a2-5). The 'needs' which we have in virtue of our 'need' for social 
community are not related so much to desires as to what is desirable 
(hairetos - choiceworthy, rightly desirable), i. e. related to those 
activities which involve acting and living well. Focusing on 'bare 
desires' (so to speak), we can easily overlook Aristotle's right desire, 
thus emphasising individual end-seeking and desire-satisfaction rather 
than the end-seeking of the community as a whole. There is nothing 
intrinsically wrong about the former, but 
... the state 
has a natural priority over the household and 
over any individual among us. For the whole must be 
prior to the parts. 24 
There is no conflict here with Aristotle's claim that the state exists for 
the promotion of the eudaimonia of individual members, precisely 
because eudaimonia relates to individuals as social beings rather than 
the arbitrary desires of this or that individual. 
23 Politics 1253a18. 
24 Ibid. 
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Eudairnonia and Activity 
Hegel makes some remarks which illuminate Aristotle's notion of 
eudaimonia and activity. Consider the following two passages: 
Individuals in their capacity as burghers in this state are 
private persons whose end is their own interest. This end 
is mediated through the universal [i. e. forms of 
association] which thus appears as a means to its 
realisation. Consequently individuals can attain their ends 
only in so far as they themselves determine their 
knowing, willing and acting in a universal way and make 
themselves links in this chain of social connexions (PR 
#187). 
The fact that must direct my conduct by reference to 
others introduces here a form of universality. It is from 
others that I acquire the means of satisfaction and I must 
accordingly accept their views. At the same time, 
however, I am compelled to produce means for the 
satisfaction of others. We play into each others hands 
and so hang together. To this extent everything private 
becomes something social (PR #192[A]). 
Individual members of a state or community are private persons in that 
they pursue their own interests and ends. In doing so, they participate 
in activities which, as possible ways of attaining certain ends, do not 
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relate exclusively to a person's own interests, i. e. they are activities 
which represent possible ways of attaining certain ends for all private 
persons in principle. 25 In Hegel's terms the particular end I pursue is 
mediated through the universal in that I pursue that end through an 
activity which does not exclusively serve my own ends. 
It may perhaps seem a little odd to talk of such 'activities', as 'activity' 
usually refers to the doing of something. But here I am talking about 
what Broadie calls 'those abstract entities crafts, activities, practices, 
projects'. The distinction between the aims of individual persons - in 
the psychological sense - and the aims of activities might be drawn 
thus: in describing what someone is doing we could refer to the activity, 
e. g. driving a car, but the driver's description would more than likely be 
something like 'I am going to the shops/to work/to meet a friend'. 
Generally speaking, driving involves the possibility of getting from A's 
to B's; actual driving involves the motives and particular ends of 
individuals specifying the A's to B's. For sure, it may appear (to repeat 
Hegel's emphasis) that the activity is the individual's own means (i. e. 
he owns the vehicle, has chosen where to go, the route to take, etc. ) to 
serve his own particular end, but it is only through driving in such a way 
that does not relate exclusively to his own ends that he can drive in first 
25 'In principle' notwithstanding i) individuals who have disabilities such that they cannot 
participate in such activities, and ii) certain restrictions that are representative of the 
customs and habits of particular states and communities, restrictions emanating from 
social mores, morality, or restrictions which have been set by way of legislation. Clearly 
these might be seen as concerns for well-being in a very broad sense, but to argue this 
would be to go beyond the scope of the current project. 
344 
instance. 26 Or, as Hegel says, `Individuals can attain their ends only in 
so far as they themselves determine their knowing, willing and acting in 
a universal way'. 
An individual's determining his 'knowing, willing and acting in a 
universal way' does not necessarily mean acting with the personal 
motive 'Act with the well-being of others in mind' (although this 
obviously is a possible personal motive). What it means is that 
personal success in many activities involves knowing and 
understanding that this is attained in such a way that is conducive to 
the well-being and success of others who also participate in that 
particular activity - whether this is a personal motive or not. When we 
consider how a great many activities carried out by individuals relate to 
more general features of life such as commerce, industry, finance, 
education, politics, et al., we can see even more clearly that acting 
from purely personal motives is not necessarily at odds with acting in a 
way which is conducive to the well-being and success of others. 
26See Chapter Six above on learning to drive in relation to this point. Also see J. L. 
Austin's attempt to replace the translation of eudaimonia as 'happiness' with 'success', 
'Agathon and EUdaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle' in J. M. E. Moravcsik (ed. ) Aristotle: 
A Collection of Critical Essays (New York, 1967). Although success is not equatable 
with eudaimonia, it is certainly applicable to it. This comes out of comparing Aristotle's 
views with those of the Stoics. In the Stoical version, eudaimonia involves the element 
of tranquillity (e. g., Cicero, Tusculan Disputations V 16,34,81, and Seneca, Epistles 85 
2,24) gained in carrying out a task in the manner of a master craftsman, 'doing the right 
actions', but success is not a necessary element. For instance, in archery what is 
important is that the bow is handled correctly in terms of tension, taking aim, etc., but 
whether the target is hit is of secondary importance (Cicero discusses archery in De 
Finibus 111 22). For Aristotle, success is required for Acting well. See T. H. Irwin 'Stoic 
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The tendency in modern debates to consider the individual in isolation 
from the social and ethical environment, often results in the analysis of 
Action in terms of act and consequent, 'internal' motivation and 
'external' consequences, falling into arguments about whether the 
important factor is the 'subjective' or the 'objective' aspect of Action - 
as Hegel would have it, a somewhat abstract exercise. However, 
moving away from the pre-conception that ethics is about individual 
desire-satisfaction, the focus of the debate changes. That is to say, 
rather than getting involved in a metaphysics of Action, we begin to 
concern ourselves with Action as a factor in the social community. Yes, 
ethics is concerned with individual Actions (which is quite different from 
individual desire-satisfaction), but individual Actions in terms of acting 
and living well in the social arena in which they take place. 
Consequently what needs to be looked at now is the relationship 
between eudaimonia and eupraxia. 
Eudaimonia and Eupraxia 
In NE Aristotle doesn't directly give us a connection between individual 
Actions and eudaimonia as a whole (whether in terms of a whole 
individual life or the whole of the public realm), a connection which 
Hegel makes in saying that individual Action and the public realm are 
dependent on one another for good. Eupraxia would seem to translate 
and Aristotelian Conceptions of Happiness' in The Norms of Nature (C. U. P., 1986), 
ed. M. Schofield and G. Striker. 
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literally as 'acting well', although it is often rendered as good Action or 
doing well. 27 Good Action and acting well would certainly seem to be 
connected, but it is precisely the relation between 'good' and the 'well' 
of eupraxia that we need to be clear about. As we shall see, clarifying 
this has bearings on how eudaimonia is to be understood. 
Although NE offers little help, Aristotle is much clearer on the topic in 
Politics. Book 7 investigates the question whether the best life is a life 
of contemplation or the 'active' life of practical wisdom, the task being 
to determine the best constitution as it is the constitution which will 
facilitate the best life. This facilitating is pertinent to the community as a 
whole as well as the best life for the individual, for are we 
... to say that 
happiness is the same for the individual and 
for the state, or not. The answer is again obvious: all 
would agree that it is the same (1324a5). 
The practical life involves 'externally acquired goods', the acquisition of 
which is often due to fortune. But Aristotle is keen not to identify good 
fortune (eutuchia) and eudaimonia, for fortune is something that 
happens to us, rather than something that is accomplished by our own 
27 For example, 1140b6-7 in the Penguin edition reads "... in the case of action, .... the 
end is merely doing weir, while F. H. Peters (Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1906) renders 
the passage "... since good action or doing well is itself the end". Ross (Oxford, 1925) 
translates "... good action itself is the end". as does M. Ostwald (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962). 
The Loeb reads "... doing well is itself the end". The essential feature here is that the 
translation carries a fully active sense to it, something that will become clear presently. 
Thus 'doing well' doesn't quite fit the bill, for we can be doing well and be relatively 
inactive -'The patient is doing well'. 
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agency, and eudaimonia is an activity. Again, this goes for both 
individual and state: 
... no man is just or restrained as a result of, or because 
of, fortune. A connected point, depending on the same 
argument, applies with equal force to the state: the best 
and well-doing state is the happy state. But it is 
impossible for those who do not do good actions to do 
well, and there is no such thing as a man's or a state's 
good action without virtue and practical wisdom. The 
courage of a state or its justice, or its practical wisdom, or 
its restraint have exactly the same effect and are 
manifested in the same form as the qualities which the 
individual has to share in if he is to be called courageous, 
just, wise, or restrained (1323b29). 
Here the connection between acting well and eudaimonia is such that it 
is impossible to be eudaimon without acting well. Thus eudaimonia is 
dependent on eupraxia. The latter is not dependent on the former, but 
rather on material circumstances such that eudaimonia is possible at 
all, for 
Let this be our fundamental basis: the life which is best 
for men, both separately, and in the mass, is the life 
which has virtue sufficiently supported by material 
resources to facilitate participation in the actions that 
virtue calls for (1323b36). 
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Thus both acting well and eudaimonia are dependent not only on 
material resources, but also the arrangements that derive from the 
constitution, for 
Obviously the best constitution must be one which is so 
ordered that any person whatsoever may prosper best 
and live blessedly.... (1324a23). 
That is to say, eupraxia (and its related terms) and eudaimonia are 
dependent on an objective state of affairs in order for them to be 
realised, which is another way, of re-stating Aristotle's principle that 
man is by nature social, and that his natural environment is the political 
state. Against this background the idea that eudaimonia is about 
individual end-seeking, or that it is in any way primary, is not so much 
simply wrong as ill-conceived. Clearly Aristotle was concerned for 
individual well-being as well as eudaimonia in general, but if those 
individual end-seekings are going to be instances of eupraxia then 
there needs to be material resources and arrangements that are not 
the result of the individual's own agency. The better the arrangements 
the more self-sufficient the individual, i. e. the more able to participate 
in self-sufficient activities. Contemplation for Aristotle is an ideal, but an 
ideal that can be realised in a well-ordered state, and an ideal in that it 
is the most self-sufficient and, in an important sense, active of 
activities: 
If all this is true and if happiness is to be equated with 
doing well, then the active life will be the best both for any 
state as a whole community and for the individual. But 
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the active life need not, as some suppose, be always 
concerned with our relations with other people, nor is 
intelligence 'active' only when it is directed towards 
results that flow from action. On the contrary, thinking 
and speculation that are their own end and are done for 
their own sake are more 'active', because the aim in such 
thinking is to do well, and therefore, also, in a sense, 
action (1325b14). 
Thinking and speculation are more 'active' in that they are neither 
dependent on things external to their exercise, nor hindered by them - 
activities that are in no way passive. However, as Hegel reminds us, 
The necessities of life must have been supplied (c. f. 
Aristotle Met. 982b22(k)), the agony of desire must have 
vanished; the purely finite interests of men must have 
been worked off.... (ILHP pp. 110). 
Broadie gives us an excellent discussion on the question as to whether 
the best life is contemplative or practical, concluding that 
Since human theoria needs material conditions but 
cannot lift a finger towards obtaining them, human theoria 
in itself is the least self-sufficient activity. But granted the 
material substructure, lovers of theoria are more 
independent than would-be politicians as they need not 
look for special occasions and resources. The practical 
virtues need others as partners and recipients of their 
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exercise ([NE] 1177a30-32), whereas the person of 
theoretic wisdom 'even when by himself can engage in 
theoria, and the better the wiser he is; he can perhaps do 
so better if he has fellow-workers, but still he is the most 
self-sufficient' (1177a32-b1). 28 
Conclusion 
What I have argued here is that by taking the individual agent as the 
starting point for an understanding of eudaimonia we miss much of 
what is going on in Aristotle's argument. This is particularly clear in the 
relation he wants to establish between eudaimonia and Action, 
something I have attempted to expand upon here. Whether we are 
talking about Action in the broader sense, i. e. in terms of activity being 
a 'natural principle', or individual instances of Action, i. e. as issuing 
from individual agents, eudaimonia comes out not as a rigid and 
stringent moral concept which might guide us to the good life, but as a 
feature of, and strived for in, Action. Man is by nature social, and thus 
Action is by nature social, activity being a 'natural principle': it is only 
natural that man is concerned with doing well, as well as with well- 
being. As we have seen, this does not necessarily mean that 
individuals are themselves motivated by the well-being of others as 
well as their own, but that the activities, projects, and practices that we 
participate in involve their success - and the success of individual 
28 Op. cit., pp. 424-5. 
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participants - as their guiding force. This is what doing well involves, 
and Actions which threaten such success come under moral and 
ethical scrutiny out of that very concern for doing well. 
It is failing to take seriously enough the teleological nature of Aristotle's 
account of Action that leads to the interpretation of his views as 
egoistic or hedonistic. This in turn involves modern readers of Aristotle 
relying on Kantian and utilitarian ideas of duty and moral obligation29 
as representing the foundation and efficacy of morality, and to 
consequentialist interpretations of purpose and function. For sure, 
purpose involves means and ends, the sort of purpose sought in the 
question 'To what end did you do that? '; however, the sort of end in 
question is not something that is consequent to the Action, but is a 
feature of Action itself. And so with eudaimonia. 
A major problem for the committed acceptance of Aristotle's 
conception of eudaimonia in modern debate is the quite stringent 
demands made of it by his commentators and critics alike. The bulk of 
material written on the topic concerns itself with a stringent and 
logically coherent theory, or whether Aristotle puts over a consistently 
'comprehensive'30 or compatible31 view. These can only represent 
29 Again we might refer to Hardie, 'The Final Good in Aristotle', as an example of a 
commentator who resorts to such notions. In the final paragraph of his article Hardie 
makes attempts to reconcile Aristotle with Professor D. J. Allan's remark that Aristotle 
"... takes little account of the motive of moral obligation", making some preliminary 
remarks on how self-respect (again emphasising the self-regarding aspect of 
eudaimonia) might be understood as a 'principle of duty'. 
30 E. g. R. Heinaman, op. Cit. 
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attempts to reconcile Aristotle with pre-conceptions which are our own 
and not his. In an important discussion of Aristotle's supposed two 
conceptions of eudaimonia, Gavin Lawrence points out how some 
commentators try to sort out the inconsistencies from this 'two 
conception' account by invoking a criterion of 'value' which is not 
Aristotle's, and that 
... Aristotle's concern 
is explicitly with the question of what 
activities, or weave of activities, constitute the ideal 
human life, and not with the question of what activities a 
human should value, or be "devoted to". 32 
The value that an activity has is not something that we bring along to 
embellish it with; any value an activity may have will be determined by 
the situation in which some sort of activity is called for. The 
circumstances and situations of human affairs are so varied that 
activities cannot be assimilated to rigorous and stringent criteria of 
value and schematized in some sort of ethical hierarchy. That 
Aristotle's concern is primarily for Action and activities, and not what 
we ought to value, is something that might be said of NE as a whole. 
Eudaimonia cannot accommodate such demands for rigour and 
stringency. I say this, however, not to allude to shortcomings in 
Aristotle's thought, but for two very different reasons. Firstly, to make 
such a demand is to ignore something that Aristotle constantly reminds 
31 E. g. AD. M. Walker, 'Virtue and Character' in Philosophy 64,1989.. 
32'Aristotle and the Ideal Life' in The Philosophical Review vol. 102, no. 1 (Jan 1993). 
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us of throughout NE, viz. that the study of ethics can only deliver what 
is for the most part true, and secondly (which I suggest is the basis for 
Aristotle's making the first point) precisely because eudaimonia is not 
strictly speaking a philosophical problem (although it would be absurd 
to suggest that presenting a coherent philosophical account of it is 
problem free), but rather an ethical, i. e. practical problem. That is to 
say, eudaimonia is a problem in that it is something that needs to be 
secured, and the ways and means of doing so are to be sought in 
attention to the practical details of life rather than in philosophical 
analyses. To demand a philosophically rigorous and stringent account 




In this thesis I have argued that a major feature of much 20th century 
Anglo-American moral philosophy is that it rests on an unexamined 
assumption that reason and desire are distinct phenomena. One 
consequence of resting on this distinction is that reason is seen as 
some distinct calculative faculty from whence the authority and 
objectivity of moral rules and principles are, and ought to be, derived. 
As I illustrate in the introduction, on this grounding elaborate theories of 
reasoning, deliberation and judgement are developed to such an 
abstract level that a gulf has developed between moral debate and 
moral life, such that any relationship between what is said and what is 
done is difficult to discern. In contrast to this, I have argued that 
Aristotle's and Hegel's discussions of ethics and ethical life based on 
considerations of purposive Action offer an antidote both to this 
assumption, and to the gulf between moral debate and moral life that it 
entails. This focusing on human activity - as opposed to general rules 
and principles - as ethical considerations helps to provide the lack of 
philosophical psychology that Anscombe complained was missing from 
moral debate in her'Modern Moral Philosophy'. 
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In Part One of the thesis I suggested that the hard and fast distinction 
between reason and desire is an inheritance - often an unconscious 
one - from 17th and 18th century metaphysics and epistemology. In 
Chapter One I traced this theme through the work of Descartes, Locke, 
Hume and Kant, arguing that Descartes' argument for, and the 
responses to, the Cogito rendered human beings as essentially 
individual minds. This is illustrated in the treatment afforded to the 
concepts of reason, will and freedom, viewed by the metaphysics and 
epistemology of the period as faculties, powers or forces possessed by 
individuals. 
In contrast, I have put forward an analysis of Hegel's claim that talk of 
reason, will and freedom without reference to the subjects of 
reasoning, willing and freedom is abstract and one-sided. The error 
consists precisely in the abstracting of these concepts from the 
historical, ethical, social and political context within which those 
subjects are located, the moral and ethical life within which reason, will 
and freedom are expressed. In matters of morality, this abstract one- 
sidedness is seen in notions of social contract and Kant's will that is 
good in itself, notions that have enjoyed a strong foothold in modern 
moral philosophy. 
The contrast that I allude to is Hegel's observation, echoing Aristotle, 
that man is by nature a social and political creature. This involves the 
claim that reasoning and desiring are not faculties, powers or forces 
distinct from our acting in the world. In failing to acknowledge this, I 
have argued in Part Two, the importance of moral habituation and 
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character is overlooked by accounts of Action based on abstract forms 
of reasoning such as causal analysis and logical inference. Such 
accounts again create a gulf between what is said and what is done, 
i. e. it is difficult to reconcile those accounts of Action with what is 
involved in acting in the world. The overall effect is that abstract 
conceptions of reason determine the subject matter, rather than the 
subject matter determining the accounts given. By importing abstract 
and theoretical forms of reasoning into accounts of Action, Aristotle's 
discussion of practical reasoning is often transformed into yet another 
species of abstract, theoretical reasoning, divorced from its proper 
sphere of activity. But, as Aristotle says, "... in the matter of conduct 
truth is assessed in the light of the facts and of actual life; because it is 
in these that the decisive factor lies". That is to say, if our account does 
not accord with the facts and "... conflicts with them we must regard it 
as no more than a theory" (NE 1179a19 - 21). 
Concluding the introduction, I said that the claim that reason is 
historically and socially constituted is implicit in the claim that man is by 
nature a social and political creature. This statement was refined in 
discussions in consequent chapters. Acting involves reasons and 
purposes pertaining to the ethical community in which we live (p. 127), 
which is to say that in our Actions we do not act in a void, but in relation 
to a given situation arising out of the practices, activities, conventions, 
etc. of ethical life (p. 132). The particular contents of our Actions are 
taken from social situations within the context of customs, habits and 
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laws (p. 191), and it is precisely this context out of which the question 
'Ought...? ' arises (pp. 212ff). 
If this is the case then, conjoined with the claim that although the 
distinction between reason and desire can be drawn conceptually, it is 
quite another thing to claim that they are distinct realiter (p. 251), this 
amounts to saying that desire and motivation are themselves 
historically and socially constituted. This again is implicit in the 
statement, reflecting the implications of the analysis in Part Two, that 
when we look closely at the social context of reason and Action, the 
question 'What moves us to Action? ' is a peculiar one (p. 287). 
In the late 20th century the abstract distinction between reason and 
desire has raised answers to this question in the claim that Action 
results from an appropriate conjunction of beliefs and desires. It is one 
thing to have a view or perspective of the world, but something further 
- some sort of force - is required in order to explain the move to act in 
the world. Such a view of motivation has come under attack in the last 
few decades. In his `Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following' McDowell 
illustrates the peculiarity of this question: 
I suspect that one reason they find ... [this claim] obvious 
lies in their explicit adherence to a quasi-hydraulic 
conception of how reason explanations account for 
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action. The will is pictured as the source of forces that 
issue in the behaviour such explanations explain. ' 
In his The Moral Problem Michael Smith claims that such a simplistic 
conception has never been treated seriously by those putting forward 
either strong or weak Humean theories of motivation, 2 but this still 
leaves Jonathan Dancy puzzled as to what precisely a theory of 
motivation based on the conjunction of beliefs and desires amounts to. 
Dancy's problem is that: 
The most striking feature of this account is that no 
justifying reason can be a motivating reason and no 
motivating reason a justifying one. 3 
Dancy's own view of motivation is: 
What motivates agents to action, I propose, and what 
justifies their actions in favourable cases, is what they 
believe, not their believing it. The belief may perhaps give 
their reason, or reveal what their reason was, but it will 
not actually be that reason. ° 
' In Steven Holtzman and Christopher Leich (eds. ), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule 
(Routledge, 1981), p. 155. McDowell's work in this area, along with that of others, has 
produced much debate during the last decade which is still very much alive (see, e. g. 
Jonathan Dancy's Practical Reality, O. U. P 2000). Here I shall confine myself with a 
few brief remarks on how this debate reflects my discussion in Part Two. 
2 Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Blackwell, 1994), pp. 101 - 2. 
3 Why There is Really No Such Thing as The Theory of Motivation' in PAS, 1995, p. 1. 
4 Ibid., p. 15. 
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In arguing that motivation is primarily linked to the particular situation in 
the world in which we act, Dancy is reflecting my claim in Chapter Two 
(p. 127) that acting involves reasons and purposes constitutive of my 
surroundings and environment, and the claim in Chapter Seven that 
desires and their objects are not isolated from one another (p. 327). My 
claim is, however, broader than Dancy's, in that the surroundings and 
environment in which I act are themselves part of an historically 
situated ethical community, and it is such a context within which 
reasons and purposes can be my reasons and purposes. 
However, this raises a question as to how far we can take particularism 
without rendering Action arbitrary and unintelligible (see Introduction, 
footnote 50). 'He did that' is a particular statement, but as an utterance 
it is raised in a context, and that context provides the grounds for the 
description under which 'that' can be called an Action. The 
characteristics of 'that' to which the terms of the description relate are 
the purpose, reason, motive etc. - the basis - of the utterance itself. 
Any meaning and value that such a statement may have are derived, 
not from its logical form, but from the conditions and circumstances that 
brought about its utterance (as I have argued in Chapter Four, on the 
logic of the Action itself rather than an abstract conception of logic). But 
in cases other than when a mundane statement of fact is being uttered 
(which itself would have some context in understanding its utterance), 
there are general descriptive terms that are appropriate to the Action. 
Thus, there are circumstances such that someone's acting well and 
acting badly will raise the utterance 'He did that', and there are a host 
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of more specific, but nevertheless general, terms corresponding to 
`well' and `badly' that are appropriate according to the purposes, 
reasons and motives of the Action. 
In saying this I am claiming, in agreement with Dancy, that only a full 
description of a particular Action makes it both intelligible as an Action 
and provides any grounds for moral judgement. Dancy considers an 
example suggested by Smith in which someone returns a wallet found 
in the street to its owner. Even if we don't have the slightest idea why 
she did it, we already think it is an intelligible thing to do, and we think 
this because it is right. One thing wrong with this, Dancy goes on to 
argue, 
... is the 
idea that if an action is right, it is at least 
intelligible, whatever the agent's reasons for doing it. This 
idea of a sort of intelligibility which prescinds from the 
agent's reasons leaves us with too little to work on. 5 
There are many possible details which would fulfil the description of the 
Action, taking into account the agent's purposes, reasons and motives 
which would cast doubt on whether, given these, giving back the wallet 
was right. Or, as I have argued in Chapter Three, a statement such as 
'Giving back a wallet to its owner' is a general and abstract description 
or type which leaves unspecified whether this particular Action is right 
or wrong, and general and abstract descriptions do not make any 
particular Actions intelligible. As Dancy goes on to to say, 
5 Ibid., p. 4. 
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What we do get from the thought that the action was right 
is that it is at least intelligible that someone should have 
done the action, provided that they did it for the reasons 
that in fact make it right, and understanding them as 
such. (my emphasis). 6 
Here I have only briefly considered the topic of motivation in the light of 
the implications of my discussion in Part Two of this thesis. These 
implications are that when our considerations of Action take as their 
starting point the logic of Action itself, and that involves taking into 
account reasons, desires, character, conscience, knowledge, self- 
awareness, etc. of particular Actions, then the further question of what 
moves us to Action becomes redundant. This amounts to saying that 
general and abstract theories of motivation are not needed, in the 
same way that general and abstract theories of reason and reasoning 
do little to clarify what is involved in moral behaviour. 
In saying this I have argued that both Aristotle's and Hegel's 
discussions of ethics and ethical life, based as they are on 
considerations of Action and mind, are rich sources that can serve as 
an antidote to the temptation to view morality in simplistic terms of rules 
and principles. On the one hand, by looking at morality in terms of the 
family of concepts that constitute philosophical considerations of Action 
and mind, the characteristics of Actions that we are wont to judge can 
be exposed. The generalisation involved in the recourse to rules, 
principles and generalist moral theories subtract these concepts from 
6 Ibid. 
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consideration, and thereby remove the very details upon which moral 
judgements of particular Actions are based. On the other hand, by 
taking into account character and habituation we reveal the social 
context in which particular Actions issue, thereby showing that reason 
and motivation are socially based rather than faculties or powers that 
render human beings as primarily individual by nature, the latter view 
tempting moral philosophers to develop abstract conceptions of reason 
and deliberation in order to overcome that individuality. Again, if we 
take seriously Aristotle's and Hegel's claim that man is by nature a 
social and political creature, then such a temptation is both 
misconceived and unnecessary. And by taking it seriously, I do not 
mean subjecting the claim to analysis according to some sort of 
criterion based on an abstract conception of reason, but by looking to 
what such a claim involves in relation to Action and ethics. 
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